Bonus versus Penalty: Does Contract Frame Affect Employee Effort?

This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to provide higher effort and whether firm profit moderates this relation. Consistent with gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) models, my experimental results show that workers provided more effort when they were paid higher wages even though there was no ex post financial reward for doing so. Moreover, firm profit influenced the relation between wages and effort. Workers provided higher effort when firm profit decreased compared to when it increased. This suggests that the degree of reciprocity is affected by firm profit. However, workers' responded asymmetrically to firm profit, in that they behaved as if they expected to share in firm profit increases but not decreases. Although firms were fairly adept at predicting the profit-maximizing wage strategy, they apparently did not anticipate workers' reluctance to share in firm profit decreases.

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The joint effects of a manager’s level of narcissism and incentive scheme on employee effort

Academy of Management Proceedings ◽

10.5465/ambpp.2021.11747abstract ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2021 (1) ◽

pp. 11747

Author(s):

Miriam Maske ◽

Matthias Sohn ◽

Bernhard Hirsch

Keyword(s):

Incentive Scheme ◽

Joint Effects ◽

Employee Effort

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Female Leaders and Employee Effort: A Multi-method Study of Entrepreneurial Firms

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3920608 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Aleksandra Kacperczyk ◽

Peter Younkin ◽

Vera Rocha

Keyword(s):

Entrepreneurial Firms ◽

Female Leaders ◽

Employee Effort

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ANTESEEDEN DAN KONSEKUENSI DARI SEVERITY OF OTHER CUSTOMER FAILURE

Jurnal Manajemen dan Pemasaran Jasa ◽

10.25105/jmpj.v4i1.487 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 73

Author(s):

Nina Budiwati ◽

Asep Hermawan

Keyword(s):

Data Analysis ◽

Customer Satisfaction ◽

Structural Equation Model ◽

Structural Equation ◽

Service Recovery ◽

Equation Model ◽

Unit Of Analysis ◽

Recovery Expectations ◽

Employee Effort ◽

Customer Misbehavior

The background of this research was to conduct a profound study of impact of other-customer failure The purpose of this paper is to investigate how and why other-customer misbehavior has a negative influence on customer satisfaction with the service firm. The objectives of this research was : (a) the effect of controllability to firm responsibility, (b) the effect of stability to firm responsibility, (c) the effect of firm responsibility to customer satisfaction, (d) the effect of firm responsibility to service recovery expectations, (e) the effect of service recovery expectations to customer satisfaction, (f) the effect of severity of other customer failure to service recovery expectations, (g) the effect of severity of other customer failure to customer satisfaction, (h) the effect of perceived employee effort to customer satisfaction. The design of this research applies a survey toward unit of analysis on hotels services by interview the customers for testing hypothesis. Meanwhile the required data consist of seventh variables which are controllability attributions, stability attributions, firm responsibility, service recovery expectation, severity of other customer failure, perceived employee effort and customer satisfaction. The aggregate numbers of hotels guests being respondent of the study are 200. Data analysis used in this research was consists of Structural Equation Model Analysis by AMOS 6 as software. The result of this research conclude that controllability and stability attributions had an effect to firm responsibility, firm responsibility had an effect to service recovery expectations, severity of other customer failure had an effect to service recovery expactations, and perceived employee effort had an effect to customer satisfaction. Meanwhile firm responsibility had an effect to customer satisfaction, service recovery expectations had an effect terhadap customer satisfaction, severity of other customer failure had an effect to customer satisfaction. Keywords: Service recovery expectations, severity of other customer failure, and customer satisfaction

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The Relationship between New Work Practices and Employee Effort

Journal of Industrial Relations ◽

10.1177/0022185609359446 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 52 (2) ◽

pp. 219-235 ◽

Cited By ~ 22

Author(s):

Andrea Ollo-Lopez ◽

Alberto Bayo-Moriones ◽

Martin Larraza-Kintana

Keyword(s):

New Work ◽

Work Practices ◽

Employee Effort ◽

The Relationship

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Temporary contracts and employee effort

Labour Economics ◽

10.1016/j.labeco.2003.11.006 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 12 (3) ◽

pp. 281-299 ◽

Cited By ~ 132

Author(s):

Axel Engellandt ◽

Regina T. Riphahn

Keyword(s):

Temporary Contracts ◽

Employee Effort

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Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.412485 ◽

2003 ◽

Author(s):

Axel Engellandt ◽

Regina T. Riphahn

Keyword(s):

Temporary Contracts ◽

Employee Effort

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Efficiency Wages, Unemployment, And Labor Discipline

Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER) ◽

10.19030/jber.v9i3.4124 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 9 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Aaron Pacitti

Keyword(s):

Labor Markets ◽

Economic Effects ◽

Efficiency Wages ◽

Unemployment Duration ◽

Efficiency Wage ◽

Economic Implications ◽

Labor Discipline ◽

Employee Effort ◽

Analysis And Synthesis ◽

Agency Issues

This paper explores the economic implications of unemployment by appealing to efficiency wage models. Agency issues in labor markets are first surveyed and discussed, providing the foundation for a detailed analysis and synthesis of two shirking models using uniform language and terminology. The use of a class-based analysis shows that unemployment disciplines both unemployed and employed labor, and explains the presence of unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon. The economic effects of unemployment on wages, employee effort, labor surveillance, and other aspects, such as unemployment duration, are developed and explored.

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