The President as Policy Entrepreneur

This concluding chapter focuses on the role of George W. Bush himself, arguing that by 2006–2007, the president had become a more mature and assertive commander-in-chief who asked hard questions of his military commanders and pushed the policy process to deliver strategic alternatives. The president successfully related the policy advice he received to the political requirements and constraints he faced to fashion a new strategy for the Iraq War. His success in doing so might constitute the basis for a modest form of “Bush revisionism.” The chapter also defines the concept of policy entrepreneurship, including the ability to connect three distinct streams: problems, policies, and politics. It then analyzes these three streams as they existed regarding US policy in Iraq by mid-2006, and describes how and why Bush was able to connect the three streams.

The Bush Administration’s Decision to Surge in Iraq

This chapter argues—using the Eisenhower administration as a model of peacetime national security decision making—that the surge decision-making process displayed by the oral histories was idiosyncratic, excessively compartmentalized, and profoundly flawed. No president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has fully adopted his model, and each has tailored procedures appropriate for his needs. The Bush process had to take into account his lack of expertise in military affairs, an increasingly polarized political climate, the legacy of the Vietnam War, the proliferation of leaks of sensitive information in the new media age, the resistance of the uniformed military leadership, and most important, Rumsfeld. Administration insiders argue that for these reasons Bush jettisoned fundamental tenets of Eisenhower's system in an effort to make a virtue out of necessity. Yet the evidence suggests that Eisenhower's best practices are just that—best practices. It further suggests that their rigorous application would have benefited Bush's process by expediting the instigation of a comprehensive review, co-opting opponents of a change in strategy, mitigating politicization, facilitating the exchange of information and advice, and accelerating implementation.

Strategy and the Surge

This chapter studies the relationship between strategy and the surge. Strategy is the bridge that links military operations and political objectives in war. A practical strategy describes those objectives and explains how military action will achieve them. The chapter disputes the idea that the surge constituted a new US strategy in Iraq. Instead, it can be considered as a “decision to put strategy on hold.” The surge, the chapter argues, encouraged a perverse strategic effect—by obscuring the political objectives of the war, it undercut efforts to forge competent and self-reliant governance in Iraq and contributed to the breakdown of the Iraqi state in the face of the subsequent rise of the Islamic State.

A Sweeping Internal Review

This chapter details the review process mentioned in the previous chapter. It highlights a series of high-level interagency meetings as the members of the review group debated the status of US efforts in Iraq and began formally to consider alternatives. By Thanksgiving of 2006, the review group was wrapping up its work, albeit without a clear policy recommendation, and divergent reviews remained among Bush's advisors. In retrospect, some of the president's advisors now believe that Bush himself was already leaning toward increasing US forces in Iraq as part of a new strategy. At the time, however, many thought the president had not made up his mind and that the deliberative process had simply deadlocked.

Together Forward?

This chapter examines debates over US policy in the summer of 2006, focusing particularly on the unhappy results of military efforts to tamp down violence in Baghdad. Two major military operations—Operations Together Forward I and II—were launched, intended, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace, recalled, to “begin the process of turning over the battlefield responsibilities to the Iraqi armed forces.” Both were clear disappointments, however, revealing how unprepared Iraqi forces were to assume responsibility for their country's security. Iraqi forces themselves were, in the words of the National Security Council's Meghan O'Sullivan, “perpetuating acts of sectarian violence” and were “as much part of the problem as they are a solution to the problem.” Throughout the summer, NSC staff thus sought to press the Iraq country team for a review of Iraq strategy, and pushed the president to ask General George Casey, commander of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), harder questions about where the current approach was leading. However, MNF-I and the US Embassy in Iraq continued to champion existing plans, believing that the existing strategy merely required more time.