Higher Order Preference on the Evolution of Cooperation on Barabási–Albert Scale-Free Network

Author(s):  
Fengjie Xie ◽  
Zhonglong Zhao ◽  
Panpan Yang
2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kohei Tamura ◽  
Rieko C Morita ◽  
Yasuo Ihara

Punishment has been deemed as a key to solve the puzzle of the evolution of cooperation. Recent studies have suggested that altruistic punishment may be motivated by preference for social equality (egalitarian punishment). Here we construct individual-based models to investigate the effectiveness of egalitarian punishment in promoting cooperation. Based on computational experiments, we first show that egalitarian punishment is as effective as classic punishment, which directly observes others' strategies, in a meta-population model. We then use a scale-free network model to show that egalitarian punishment can be effective even when heterogeneity in the number of interactions among individuals is incorporated. Finally, we show that generosity in punishment can affect co-evolution of egalitarian punishment and cooperation.


Complexity ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Pilwon Kim

At an individual level, cooperation can be seen as a behaviour that uses personal resource to support others or the groups which one belongs to. In a conflict between two individuals, a selfish person gains an advantage over a cooperative opponent, while in a group-group conflict the group with more cooperators wins. In this work, we develop a population model with continual conflicts at various scales and show cooperation can be sustained even when interpersonal conflicts dominate, as long as the conflict size follows a power law. The power law assumption has been met in several observations from real-world conflicts. Specifically if the population is structured on a scale-free network, both the power law distribution of conflicts and the survival of cooperation can be naturally induced without assuming a homogeneous population or frequent relocation of members. On the scale-free network, even when most people become selfish from continual person-person conflicts, people on the hubs tend to remain unselfish and play a role as “repositories” of cooperation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (30) ◽  
pp. 1850334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ai-Zhong Shen ◽  
Jin-Li Guo ◽  
Jun-Fang Wang ◽  
Qi Suo

Extortion strategies can unilaterally transcend any opponent’s expected payoffs and promote cooperative behaviors in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. However, extortion strategies have the evolutionary instability if the players game with uniform structure. In this paper, we study the influence of extortion on the evolution of cooperation in the scale-free network with the player’s game payoffs calculated by average payoffs and the strategy update rule according to the replicator dynamics rule. Firstly, we study the stability of evolutionary game results after introducing the extortion strategy and the influence of evolution extortion on cooperation. In addition, we compare the results of our model with the donation games of the accumulated payoff in the BA networks. Moreover, we study the influence of the model parameters on game results. The results show that extortion can form long-term stable relationships with neighbors and the average payoffs’ inhibiting effect of cooperative behaviors disappear after introducing the extortion strategies in the scale-free network. The smaller value of the extortion actor and the benefit factor have a greater effect on the stability density of the strategies but the initial strategy density does not.


2009 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 1230-1232
Author(s):  
Hao RAO ◽  
Chun YANG ◽  
Shao-hua TAO

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiuwen Fu ◽  
Yongsheng Yang ◽  
Haiqing Yao

Previous research of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) invulnerability mainly focuses on the static topology, while ignoring the cascading process of the network caused by the dynamic changes of load. Therefore, given the realistic features of WSNs, in this paper we research the invulnerability of WSNs with respect to cascading failures based on the coupled map lattice (CML). The invulnerability and the cascading process of four types of network topologies (i.e., random network, small-world network, homogenous scale-free network, and heterogeneous scale-free network) under various attack schemes (i.e., random attack, max-degree attack, and max-status attack) are investigated, respectively. The simulation results demonstrate that the rise of interference R and coupling coefficient ε will increase the risks of cascading failures. Cascading threshold values Rc and εc exist, where cascading failures will spread to the entire network when R>Rc or ε>εc. When facing a random attack or max-status attack, the network with higher heterogeneity tends to have a stronger invulnerability towards cascading failures. Conversely, when facing a max-degree attack, the network with higher uniformity tends to have a better performance. Besides that, we have also proved that the spreading speed of cascading failures is inversely proportional to the average path length of the network and the increase of average degree k can improve the network invulnerability.


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