Small Populations

Chapter 5 examines the history of California’s women’s prisons. Women’s prisons have never been home to prison gangs like those found in some men’s prisons; norms are used instead to govern social and economic interactions. Some women also form fictive kinships, taking on roles as the mom, dad, and child. This chapter shows that decentralized social order operates because women’s prisons have always held relatively few prisoners. In such small populations, gossip, ostracism, and shaming work effectively, and at low cost, to punish bad behavior, and female prisoners have never had to invest in the costly, centralized institutions that men often turn to.

When Officials Govern

3 shows how in Nordic counties, prison officials provide significantly more resources, more competent administration, and higher-quality governance than is found in Latin American prisons. As a result, prisoners have few reasons to spend time, energy, and resources on providing these same goods and services. The chapter goes on to show that there are few prisoner-created organizations with relatively little influence on the everyday life of prisoners, and social norms are the predominant governance mechanism in place as small prison populations make gossip and ostracism powerful tools for punishing bad behavior. Even in the sphere of illegal drug use, prisoners do not use markets to coordinate the use of resources, relying instead on a system of sharing.

Social Networks

Chapter 6 considers men’s prisons in England, which rely on decentralized institutions to govern social and economic life. Prisoners affiliate with people from their hometowns and sometimes even the same housing estates. They do not rely on organized, racially segregated prison gangs, like those found in many U.S. men’s prisons. Instead, because of the small size of prisons and pre-existing social networks, norm-based governance works effectively. This chapter examines studies from maximum- and medium-security prisons to test these claims. The governance theory explains why there is less racial segregation, few to no prison gangs, and less violent harassment of sex offenders.

When Prisoners Govern

Chapter 2 describes how in many Latin American prisons, officials provide little of the resources, administration, or governance that prisoners often desire. In their absence, prisoners themselves govern. They often create extensive ruling bodies, including associations and committees, that create rules, enforce property rights, and maintain stability within the prison. They participate in flourishing markets, both among themselves and with the outside world. In doing so, prisoners fill the gap in governance and resources created by absent officials. The chapter then examines prisons in Brazil and Bolivia to understand how and why prisoners play such a substantial role in operating prisons.

Why Does Prison Social Order Vary?

Chapter 1 discusses how all prisons share essential features. Prisoners, who have either been charged with or convicted of a crime, are forced to relocate to a facility for confinement. Once there, the captive must usually interact with other people in the same situation. They suffer the pains of imprisonment, which often includes deprivation of liberty, goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and security. Prisoners tend to come from relatively disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. All prisons are based on coercion, and prisoners have no voluntary exit option. The chapter then shows how there is nevertheless, tremendous variation in life behind bars. In some prisons, informal institutions are incredibly important; in others, they are nearly non-existent. In some places, prisoners create hierarchy and organizations to rule; in others, norms prevail. Finally, the chapter outlines how the book will help explain how these different systems of governance arise.

Social Distance

Chapter 7 looks at the special housing unit for gay and transgender prisoners in the Los Angeles County Jail. This unit houses a small population, and many of the residents know each other from interacting on the street. In addition, because of an unusual and controversial admissions process, prisoners in this unit are far more likely to share more similar social identities. This chapter shows that as a result of all three factors, decentralized governance mechanisms are highly effective in this housing unit. Prisoners have not relied on the more extensive, centralized institutions that men in the general population housing units rely on. Instead, they use gossip and ostracism to encourage good behavior from other prisoners.

When No One Governs

Chapter 4 discusses the case of the Andersonville Prisoner of War Camp established during the American Civil War, which stands out as one of the most brutal and deadly camps then in operation. It describes how officials provided shockingly few resources, no basic infrastructure, and essentially no governance within the facility. However, prisoners themselves did little to organize because there were few benefits from doing so. There was no access to outside economic activity, no trade was possible, and there were few natural resources within the perimeter of the camp. As such, there were no gains from acting collectively. As chapter 4 explains, the case of Andersonville shows that governance institutions do not emerge automatically, even in the face of state failure.

Understanding Institutional Diversity

Chapter 8 summarizes the main empirical implications discussed in the governance theory. It points toward public policy options for reshaping prison social order and also argues that prison ethnographers should incorporate more comparative analysis into their work. There is a large body of literature on methods and methodology of making comparisons, especially in the field of comparative politics and comparative historical sociology. Incorporating more comparative methods will increase the importance and usefulness of individual ethnographic studies and open up a large number of new research questions.