The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 667-690
Author(s):  
George R. Crowley
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legislature Size

scholarly journals The Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending: A Meta-Analysis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huzeyfe Alptekin ◽  
Danilo Freire ◽  
Umberto Guarnier Mignozzetti ◽  
Catarina Roman
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Public Spending ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Public Expenditures ◽  
Significant Heterogeneity ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legislature Size ◽  
Seminal Article ◽  
Inference Methods ◽  
The Relationship

In a seminal article, Weingast et al. (1981) argue that there is a positive relationship between legislature size and inefficiency in public expenditures. Their proposition is currently known as the "law of 1/n" and has been widely debated in political science and public administration. However, recent studies have questioned the validity of the theory. In this letter, we estimate the first meta-analysis of the relationship between the number of legislators and public spending. Based on a sample of 29 articles, we find no robust evidence for the effect of legislature size on government budgets. Yet the aggregate results show significant heterogeneity. While earlier studies provide moderate support for the "law of 1/n", papers using causal inference methods consistently find a negative relationship between seats and spending. The available evidence also indicates that proportional representation and mixed voting systems are no more likely to overspend than majoritarian ones.

Collusion and Legal Cynicism

2019 ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Javier Auyero ◽  
Katherine Sobering
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Police Officers ◽  
Thick Description ◽  
Legal Cynicism ◽  
The Law

Residents in Arquitecto Tucci believe that the police are part of their problems in their neighborhood. Continuing the thick description of everyday life in Arquitecto Tucci, this chapter examines different expressions of the shared belief that police officers are seen not only as abusive and extortive but also as actively complicit with criminals. It finds that suspicions of collusion have bred a deep collective distrust in the police and contributed to a shared cynicism toward the law that pervades everyday life. It then shows how these attitudes constrain residents’ recourse against violence, finding that when they become the victims of crimes, residents do not call the police, but instead choose either not to act or to solve their problems through alternative channels or collective action.

Labour before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 257
Author(s):  
Todd McCallum ◽  
Judy Fudge ◽  
Eric Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
The Law

scholarly journals La representación parlamentaria en América latina. Las comisiones permanentes y los partidos en el congreso

2009 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luisa Béjar
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Dominican Republic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Law ◽  
America Latina ◽  
The Relationship

RESUMEN: El principal argumento de este escrito es que la heterogeneidad de los diseños institucionales que prima en el campo electoral en América Latina (Carroll y Shugart, 2005) también se reproduce en el parlamentario. El perfil morfológico del sistema de comisiones propio de cada Congreso y el lugar que la ley les asigna en el proceso legislativo son prueba evidente de ello. Mientras el marco normativo de algunas legislaturas no deja lugar a dudas en cuanto a la intención de delegar en los partidos las decisiones encomendadas a estos cuerpos; en otros casos, ello ocurre en menor medida. En los casos formalmente ceñidos a una lógica de partido, por otra parte, se alientan esquemas de delegación de corte muy diverso. En este escrito se revisa el acomodo institucional del sistema de comisiones de la Cámara Baja en: Argentina; Bolivia; Brasil; Colombia; Chile; México; Paraguay; República Dominicana y Uruguay. En este sentido, el estudio examina tanto la importancia concedida a su trabajo, como algunos aspectos de su morfología que afectan la estructura de incentivos que acota el desarrollo del proceso legislativo. Asimismo, se analizan los procedimientos utilizados en cada Congreso para enfrentar los problemas de acción colectiva. Por último, se presentan algunas ideas para la elaboración de una futura taxonomía sobre la relación que guardan en la región los partidos y las comisiones permanentes del Congreso.ABSTRACT: The main argument of this paper is that the heterogeneity of the institutional framework that prevails in Latin America’s electoral field (Carroll y Shugart, 2005), also reproduces itself in the parliamentary one. This is proved by the morphologic profile of each Congress’ commission system and the place that the law assigns to the system. While some legislative frameworks clearly intend to delegate to parties the decisions entrusted to this bodies; in other cases, this takes place in a less important way. In the cases formally related with a party logic, on the other hand, diverse delegation schemes are encouraged. In this article we analyze the institutional framework of the commission systems of the low chamber in: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Chile; Mexico; Paraguay; Dominican Republic and Uruguay. In this sense, this work examines the importance given to their job and some aspects of its morphology that affect the structure of incentives that narrows the development of the legislative process. We also analyze the procedures used by each Congress to solve its problems of collective action. Lastly, some ideas for the elaboration of a future taxonomy on the relationship between parties and permanent commissions in the region are presented.

scholarly journals Inter se Modification of the UN Drug Control Conventions

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 456-492
Author(s):  
Neil Boister ◽  
Martin Jelsma
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Safety Valve ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Drug Control ◽  
Vienna Convention ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
Global Consensus ◽  
Time Restrictions ◽  
Collective Response ◽  
The Law

Abstract Legal tensions are growing as more jurisdictions move towards legal regulation of the cannabis market in contravention of the obligation under UN drug control treaties to limit cannabis exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Reaching a global consensus to amend the conventions does not appear to be a viable political option in the foreseeable future. Amongst the limited options not requiring consensus, inter se modification – based on article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – provides a useful safety valve for collective action to adjust a treaty regime arguably frozen in time. Restrictions imposed on inter se modification require a clear commitment to the original treaty aim to promote the health and welfare of humankind and to the original treaty obligations vis-à-vis states not party to the agreement. A coordinated collective response has benefits compared to a chaotic scenario of multiple unilateral reservations and questionable re-interpretations.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document