Documentary reality television's privacy problem

<p>Documentary reality television is hugely successful. The genre, which includes shows like Police Ten 7, Coastwatch and Border Patrol, consistently outperforms other television formats and fills free-to-air television schedules. In these shows ride-along film crews and body-worn cameras record agencies as they go about their tasks. Often these agencies are public authorities and their tasks are statutory functions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the genre’s privacy implications. It concludes that the genre is systemically unlawful. It is unlawful because it breaches the privacy rights of involuntary participants. The paper considers the privacy implications by examining the genre against the shared features of the publication tort and the Privacy Broadcasting Standard. Both of these consider that it is a breach of privacy to broadcast material subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, where that broadcast is highly offensive unless there is an applicable defence. While the material broadcast represents the work of agencies, it also represents the personal stories of everyday people going about their lives. Often the moments captured are significant life events and intimate moments for those people. By agreeing to contribute to the genre, agencies agree to broadcast these life events without the active involvement of the participants. Research has also found that this is often occurring without informed consent. While the focus of this paper is on the private law implications of the genre, it identifies that some public authorities’ involvement in the genre may also be ultra vires. The paper finishes by considering why, if the genre is systemically unlawful, people are not suing. It considers that general issues with access to civil justice and the powers of the Broadcasting Standards Authority stand in the way of potential complainants. It finishes by considering some solutions that could improve the situation.</p>

Documentary reality television's privacy problem

<p>Documentary reality television is hugely successful. The genre, which includes shows like Police Ten 7, Coastwatch and Border Patrol, consistently outperforms other television formats and fills free-to-air television schedules. In these shows ride-along film crews and body-worn cameras record agencies as they go about their tasks. Often these agencies are public authorities and their tasks are statutory functions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the genre’s privacy implications. It concludes that the genre is systemically unlawful. It is unlawful because it breaches the privacy rights of involuntary participants. The paper considers the privacy implications by examining the genre against the shared features of the publication tort and the Privacy Broadcasting Standard. Both of these consider that it is a breach of privacy to broadcast material subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, where that broadcast is highly offensive unless there is an applicable defence. While the material broadcast represents the work of agencies, it also represents the personal stories of everyday people going about their lives. Often the moments captured are significant life events and intimate moments for those people. By agreeing to contribute to the genre, agencies agree to broadcast these life events without the active involvement of the participants. Research has also found that this is often occurring without informed consent. While the focus of this paper is on the private law implications of the genre, it identifies that some public authorities’ involvement in the genre may also be ultra vires. The paper finishes by considering why, if the genre is systemically unlawful, people are not suing. It considers that general issues with access to civil justice and the powers of the Broadcasting Standards Authority stand in the way of potential complainants. It finishes by considering some solutions that could improve the situation.</p>

Applying and Developing the Intrusion into Seclusion Tort in New Zealand

<p>As new and intrusive ways of invading a person’s privacy become increasingly common, it is important that tort law has a satisfactory way of protecting a person from intrusion. The case of C v Holland in 2012 created such a protection mechanism, by importing the tort of intrusion into seclusion from the USA. Whereas the first tort of privacy introduced in New Zealand protects the publication of private facts, intrusion into seclusion prevents access to a person even if it does not result in dissemination of any personal information. This thesis explains why protecting the intrusion interest per se is important and uses Kirsty Hughes’ barriers theory, which suggests that privacy should only be protected when a desire for it is communicated or normatively appropriate, to help define the intrusion interest such that it is legally useful. It analyses the elements of an intrusion into seclusion action as suggested by Whata J in C v Holland, and recommends how they could be better constituted. The crux of the thesis though focuses on when a reasonable expectation of privacy is satisfied, a question that received limited attention in C v Holland. This section suggests that determining a reasonable expectation of privacy involves a detailed analysis of three suggested factors, modified from Richard Wilkins’ approach in the US search and seizure context. The thesis considers how the factors could be applied, both separately and holistically, to an intrusion into seclusion claim in New Zealand.</p>

Applying and Developing the Intrusion into Seclusion Tort in New Zealand

<p>As new and intrusive ways of invading a person’s privacy become increasingly common, it is important that tort law has a satisfactory way of protecting a person from intrusion. The case of C v Holland in 2012 created such a protection mechanism, by importing the tort of intrusion into seclusion from the USA. Whereas the first tort of privacy introduced in New Zealand protects the publication of private facts, intrusion into seclusion prevents access to a person even if it does not result in dissemination of any personal information. This thesis explains why protecting the intrusion interest per se is important and uses Kirsty Hughes’ barriers theory, which suggests that privacy should only be protected when a desire for it is communicated or normatively appropriate, to help define the intrusion interest such that it is legally useful. It analyses the elements of an intrusion into seclusion action as suggested by Whata J in C v Holland, and recommends how they could be better constituted. The crux of the thesis though focuses on when a reasonable expectation of privacy is satisfied, a question that received limited attention in C v Holland. This section suggests that determining a reasonable expectation of privacy involves a detailed analysis of three suggested factors, modified from Richard Wilkins’ approach in the US search and seizure context. The thesis considers how the factors could be applied, both separately and holistically, to an intrusion into seclusion claim in New Zealand.</p>

The new intrusion tort: The news media exposed?

