Corporate Governance: Achieving Good Corporate Governance in order to Deal with the Contagion Effects of Financial Crisis

Author(s):  
Mustafa Avcin
2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-37
Author(s):  
Klaus J. Hopt

AbstractBanks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis, confirms this. Banks practicing good corporate governance in the traditional, shareholder-oriented style fared less well than banks having less shareholder-prone boards and less shareholder influence. The special governance of banks and other financial institutions is firmly embedded in bank supervisory law and regulation. Most recently there has been intense discussion on the purpose of (non-bank) corporations. For banks stakeholder governance and, more particularly, creditor or debtholder governance is more important than shareholder governance. The implications of this for research and reform are still uncertain. A key problem is the composition and qualification of the board. The legislative task is to enhance independent as well as qualified control. The proposal of giving creditors and even supervisors a special seat in the board is not convincing. Other important special issues of bank governance are for example the duties and liabilities of bank directors in particular as far as risk and compliance are concerned, but also the remuneration paid to bank directors and senior managers or key function holders. Claw-back provisions, either imposed by law or introduced by banks themselves, exist already in certain countries and are beneficial. Much depends on enforcement, an understudied topic.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 30-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Stiglbauer

Although bad corporate governance has been identified as one reason for the failure of financial companies in the current financial crisis, the discussion almost exclusively refers to big players so far. This paper therefore investigates SMEs in the financial sector. Against theoretical assumptions and previous findings for big companies, in regressions for 21 SMEs in the German financial sector we find compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code (as a proxy for “good” corporate governance) not to affect performance significantly positively. This opens the discussion whether the existing rules of “good” corporate governance in Germany do also fit to SMEs and which actions have to be taken into consideration by politics, financial authorities and regulators to solve the situation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 109 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-64
Author(s):  
Jens Gal

Abstract Corporate governance is the set of rules, be they legal or self-regulatory, practices and processes pursuant to which an insurance undertaking is administrated. Good corporate governance is not only key to establishing oneself and succeeding in a competitive environment but also to safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders in an insurance undertaking. It is insofar not surprising that mandatory requirements on the administration of insurance undertakings have become rather prolific in recent years, in an attempt by regulators to protect especially policyholders against perceived risks hailing from improperly governed insurance undertakings. In Germany this has been regarded by many undertakings as an overly paternalistic approach of the legislator, especially considering that the German insurance sector has experienced for decades if not centuries a remarkably low number of insolvencies and that German insurers were neither the trigger nor the (especially) endangered actors in the financial crisis commencing in 2007. Notwithstanding the true core of this criticism, that the insurance industry was taken to a certain degree hostage by the shortcomings within the banking sector, the reform of German Insurance Supervisory Law via implementation of the Solvency II-System has brought many advances in the sense of better governance of insurance undertakings and has also brought to light many deficiencies that the administration of some insurance undertakings may have suffered from in the past, which are now more properly addressed.


