The Role of Property Rights in Allocation Efficiency and Inclusive Economic Growth

2020 ◽  
pp. 57-77
Author(s):  
Lei Sun
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Allocation Efficiency

Re-Thinking the Role of Institutions in Neoliberalism From New Institutional Economics Perspective

2020 ◽  
pp. 25-40
Author(s):  
Ilke Civelekoglu ◽  
Basak Ozoral
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Fertile Ground

In an attempt to discuss neoliberalism with a reference to new institutional economics, this chapter problematizes the role of formal institutions in the neoliberal age by focusing on a specific type of formal institution, namely property rights in developing countries. New institutional economics (NIE) argues that secure property rights are important as they guarantee investments and thus, promote economic growth. This chapter discusses why the protection of property rights is weak and ineffective in certain developing countries despite their endorsement of neoliberalism by shedding light on the link between the institutional structure of the state and neoliberalism in the developing world. With the political economy perspective, the chapter aims to build a bridge between NIE and political economy, and thereby providing fertile ground for the advancement of NIE.

Sicherung privater Investitionen – ein geeignetes Instrument der Entwicklungshilfe?

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Egger ◽  
Andreas Freytag ◽  
Sebastian Voll ◽  
Philipp Harms
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
The Impact

AbstractPeter Egger’s paper provides a synthesis of findings with regard to the impact of bilateral as well as multilateral means of protection of cross-border direct investments in less developed countries and, in turn, on their economic growth. In particular, he focuses on the role of bilateral investment treaties and multilateral agreements such as the GATS in this regard. Previous empirical work identifies a significant positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. It suggests a similar impact of the GATS on FDI. He argues that these agreements contribute significantly to economic growth in less developed economies and countries in transition by spurring technology transfers through multinational activity of the developed countries in other economiesAndreas Freytag and Sebastian Voll emphasize the important role of adequate institutions both for investment and development. The question is, whether investment guarantees as insurance for political risks in the recipient country support economic development or not. Actually, the German Federal Republic is the leading warrantor for FDI-insurances on the world, but the benefiting countries are not the LDC’s. Using these warranties as an instrument of development policy in the future is content of actual political discussion. They argue that, in case of economies with weak domestic institutions, investment guarantees could provide disincentives for politicians in the target country to establish rule of law and good governance. On the other hand, investment guarantees could foster development by providing additional access to FDI, especially in emerging market economies with sufficient and improving institutional qualityPhilipp Harms points out while foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries and emerging markets have increased substantially in recent years, many low-income countries are still shunned by multinational firms. One of the key causes for this observation is the poor quality of institutions and an often precarious political environment in these countries. Given the benefits of FDI for host country productivity and income levels, it could thus be argued that protecting the security of property rights is an effective way of enhancing growth and prosperity in poor countries. While he agrees with this point of view, he argues that “traditional” forms of development aid can substantially contribute to an improved investment climate in developing countries. This argument is based on the notion that insecure property rights reflect distributional conflicts in the host country population, and that appropriate development support can shift agents’ distributional interests in favor of foreign firms.

Property Rights, Law, and Economic Development

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Xu
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Private Ownership ◽  
Performance Property ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
Sustainable Economic Growth ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article explores the relationship between property rights and economic performance. Property rights, or more precisely, formal, individualized property rights, have long been regarded as the fundamental precondition for sustainable economic growth. However, the available empirical evidence shows that formal private ownership fails to bring about desirable economic outcomes in most developing countries despite the advantages claimed by numerous economists and lawyers. This puzzle can be addressed by taking into consideration such factors as the functioning of related markets, the influence of social norms, and the role of the state.

Government`s Role in Korea`s Economic Development from a Perspective of the Institutions Hypothesis

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 115-128
Author(s):  
Park Sang In
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Development Experience ◽  
The 1960S

This paper divides economic institutions into three categories-coordination institutions, property rights institutions, and contracting institutions-and from this perspective, analyzes the role of government in Korea`s economic development from the 1960s to the 1980s. This analysis suggests that the Korean development experience is not in line with the conclusions of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), since property rights institutions did not play a significant role in Korea`s economic development. Instead, the Korean government acted as coordination institutions, which effectively overcame the coordination failure of the market and succeeded in generating effective demand to spur sustainable growth. These results invite further comparative and empirical studies on how Korea came to have a dictator whose goal was consistent with the economic growth of the nation.

scholarly journals Contracting Institutions, Property Rights and Economic Growth in the Post-90s Albania

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Curcija
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Time Series ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Time Series Data ◽  
Series Data ◽  
Significant Positive Effect ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Positive Effect

Economists often emphasize the role of institutions in order to explain the difference in wealth and development among different countries and in their researches they mark correlation between institution and economic development. This paper tests the validity of these models referring to Albania using time-series data from 1993 to 2015. There is evidence of significant positive effect of property rights on economic growth and credit to private sector, while there is evidenced insignificant impact of contracting institutions on economic outputs. A plausible explanation of these differences may be the different flexibility towards changes on property right institution rather than contracting institutions.

Stepping in the Shoes of Leaders of Populist Right-Wing Parties

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jolanda Jetten ◽  
Rachel Ryan ◽  
Frank Mols
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Growth Condition ◽  
Baseline Condition ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Economic Context

Abstract. What narrative is deemed most compelling to justify anti-immigrant sentiments when a country’s economy is not a cause for concern? We predicted that flourishing economies constrain the viability of realistic threat arguments. We found support for this prediction in an experiment in which participants were asked to take on the role of speechwriter for a leader with an anti-immigrant message (N = 75). As predicted, a greater percentage of realistic threat arguments and fewer symbolic threat arguments were generated in a condition in which the economy was expected to decline than when it was expected to grow or a baseline condition. Perhaps more interesting, in the economic growth condition, the percentage realistic entitlements and symbolic threat arguments generated were higher than when the economy was declining. We conclude that threat narratives to provide a legitimizing discourse for anti-immigrant sentiments are tailored to the economic context.

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