Deep engagement and public opinion toward the United States: U.S. military presence and threat perceptions

Under what conditions are a country’s residents likely to express favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward the United States? I discuss this question using survey data from 38 countries, focusing on the possible impacts that the active approach by the United States toward security threats has on the psychology of countries’ residents. The results show that the larger the U.S. military presence in a country, the more likely that its residents are to express negative attitudes toward the United States. Meanwhile, citizens who feel threatened by specific types of global actors that the U.S. government actively confronts as security threats are less likely to express negative attitudes toward the United States, and particularly less likely to do so the larger the U.S. military presence in their country. These findings contribute significantly to understanding the shifts in the socio-political dynamics of regions such as the Asia-Pacific, where the United States has long implemented an active approach.

Hedging between the United States and China? South Korea’s ideology-driven behavior and its implications for national security

Given the limits of the prevailing hedging account for Seoul’s puzzling behavior that is in conformity with the interests of its adversary (i.e. North Korea) and potential threat (i.e. China) rather than those of its principal ally (i.e. the United States) and security cooperation partner (i.e. Japan), this article emphasizes the impact of the progressive ideology on Seoul’s security policy. In doing so, it calls for attention to a domestic source of ideology in explaining the security behaviors of a secondary state, which is under-researched and thus is poorly understood.

China’s motives, influence and prospects in Pacific Island countries: views of Chinese scholars

China’s rise in the Pacific has brought the region into the limelight, but research into the views of Chinese scholars of Pacific Studies is limited. Building on a survey and interviews of 39 Chinese scholars, this article analyses China’s motives, influence, and prospects in the Pacific. It finds out that Chinese scholars list China’s diplomatic strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, and economic interests as the three main causes of China’s Pacific diplomacy. The majority of these scholars rate the performance of China’s Pacific diplomacy as pass/average. Most Chinese scholars are cautiously optimistic about the Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific, and they expect China to both compete and cooperate with traditional powers in the Pacific in the foreseeable future. Some of these scholars’ views on issues like the China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the impact of Chinese aid on local corruption contradict the official Chinese line strikingly.

Diaspora organizations, political settlements, and the migration-development nexus: the case of the Indonesian Diaspora Network

This article examines the Indonesian Diaspora Network (IDN), an organization that seeks to ‘facilitate’ and ‘empower’ Indonesia’s diaspora and enhance its contribution to the country’s development. IDN portrays itself as an expression of the collective will of a unified and coherent Indonesian diaspora that is working to promote development-for-all, while critics suggest it is the instrument of elite and professional elements within the diaspora pursuing narrower interests and agendas. By contrast, this article suggests that IDN is a political settlement between these and other elements within the diaspora, each of which has distinct interests and agendas with regard to Indonesia’s development. Its impact on Indonesia’s development is consequently much less clear-cut than existing analyses suggest while also being contingent on processes of political and social struggle. In theoretical terms, the article encourages an understanding of diaspora organizations in terms of political settlements analysis.

Hedging and grand strategy in Southeast Asian foreign policy

This article examines recent interest in hedging as a feature of international politics in the Asia Pacific. Focusing on the small states of Southeast Asia, we argue that dominant understandings of hedging are misguided for two reasons. Despite significant advances in the literature, hedging has remained a vague concept rendering it a residual category of foreign policy behavior. Moreover, current accounts of hedging tend to overstate the strategic intentions of ostensible hedgers. This article proposes that a better understanding of Southeast Asia’s foreign policy behavior needs to dissociate hedging from neorealist concepts of international politics. Instead, we locate the concept in the context of classical realism and the diplomatic practice of second-tier states. Exploring Southeast Asia’s engagement with more powerful actors from this perspective reveals the strategic limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the dilemma that Southeast Asian states face from a rising China challenging the status quo in the western Pacific.