<p>In C v Holland, Whata J recognised that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion formed part of New Zealand’s common law. The tort protects against intentional intrusions into a person’s private space. This decision potentially exposes the news media to tortious liability when it engages in intrusive newsgathering practices. However, Whata J’s decision provides little guidance as to how the tort should be applied in later cases. In order to ascertain the meaning of the tort’s formulation, this essay draws upon the methods used, both in New Zealand and internationally, to prevent the news media from breaching individual privacy rights. It then suggests that the courts should replace the formulation with a one-step reasonable expectation of privacy test. It also argues that the legitimate public concern defence should be better tailored to the intrusion context. Finally, it briefly assesses how the intrusion tort should interact with the tort in Hosking v Runting. Ultimately, it concludes that, in future, the courts should reflect more carefully on the precise wording of the intrusion tort’s formulation so that it best vindicates the interests that it was designed to protect.</p>

The new intrusion tort: The news media exposed?

<p>In C v Holland, Whata J recognised that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion formed part of New Zealand’s common law. The tort protects against intentional intrusions into a person’s private space. This decision potentially exposes the news media to tortious liability when it engages in intrusive newsgathering practices. However, Whata J’s decision provides little guidance as to how the tort should be applied in later cases. In order to ascertain the meaning of the tort’s formulation, this essay draws upon the methods used, both in New Zealand and internationally, to prevent the news media from breaching individual privacy rights. It then suggests that the courts should replace the formulation with a one-step reasonable expectation of privacy test. It also argues that the legitimate public concern defence should be better tailored to the intrusion context. Finally, it briefly assesses how the intrusion tort should interact with the tort in Hosking v Runting. Ultimately, it concludes that, in future, the courts should reflect more carefully on the precise wording of the intrusion tort’s formulation so that it best vindicates the interests that it was designed to protect.</p>

14. Invasion of privacy

This chapter discusses different aspects of privacy. It shows that there is no general common law right to protection from invasion of privacy (the so-called ‘right to be let alone’), but that limitation has been largely subverted by the new law in the second section on the protection of personal information and the reasonable expectation of privacy that has developed significantly in recent years. This shows the potential power of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights, and is the subject of considerable controversy, especially in relation to the protection of celebrity privacy. The final section considers remedies in privacy cases.

Legal framework for privacy in technological advanced society

This article will review the genesis of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" ("REP") requirement, both to establish the governing legal framework and to demonstrate how changing technology has altered our conception of the privacy in the past аnd describes the limits and ability of government agents to search for and seize evidence without a warrant

Fourth Amendment Protections of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: Patient Privacy in the Opioid Crisis

The opioid crisis is one of the largest public health problems in the history of the United States. Prescription drug monitoring programs (“PDMPs”)—state databases containing the records of all prescriptions for controlled substances written in the state—have emerged as a means to track opioid prescribing and use. While PDMPs are typically used as a tool for physicians to inform their prescribing practices, many states also permit law enforcement to access PDMPs when investigating controlled substance distribution, often without prior judicial approval. Such law enforcement use of PDMPs raises serious questions of patient privacy. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy and has been interpreted to require law enforcement have probable cause and a search warrant before infringing upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Several courts have held that patients have no reasonable expectation of privacy, or a severely diminished expectation of privacy, in their prescription drug records held in PDMPs. As support, courts rely on the third-party doctrine because the information is disclosed to physicians and then held by the state; the highly regulated nature of the prescription drug industry; and the statutory framework of the Controlled Substances Act. Such analysis disregards patients’ expectation of privacy in their personal health information, the confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship, and the resulting patient incentives not to seek care. Therefore, this Article argues that law enforcement must have probable cause and a search warrant to access PDMPs because the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements do not apply.

Voyeurism

This chapter considers the offense of voyeurism, where the offender infringes on the complainant’s autonomy by intruding on her sexual privacy without her consent. Rather than ask if the alleged victim expressed actual consent, it will sometimes be appropriate to ask if she gave constructive consent, based on her assuming the risk of some potential harm or wrong. Many victims of voyeurism probably never know that they have been victimized and thus do not suffer the usual sort of psychological trauma that victims of sexual misconduct often endure. Nevertheless, voyeurism clearly involves a serious wrong. In that sense, it constitutes what has been referred to in the criminal law theory literature as a harmless wrong. There is also another conceptual challenge that voyeurism presents. In order for the offense to be committed, the victim must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. But this raises the question of exactly what expectations of privacy should be considered reasonable in a world in which new technologies and new social practices—including social media, smartphones, sexting, and revenge porn—have simultaneously lowered the threshold of what society regards as private while increasing the potential for harm to individuals.