Professional Decision Making: Reframing Teachers’ Work Using Epistemic Frame Theory

Author(s):  
Michael Phillips ◽  
Amanda Siebert-Evenstone ◽  
Aaron Kessler ◽  
Dragan Gasevic ◽  
David Williamson Shaffer
Author(s):  
Adam Mechtley

Epistemic frame theory has guided research using epistemic games, which are computer games focused on rich professional enculturation. Among other things, this theory characterizes communities of practice in terms of their epistemologies, which encompass the standards communities use to justify claims or actions. By drawing on contemporary perspectives in the subfield of research focused on epistemic cognition, this piece argues in favor of disambiguating enacted and professed epistemic cognition in epistemic frame theory, as well as attending to more nuances of the contexts of players' actions. These factors affect how we model communities of practice in games, how we assess players' capabilities, and what types of data we might include in our analyses of players' activity. By integrating with the epistemic cognition scholarship, games researchers could enrich their own work, while also leveraging some unique advantages of game-based learning to support broader goals in the scholarly community.


PARADIGMI ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
Claudia Casadio

- In the study of metaphor, frame is intended as the context, the environment, the landscape in which a metaphor is conceived, expressed and used; the term framing was introduced by George Lakoff within a cognitive setting and gives a distinctive shape to his theory. The idea however can be traced back to Richards (1936) and Black (1962): both the tenor vs. vehicle and the topic vs. focus distinctions, on the ba- sis of which they propose a general characterization of a metaphorical domain, can be considered as instances of framing in the sense argued by Lakoff. The same holds for recent cognitive theories of metaphor such as Way's (1991) and Indurkhya (1992). Interestingly, the notion of frame has been invoked by well known psychologists like Kahneman and Tversky as a fundamental conceptual model for explaining human rational behaviour and decision making. In this paper we maintain that the psychological approach is not indifferent to the frame theory of metaphor. On the contrary, it offers useful clues and research hypotheses for further development. Keywords: Context, Decision, Focus, Frame, Metaphor, Rationality.


Author(s):  
Andrea Sgarro

We develop a reference setting for uncertainty representation, i.e. incomplete interval probabilities, which we think may be useful not only at the formal but also at the conceptual level. The universe we choose to work on is a finite set, which is thought of as open (incomplete, not fully observable); a pre-assumption we make is acceptance of Dempster rule without the normalization coefficient as an adequate tool for pooling opinions. We make use of three comparatively old ingredients: interval probabilities, open-frame bodies of evidence and Rényi's incomplete probabilities. As for open-frame bodies of evidence, we introduce a formal novelty, seemingly of little or no consequence, which instead leads us quite naturally to the unifying approach of incomplete interval probabilities. We tackle the problem of forcing incomplete states of knowledge into completeness, as required at the operational stage of decision making.


Author(s):  
Marco Tagliabue ◽  
Massimo Cesareo ◽  
Valeria Squatrito ◽  
Giovambattista Presti

  Behavioral economics is a discipline that is mainly rooted in cognitivism and that is concerned with the study of decision-making processes and choice behavior. These involve addressing the relations between cognition and overt behavior, which comprise one of the most challenging topics in the domain of behavioral sciences at large and have been approached by different epistemological viewpoints. Within the cognitivist tradition, private events have been often treated as causes of behaviors, adopting a mechanistic view. Conversely, a contextual functional behavioral perspective treats them with the same methodology that is adopted for overt behaviors. Relational frame theory, a post-Skinnerian theory of language and cognition, offers a behavioral perspective on cognition and overt behavior and how they influence human behavior, by keeping a high degree of coherence with basic principles and goals of behavior analysis (i.e., effective action). This conceptual paper represents an attempt to offer a perspective drawn from contextual behavioral science on some constructs described in behavioral economics. Furthermore, it provides a common ground for behavior analysts and researchers in other fields of psychology to further expand our knowledge and respective explanations of decision-making processes. Finally, it draws a line for connecting basic research to applied solutions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Simen ◽  
Fuat Balcı

AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Danks

AbstractThe target article uses a mathematical framework derived from Bayesian decision making to demonstrate suboptimal decision making but then attributes psychological reality to the framework components. Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) positive proposal thus risks ignoring plausible psychological theories that could implement complex perceptual decision making. We must be careful not to slide from success with an analytical tool to the reality of the tool components.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
David R. Shanks ◽  
Ben R. Newell

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
David R. Shanks ◽  
Ben R. Newell

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document