Author(s):  
Nina Nurasyekin Zulkefli ◽  
SM Abdul Quddus

Corporate governance is a set of structural process that includes the actions of directing and controlling by the authorized board of directors. In Malaysia, corporate governance is directly under the involvement of the Ministry of Finance, Bursa Malaysia, and Securities Commissions (SC) and Registrar of Company. A good reform of corporate governance in Malaysia is essential to enhance the quality of corporate governance practices after the Asian Financial Crisis 1997. The statistic shows that the low number of Malaysian companies adhered to good corporate governance practices. This poses a question of the extent to what issues and challenges faced by the Malaysian companies reluctantly to adopt a good practice of corporate governance. Hence, the Malaysian government has initiatively introduced Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) as a new code and rules for solving the problems of corporate governance. This study is important to ensure better management of corporate governance of companies in Malaysia, accountability, integrity, and transparency, thereby ensuring the survival of Malaysian corporate governance institutions around the world. The paper uses a qualitative approach. The findings from this study highlight that the introduction of MCCG is tantamount to solve the underpinning problems of the corporate governance system. Keywords: Corporate governance, Malaysia, MCCG, Asian Financial Crisis. Abstrak Tadbir urus korporat adalah satu set proses struktur yang merangkumi sistem penyeliaan oleh lembaga pengarah yang diberi kuasa. Di Malaysia, tadbir urus korporat adalah di bawah penglibatan Kementerian Kewangan, Bursa Malaysia, dan Suruhanjaya Sekuriti (SC) dan Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia. Pembaharuan tadbir urus korporat yang baik di Malaysia adalah penting untuk meningkatkan kualiti amalan tadbir urus korporat selepas Krisis Kewangan Asia 1997. Statistik menunjukkan bahawa bilangan syarikat Malaysia yang rendah dalam mematuhi amalan tadbir urus korporat yang baik. Ini menimbulkan persoalan sejauh mana isu dan cabaran yang dihadapi oleh syarikat-syarikat di Malaysia yang enggan mengamalkan amalan tadbir urus korporat yang baik. Justeru, kerajaan Malaysia telah memperkenalkan Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia (MCCG) sebagai kod baru dan peraturan untuk menyelesaikan masalah tadbir urus korporat. Kajian ini penting untuk memastikan pengurusan tadbir urus korporat yang lebih baik di Malaysia, akauntabiliti, integriti dan ketelusan, serta seterusnya memastikan kelangsungan institusi tadbir korporat Malaysia di seluruh dunia. Kaedah kajian adalah menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif. Dapatan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa pengenalan MCCG adalah penting untuk menyelesaikan masalah asas sistem tadbir urus korporat. Kata Kunci: Tadbir Urus Korporat, Malaysia, MCCG, Krisis Kewangan Asia.  


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 426-434
Author(s):  
Athenia Bongani Sibindi

The insurance sector plays a critical role in any economy by its very mechanism of risk transfer and savings mobilisation. It thus performs a critical role in intermediation by fostering the liquidity of the financial markets. This in turn ensures that capital is transferred from surplus units to deficient units of the economy who are in need of funds for the undertaking of capital projects and thereby spurring productivity. In the aftermath of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis the insurance industry image was tainted. As such, the observance of good corporate governance tenets has now more than ever before become quintessential and also a prescription by regulators. The purpose of this paper is to explore the corporate governance practices (both internal control as well as regulatory measures) that are prevalent in the South African Insurance industry. This paper utilised qualitative research methods and lend itself to document analysis of company reports that the insurance companies submit, as well as the Acts and industry codes that governs the insurance industry in South Africa. The Atlas.ti software was used to analyse the documents. We find evidence that insurers are at various stages of embedding good corporate governance practices. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the insurance companies by and large have strengthened their internal control systems. They have also complied with regulatory directives and are grappling with the implementation of Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) as well as Solvency Assessment Measurement (SAM) which are market conduct and prudential regulations respectively. Further they also subscribe to the King I, King II and King III frameworks of corporate governance. However we wish to caution against “over regulating” this sector as this could stifle innovation


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-39
Author(s):  
Achmad Tjahjono ◽  
Siti Chaeriyah

The Company was founded with the goal of increasing the value of the company as well as to provide prosperity for the owners or shareholders. Good Corporate Governance and profitability is an effort to enhance company value. This study aims to determine the influence of good corporate governance to company value with profitability as intervening variable. The population of this research is manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010 - 2014. The sample is taken by using purposive sampling method. Under this method, as many as 123 companies were obtained. The analysis tool to test the hypothesis is path analysis with AMOS software version 21. Data analysis method is descriptive analysis, path analysis, and sobeltest. The results of this study indicate that managerial ownership, the audit committee and the profitability have positive impact toward the of the company value, institutional ownership has positive impact but not significant, non-executive director with negative effect tendency on the company value. The results of this study also showed that profitability cannot mediate the effect of good corporate governance mechanisms on company value. It can be suggested to replace the intervening variable with other variables such as quality of earnings instead of profitability since it is declined as an intervening variable. non-executive director and institutional ownership does not contribute any positive and significant effect on company value and profitability. The following research can use another proxy in the measurement process and consider other theories that could explain comprehensively.


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