A Framework of Oligopolistic Market Simulation with Coevolutionary Computation

Author(s):  
Haoyong Chen ◽  
Xifan Wang ◽  
Kit Po Wong ◽  
Chi-yung Chung
Author(s):  
Thomas Plieger ◽  
Thomas Grünhage ◽  
Éilish Duke ◽  
Martin Reuter

Abstract. Gender and personality traits influence risk proneness in the context of financial decisions. However, most studies on this topic have relied on either self-report data or on artificial measures of financial risk-taking behavior. Our study aimed to identify relevant trading behaviors and personal characteristics related to trading success. N = 108 Caucasians took part in a three-week stock market simulation paradigm, in which they traded shares of eight fictional companies that differed in issue price, volatility, and outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires measuring personality, risk-taking behavior, and life stress. Our model showed that being male and scoring high on self-directedness led to more risky financial behavior, which in turn positively predicted success in the stock market simulation. The total model explained 39% of the variance in trading success, indicating a role for other factors in influencing trading behavior. Future studies should try to enrich our model to get a more accurate impression of the associations between individual characteristics and financially successful behavior in context of stock trading.


2003 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
George J. Staubus

This is a review of how various experiences in my career have contributed to my understanding of accounting. I recall the circumstances surrounding several of my efforts towards the development of accounting theories, viz. (1) decision-usefulness theory, (2) activity costing, and (3) market simulation accounting, as well as my excursion into (4) market association research in seeking to validate decision-usefulness theory and (5) a search for the effects of firms' economic environments on the development of enterprise accounting in the 2nd millennium, C.E. I give my impressions of several of the important players in the evolution of accounting thought in the 20th century with whom I was closely associated, such as Vatter, Moonitz, Chambers, and Sterling, as well as other prominent figures in the broad field of accounting. Some of my gains from associations with three institutions—the American Accounting Association, The University of Chicago, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board—are identified. I conclude with a few summary thoughts on what I have learned.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. e0151096 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Todd ◽  
Peter Beling ◽  
William Scherer
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-455
Author(s):  
Moshood Abdussalam

Yawning gaps in bargaining powers between transacting parties have always been a source of concern in commercial relations and the legal governance of such relations. In modern times, the likely implications of gaps in bargaining powers are not only palpable as it concerns the affairs of transacting parties with weaker bargaining powers, but also on the welfare of society, at large. That is particularly so in this milieu of pervasive oligopolistic market structures, organised commercial networks, digitisation, and big data. The imperative to guard against the use of contractually agreed remedial clauses to consolidate market power and as tools for wealth extraction is the concern of this article. To this end, this article makes a case for a recalibration of the rule against penalties in contract law.


Author(s):  
Atsushi Yamagishi

Abstract: I analyze markets in which consumers may misestimate the true value of goods and the government can affect the valuation through public promotion. When entry of firms is not allowed, the government makes consumers overvalue the goods to mitigate welfare loss from underproduction in an oligopolistic market, provided that the promotion cost is sufficiently low. On the contrary, in a free-entry market, no matter how low the promotion cost is, the government may make consumers undervalue them in order not to induce wasteful entries despite the remaining underproduction problem. In addition, my result in a free-entry market suggests that the main finding of Glaeser and Ujhelyi (J Public Econ 94: 247-257, 2010)crucially depends on the barriers to entry and the opposite result may be obtained under free entry.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dermot Leahy ◽  
Catia Montagna

AbstractWe bridge the organisational economics and industrial economics literatures on the vertical boundaries of the firm by contextualising the transaction cost approach to the make-or-buy decision within an oligopolistic market structure. Firms invest in the quality of the intermediate resulting in the endogenous determination of the price of the intermediate and marginal production cost of the final good. We highlight new strategic incentives to outsource and/or vertically integrate and show how these incentives can result in asymmetric-mode-of-operations, investment and costs. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.


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