Hedging between the United States and China? South Korea’s ideology-driven behavior and its implications for national security

Author(s):  
Min-hyung Kim

Abstract Given the limits of the prevailing hedging account for Seoul’s puzzling behavior that is in conformity with the interests of its adversary (i.e. North Korea) and potential threat (i.e. China) rather than those of its principal ally (i.e. the United States) and security cooperation partner (i.e. Japan), this article emphasizes the impact of the progressive ideology on Seoul’s security policy. In doing so, it calls for attention to a domestic source of ideology in explaining the security behaviors of a secondary state, which is under-researched and thus is poorly understood.

2020 ◽  
pp. 113-120
Author(s):  
Mukhammadolim Mukhammadsidiqov ◽  
Abrar Turaev

This article analyzes the impact of neoconservative ideology on the formation of national security paradigms in the United States and reveals the impact of views and ideas put forward by U.S. neoconservatives on the formation of public administration, especially security goals in domestic and foreign policy. In particular, the role of Albert Walstetter, a well-known proponent of neoconservative views, in the formation of security concepts is discussed. The role of political philosopher Leo Strauss’s political-philosophical and military-strategic approaches in the development of neoconservative ideology and the conceptual basis of modern security problems are theoretically analyzed. It is emphasized that the assessment of the impact of neoconservative ideology on the formation of security policy in the development of political processes related to public administration in the United States depends on understanding the content of formed neoconservative security concepts. Based on the predominance of national interests based on national security approaches in the ideology of neoconservatism, the influence of neoconservatism on the interpretation of international relations as a highly conflicted, the anarchic environment is revealed in the formation of the neoconservative paradigm of security. In the following periods, the implementation of Albert Walstetter and Leo Strauss’s military-strategic ideas under the influence of neoconservatives in the US administration, in particular, the practice of proposing to continue the foreign policy course on the use of military force as a factor of national security.


1969 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 755-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Kay

This review essay will focus on four central questions which the author believes to be closely related to the problem of progress in the study of international organizations. These questions, narrowed to fit the scope of this essay, are the following: 1) What has been the role of international organizations in the national security strategy of the United States; 2) what has been the impact of the United States in the international organizations of which it is a member; 3) what has been the impact of participation in international organizations on the range of United States choices and methods in the foreign policy area; 4) what impact have changes in the shape of the international political system had upon United States participation in international organizations and upon those organizations' impact on the United States. This analysis will concentrate only on studies relevant to these themes.


2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 2-27

Next week I will go before Congress to lay out my priorities for the coming year. There will be no room for misunderstanding. The most basic commitment of our government will be the security of our country. We will win this war; we will protect our people; and we will work to renew the strength of our economy.Our first priority is the military. The highest calling to protect the people is to strengthen our military. And that will be the priority of the budget I submit to the United States Congress. Those who review our budget must understand that we're asking a lot of our men and women in uniform, and we'll be asking more of them in the future. In return, they deserve every resource, every weapon needed to achieve the final and full victory.


1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
P.M. Kamath

In the post-World War II period “national security” has become the most important concept commanding respect among policy-makers and demanding crippling-silence on the part of the national community. It is not necessary here to examine the reasons1, for this commandeering position given to the concept of national security, but in an objective sense, foreign affairs of any nation in the ultimate analysis is conducted to secure national security. In this sense national security essentially denotes a nation's determination to preserve at any cost some of its interests. Foremost are : territorial integrity, political independence and fundamental governmental institutions.2 In the contemporary world it is also a well established fact that the military, diplomatic and economic aspects of a nation's foreign affairs are inseperably interlinked with one another. While foreign policy aims at serving national interest through peaceful diplomatic means, military policy aims at preparedness to protect national interest in case foreign policy fails. The foreign policy of a nation has also to take into consideration economic states involved in a particular policy consideration. This is particularly true for a super power like the United States. Hence, in a sense, it is appropriate to term the combination of foreign and military policies of a nation as national security policy. Who makes national security policy in the United States? What are the special features of national security policy-making process? It is proposed to answer these questions in this paper with special reference to the Reagan Administration.


Author(s):  
Melvyn P Leffler

This book gathers together decades of writing by the author, to address important questions about U.S. national security policy from the end of World War I to the global war on terror. Why did the United States withdraw strategically from Europe after World War I and not after World War II? How did World War II reshape Americans' understanding of their vital interests? What caused the United States to achieve victory in the long Cold War? To what extent did 9/11 transform U.S. national security policy? Is budgetary austerity a fundamental threat to U.S. national interests? The wide-ranging chapters explain how foreign policy evolved into national security policy. The book stresses the competing priorities that forced policymakers to make agonizing trade-offs and illuminates the travails of the policymaking process itself. While assessing the course of U.S. national security policy, the author also interrogates the evolution of his own scholarship. Over time, slowly and almost unconsciously, the author's work has married elements of revisionism with realism to form a unique synthesis that uses threat perception as a lens to understand how and why policymakers reconcile the pressures emanating from external dangers and internal priorities.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Heradstveit ◽  
Matthew G. Bonham

This article focuses on the Axis of Evil metaphor that was used by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address in 2002 to represent Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. After describing "axis" as a metonym for fascism and Nazism, and "evil" as a metonym for Satanic forces that implies an alliance of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that is collectively responsible for evil deeds, the authors analyze the impact of this metaphor on Iranian self-image and politics. The data for this analysis are drawn from in-depth interviews conducted with 18 members of the Iranian oppositional elite. The interview results suggest that the Axis of Evil metaphor had an impact on political discourse in Iran and strengthened the rhetorical position of conservatives vis-à-vis reformers by reviving militant revolutionary language with the Great Satan (the United States) as the main target of the theocratic and conservative forces. The article concludes with some observations about the implications of using cultural and historical experiences for explaining differences between the ways in which Americans (and other people in the West) and Iranians have understood the metaphor.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-94
Author(s):  
CHOI LYONG

AbstractThis article discusses the impact and implications of Sino-American reconciliation on South Korea's policy towards its conflict with North Korea as well as its effect on South Korean politics in the early 1970s. Specifically, this article will examine how the Park regime altered its policy toward the North in response to the demands of the Nixon administration, before discussing the limitations of the policy in terms of the hostile approach of the Park regime toward Pyongyang during its talks with North Korea in 1972.Based on recent findings in the South Korean and American archives, and an interview with former KCIA official Gang Indeok, this article contends that this particular focus provides an interesting case study to explain the impact of global changes on the domestic politics of specific nation(s) during the Cold War era. Along with many other American client states, the Republic of Korea misunderstood the objective of the United States before Nixon announced his Doctrine in 1969 and intention to reduce American support for Park. To be sure, it was not Washington's intention to build a democratic country in the Korean Peninsula. Rather, as Westad has indicated, the superpower sought greater control over the world and the expansion and extension of its power. This short article will thus demonstrate the process by which the client states of the United States—in particular, South Korea—came to understand the real aims of Washington and learned how to utilize these American intentions for their own national interest.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document