Counterfactual Simulation of the Islamic Model for Senegal

AbstractByrne (2005) assumes that counterfactual thinking requires a comparison of facts with an imagined alternative. In our view, however, this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. We argue that individuals do not necessarily engage in counterfactual simulations exclusively to evaluate factual reality. Instead, comparative evaluation is often suspended in favor of experiencing the counterfactual simulation as if it were real.

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Eye-Tracking Causality

Psychological Science ◽

10.1177/0956797617713053 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 28 (12) ◽

pp. 1731-1744 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Tobias Gerstenberg ◽

Matthew F. Peterson ◽

Noah D. Goodman ◽

David A. Lagnado ◽

Joshua B. Tenenbaum

Keyword(s):

Eye Movements ◽

Eye Tracking ◽

Direct Evidence ◽

Critical Role ◽

Billiard Ball ◽

Process Theories ◽

Causal Judgments ◽

High Level ◽

Counterfactual Simulation

How do people make causal judgments? What role, if any, does counterfactual simulation play? Counterfactual theories of causal judgments predict that people compare what actually happened with what would have happened if the candidate cause had been absent. Process theories predict that people focus only on what actually happened, to assess the mechanism linking candidate cause and outcome. We tracked participants’ eye movements while they judged whether one billiard ball caused another one to go through a gate or prevented it from going through. Both participants’ looking patterns and their judgments demonstrated that counterfactual simulation played a critical role. Participants simulated where the target ball would have gone if the candidate cause had been removed from the scene. The more certain participants were that the outcome would have been different, the stronger the causal judgments. These results provide the first direct evidence for spontaneous counterfactual simulation in an important domain of high-level cognition.

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A counterfactual simulation exercise of CO2 emissions abatement through fuel-switching in the UK (2008-2012)

International Journal of Global Energy Issues ◽

10.1504/ijgei.2012.046712 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 35 (5) ◽

pp. 311 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Julien Chevallier ◽

Erik Delarue ◽

Emeric Lujan ◽

William D' ◽

N.A. haeseleer

Keyword(s):

Simulation Exercise ◽

Fuel Switching ◽

The Uk ◽

Counterfactual Simulation

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The trajectory of counterfactual simulation in development

10.31234/osf.io/vq32j ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Jonathan F. Kominsky ◽

Tobias Gerstenberg ◽

Madeline Pelz ◽

Mark Sheskin ◽

Henrik Singmann ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Young Children ◽

The United States ◽

Developmental Changes ◽

Developmental Studies ◽

Counterfactual Reasoning ◽

Visual Matching ◽

Matching Strategy ◽

Choice Method ◽

Counterfactual Simulation ◽

Do So

Young children often struggle to answer the question “what would have happened?” particularly in cases where the adult-like “correct” answer has the same outcome as the event that actually occurred. Previous work has assumed that children fail because they cannot engage in accurate counterfactual simulations. Children have trouble considering what to change and what to keep fixed when comparing counterfactual alternatives to reality. However, most developmental studies on counterfactual reasoning have relied on binary yes/no responses to counterfactual questions about complex narratives and so have only been able to document when these failures occur but not why and how. Here, we investigate counterfactual reasoning in a domain in which specific counterfactual possibilities are very concrete: simple collision interactions. In Experiment 1, we show that 5- to 10-year-old children (recruited from schools and museums in Connecticut) succeed in making predictions but struggle to answer binary counterfactual questions. In Experiment 2, we use a multiple-choice method to allow children to select a specific counterfactual possibility. We find evidence that 4- to 6-year-old children (recruited online from across the United States) do conduct counterfactual simulations, but the counterfactual possibilities younger children consider differ from adult-like reasoning in systematic ways. Experiment 3 provides further evidence that young children engage in simulation rather than using a simpler visual matching strategy. Together, these experiments show that the developmental changes in counterfactual reasoning are not simply a matter of whether children engage in counterfactual simulation but also how they do so.

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Taylor Rule and the Macroeconomic Performance in Pakistan

The Pakistan Development Review ◽

10.30541/v49i1pp.37-56 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 49 (1) ◽

pp. 37-56 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Wasim Shahid Malik ◽

Ather Maqsood Ahmed

Keyword(s):

Monetary Policy ◽

Taylor Rule ◽

Jel Classification ◽

Macroeconomic Performance ◽

Policy Strategy ◽

Simple Instrument ◽

Extreme Deviation ◽

Parameter Values ◽

Actual Policy ◽

Counterfactual Simulation

A near-consensus position in modern macroeconomics is that policy rules have greater advantage over discretion in improving economic performance. For developing countries in particular, simple instrument rules appear to be feasible options as pre-requisites since more sophisticated targeting rules are generally lacking. Using Pakistan’s data, this study has attempted to estimate the Taylor rule and use it as monetary policy strategy to simulate the economy. Our results indicate that the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has not been following the Taylor rule. In fact, the actual policy has been an extreme deviation from it. On the other hand, counterfactual simulation confirms that macroeconomic performance could have been better in terms of stability of inflation and output, had the Taylor rule been adopted as monetary policy strategy. The study also establishes that further gains are possible if the parameter values of the rule are slightly modified. JEL classification: E47, E31, E52 Keywords: Taylor Rule, Macroeconomic Performance, Counterfactual Simulation

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A counterfactual simulation model of causal judgment

10.31234/osf.io/7zj94 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Tobias Gerstenberg ◽

Noah D. Goodman ◽

David Lagnado ◽

Joshua Tenenbaum

Keyword(s):

Simulation Model ◽

Causal Judgment ◽

Physical Domain ◽

Heuristic Model ◽

Physical Support ◽

Quantitative Mapping ◽

Causal Judgments ◽

Counterfactual Simulation

How do people make causal judgments? We introduce the counterfactual simulation model (CSM) which predicts causal judgments by comparing what actually happened with what would have happened in relevant counterfactual situations. The CSM postulates different aspects of causation that capture the extent to which a cause made a difference to whether and how the outcome occurred, and whether the cause was sufficient and robust. We test the CSM in three experiments in which participants make causal judgments about dynamic collision events. Experiment 1 establishes a very close quantitative mapping between causal judgments and counterfactual simulations. Experiment 2 demonstrates that counterfactuals are necessary for explaining causal judgments. Participants' judgments differed dramatically between pairs of situations in which what actually happened was identical, but where what would have happened differed. Experiment 3 features two candidate causes and shows that participants' judgments are sensitive to different aspects of causation. The CSM provides a better fit to participants' judgments than a heuristic model which uses features based on what actually happened. We discuss how the CSM can be used to model the semantics of different causal verbs, how it captures related concepts such as physical support, and how its predictions extend beyond the physical domain.

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