Critical Self-Reflection

Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu

This chapter argues that the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding expresses Hume’s own dissatisfaction with the treatment of scepticism found in the Treatise of Human Nature. EHU 1.12 argues that curiosity, so crucial in THN 1.4.7, can in fact lead one to false metaphysics. EHU 5.1 is striking insofar as it states that Hume’s preferred Academical philosophy does not mingle with the passions. This is antithetical to the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11), which recommends assenting to reason when it mixes with the passions. Thus, the Enquiry seems to distinctly reject the anti-sceptical framework of the Treatise, paving the way for a new epistemology in the later work.

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-46
Author(s):  
Ruth M. Espinosa

Abstract: In this paper, I consider some issues concerning Hume’s epistemology of testimony. I’ll particularly focus on the accusation of reductivism and individualism brought by scholars against Hume’s view on testimonial evidence, based on the tenth section of his An enquiry concerning human understanding. I first explain the arguments against Hume’s position, and address some replies in the literature in order to offer an alternative interpretation concerning the way such a defense should go. My strategy is closely connected with Hume’s notion of virtue and the role it plays in his epistemology, mainly as presented in his A treatise of human nature. I address the problem of how the section “Of miracles” in the Enquiry must be properly understood, as several misunderstandings of Hume’s epistemology of testimony emerge partially from the particular character and aim of that section.


2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-118
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Davidovic

In this article I explore how Hume?s views on the relationship between scepticism and philosophy developed and matured throughout his philosophical career. Hume?s first work, A Treatise of Human Nature, leaves open the question of why would anyone pursue philosophy in light of the discovery that sceptical arguments are irrefutable. What I aim to show is that, although Hume?s attitude to scepticism and his own sceptical position remain essentially unchanged over the years, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, along with a couple of his minor writings, contain interesting changes, additions and improvements to his thinking about the way scepticism can inform our philosophical enquiries. Only in his last work Hume unambiguously claims that scepticism does have a positive and lasting influence on our philosophising, and this influence consists in intelectual modesty and subject-matter limitations whithin philosophical investigations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 1727-1742
Author(s):  
Mendo Castro Henriques

In Insight, an essay on human understanding, (1957, 1st edition) Lonergan presents a heuristic model of emerging probability in order to define, explain and extract norms from the dynamism common to all nature, including human nature, a dynamism that mirrors the reality of intellection. Continuity between different levels of nature discloses a directed, upward, but indeterminate dynamism of the emerging generalized probability. In addition to the ethical consequences that he elaborates, Lonergan remains in an open hermeneutic framework, beyond being proportionate to discursive reason; he opens the way for a surprising final manifestation of this universal dynamism through what he calls transcendent conjugated forms of generalized probability emerging – faith, hope and charity – that are proposed to human freedom.


Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu

This chapter makes the case that Hume’s epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is superior to that of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, the framework of EHU 12 has strong parallels to contemporary epistemology, in contrast to the Title Principle from THN 1.4.7.11. In particular, aspects of this framework have affinities with Wright-style conservatism, and Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Second, this framework avoids the weaknesses that afflicted the Title Principle: it has adequate foundation, is able to satisfactorily reject superstition, and is founded on truth. Third, unlike its analogue in the Treatise, the epistemological framework of the Enquiry is able to offer a ‘compleat answer’ to Reid and Beattie by denying the common-sense philosophy that is the fundamental basis of their critiques of his philosophy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-215
Author(s):  
Evgeniy N. Blinov ◽  

The present article analyzes an ambitious attempt to revisit and reevaluate Hume’s metaphysical project in the early 21th century, proposed by Vadim Vasilyev. His claim is to demonstrate that the problems raised by the author of Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are far from being completely resolved and could provide us some valuable hints into the problems of contemporary analytical metaphysics. Against a widespread consensus that the evolution in Hume’s had been insignificant, Vasilyev maintains that his philosophical project underwent crucial transformations. He provides evidence of a gradual shift from a radical empiricism to a moderate rationalism by re-examining some classical problems of Hume’s studies and providing a critical analysis of the problems of causality and personal identity. This review provides some arguments for and against Vasilyev’s claims.


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-161
Author(s):  
Jani Hakkarainen

In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real (distinct and continued) entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various ways to avoid this problem do not work. Accordingly, this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism.


Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.


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