The Possibility of Temporal Bias

This chapter discusses whether prudential rationality ought to permit of temporal biases: biases toward goods in the near future in comparison to the far future, and goods in the future in comparison to the past. I argue that there are strong rationales for such biases and that extant arguments offered by Meghan Sullivan, David Brink, Meghan Sullivan and Preston Greene, and Tom Dougherty against such biases fail.

Introduction

If an observer were to produce a broad impression of the state of practical philosophy in the early part of the twenty-first century—and many other centuries besides—she would be forgiven for coming to the conclusion that philosophers seem to think that morality is all there is. Even the common moniker for the subdiscipline—...

Temporal Neutrality and The Demandingness of Prudence

This chapter provides a rationale for temporal neutrality that succeeds against the rationales for temporal biases provided in Chapter Eleven. I argue that temporally biased agents display unsavory attitudes toward temporally located goods that should not be permitted by an acceptable theory of prudential rationality. Following this, I discuss the demandingness of prudence in light of temporal neutrality, and argue that while prudence may be a significant source of self-regarding reasons, it needn’t be the only such source.

A Defense of Subjectivism

This chapter defends subjectivism about prudential value, the thesis that a necessary condition for all goods for a person is that the person in question value the good under the relevant conditions. This chapter provides a novel argument for subjectivism, the relationship to value argument, and defends its insistence that subjects should value, rather than take a non-valuing pro-attitude toward, individual goods

What Is a Theory of Prudential Intrinsic Value?

There is little agreement among theorists concerning what we would like a theory of intrinsic prudential value to do. This chapter holds that such a theory is not meant to provide an account of a person’s well-being, life quality, or any other such notion, except derivatively. Instead, theories of intrinsic prudential value should provide (or offer a procedure to provide) a prudential ordering: those particular states, objects, or events that are intrinsic goods for a person, ordered by their comparative value.

The “Intrinsic” Bit

This chapter is a sustained argument against the Moorean claim that the value of a bearer is intrinsic if and only if this value supervenes entirely on the intrinsic properties of the bearer. This chapter addresses both halves of this biconditional separately, and argues that neither side is true. Whether a bearer’s value is intrinsic, this chapter concludes, has nothing to do with the intrinsicality or extrinsicality of the properties upon which this value supervenes.

Deontic and Maximizing

This chapter tackles the question of whether prudence is deontic (whether, in other words, there is such a thing as a prudential requirement), and whether prudence is maximizing (whether, in other words, one is prudentially required to act in accordance with the strongest balance of prudential reasons). I argue in the affirmative in both cases, against, most importantly, satisficing approaches to prudence.

The Valuing Attitude

Ths chapter is the first of two that attempts to provide a theory of valuing, central to the subjectivist theory defended in Chapter Four. Against alternatives, this chapter argues that the best account of the nature of valuing is cognitive; a belief that the object or state in question is good.

Idealization

This chapter addresses the use and abuse of idealization from within subjectivist theories of prudential value. I argue that any subjectivist view must idealize from within a theory of valuing—only idealized judgments properly characterize a person’s actual values. Nevertheless, I argue against holding that a person’s idealized values should form the basis of her good.

Scoreism and the Constitution of Prudential Reasons

This chapter addresses the nature and constitution of prudential reasons. I argue that we should reject scoreism, according to which prudential reasons are constituted by facts about well-being scores (i.e., how “well-off” one is at a time), but instead should be constituted by facts about intrinsic prudential values (i.e., that a particular thing is intrinsically good). This understanding of prudential reasons helps to solve a persistent problem for subjectivist theories of the good.