Neural Control Systems

1988 ◽  
pp. 17-42
Author(s):  
Jack George Thompson
2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (10) ◽  
pp. 1684-1698 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin R. Eisenreich ◽  
Rei Akaishi ◽  
Benjamin Y. Hayden

Executive control refers to the regulation of cognition and behavior by mental processes and is a hallmark of higher cognition. Most approaches to understanding its mechanisms begin with the assumption that our brains have anatomically segregated and functionally specialized control modules. The modular approach is intuitive: Control is conceptually distinct from basic mental processing, so an organization that reifies that distinction makes sense. An alternative approach sees executive control as self-organizing principles of a distributed organization. In distributed systems, control and controlled processes are colocalized within large numbers of dispersed computational agents. Control then is often an emergent consequence of simple rules governing the interaction between agents. Because these systems are unfamiliar and unintuitive, here we review several well-understood examples of distributed control systems, group living insects and social animals, and emphasize their parallels with neural systems. We then reexamine the cognitive neuroscience literature on executive control for evidence that its neural control systems may be distributed.


2000 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 1024-1037 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Denny ◽  
Anne Smith

This study tested the hypothesis that, in stuttering speakers, relations between the neural control systems for speech and life support, or metabolic breathing, may differ from relations previously observed in normally fluent subjects. Bilaterally coherent high-frequency oscillations in inspiratory-related EMGs, measured as maximum coherence in the frequency band of 60–110 Hz (MC-HFO), were used as indicators of participation by the brainstem controller for metabolic breathing in 10 normally fluent and 10 stuttering speakers. In all controls and most stuttering subjects, MC-HFO for speech was higher than or comparable to MC-HFO for deep breathing. For 4 stuttering subjects, higher MC-HFO was observed for speech than for deep breathing. Comparison of deep breathing to a speechlike breathing task yielded similar results. No relationship between MC-HFO during speech and severity of disfluency was observed. We conclude that in some stuttering speakers, the relations between respiratory controllers are atypical, but that high participation by the HFO-producing circuitry in the brainstem during speech is not sufficient to disrupt fluency.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin R. Eisenreich ◽  
Rei Akaishi ◽  
Benjamin Y. Hayden

AbstractExecutive control refers to the regulation of cognition and behavior by mental processes and is a hallmark of higher cognition. Most approaches to understanding its mechanisms begin with the assumption that our brains have anatomically segregated and functionally specialized control modules. The modular approach is intuitive: control is conceptually distinct from basic mental processing, so an organization that reifies that distinction makes sense. An alternative approach sees executive control as self-organizing principles of a distributed organization. In distributed systems, control and controlled processes are co-localized within large numbers of dispersed computational agents. Control then is often an emergent consequence of simple rules governing the interaction between agents. Because these systems are unfamiliar and unintuitive, here we review several well-understood examples of distributed control systems, group living insects and social animals, and emphasize their parallels with neural systems. We then re-examine the cognitive neuroscience literature on executive control for evidence that its neural control systems may be distributed.


1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 451-454
Author(s):  
J. Fernández de Cañete ◽  
A. García-Cerezo ◽  
A. García-González ◽  
C. Macías ◽  
I. García-Moral

IEEE Expert ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Saravanan ◽  
D.B. Fogel

2002 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Prochazka

Since the time of Descartes the machine-like control of movement in animals and the animal-like control of movement in automata has fascinated and inspired scientists, engineers and philosophers alike. In 1966, Drs. Rajko Tomovic and Robert McGhee proposed the concept of a "cybernetic actuator," a new type of control system which "possesses the property of producing continuous controlled motion from an input which may assume only four distinct states". The specific application at the time was an artificial limb prosthesis. Signals from sensors monitoring joint angle and ground contact were to be continuously compared to a set of threshold values corresponding to specific moments in the step cycle. The binary signals (above or below threshold) were listed in a look-up chart which associated sensory combinations with actuator states. It was proposed that this system would provide all of the known state transitions required of an above knee prosthesis. In this and later papers Tomovic was careful to point out the differences between such "artificial reflex control" systems and neural control systems in animals. Nonetheless in the last few years it has become commonplace to see the control of locomotion and other rhythmical behaviors described in terms of "sensory rules," that is in terms of finite state systems. With the advent of neural nets and fuzzy logic control robotic devices are taking on more and more of the features of biological control systems. In turn, neurophysiologists borrow more and more from the concepts and mechanisms of modern control theory. The influence of Tomovic's simple but powerful idea continues to spread.


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