scholarly journals Dealing with Atypical Instances in Evidential Decision-Making

Author(s):  
Benjamin Quost ◽  
Marie-Hélène Masson ◽  
Sébastien Destercke
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed

Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.


Author(s):  
ELHUM NUSRAT ◽  
KOICHI YAMADA

In this paper, a descriptive decision-making model under uncertainty is proposed which incorporates two types of decision attitudes for uncertainty; one is an attitude about ignorance (optimism/pessimism) and the other one is about risk (risk-seeking and risk-aversion). At first, Evidential Decision Making Problem (EDMP) has been defined where Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) has been used to represent uncertainty. Then probability approximation approach of solving EDMP is shown. For deciding the decision weights in different attitudes of decision maker, Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operator has been used. Later on, Prospect Theory has been applied to accomplish a descriptive decision-making model. To show the effectiveness of our approach, a real life decision problem of travelers' route choice from a set of alternatives has also been provided.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Simen ◽  
Fuat Balcı

AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Danks

AbstractThe target article uses a mathematical framework derived from Bayesian decision making to demonstrate suboptimal decision making but then attributes psychological reality to the framework components. Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) positive proposal thus risks ignoring plausible psychological theories that could implement complex perceptual decision making. We must be careful not to slide from success with an analytical tool to the reality of the tool components.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
David R. Shanks ◽  
Ben R. Newell

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
David R. Shanks ◽  
Ben R. Newell

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie F. Reyna ◽  
David A. Broniatowski

Abstract Gilead et al. offer a thoughtful and much-needed treatment of abstraction. However, it fails to build on an extensive literature on abstraction, representational diversity, neurocognition, and psychopathology that provides important constraints and alternative evidence-based conceptions. We draw on conceptions in software engineering, socio-technical systems engineering, and a neurocognitive theory with abstract representations of gist at its core, fuzzy-trace theory.


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