The influence of extortion strategies on the evolution of cooperation in the scale-free network

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (30) ◽  
pp. 1850334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ai-Zhong Shen ◽  
Jin-Li Guo ◽  
Jun-Fang Wang ◽  
Qi Suo
Keyword(s):  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Uniform Structure ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Free Network ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors ◽  
The Stability

Extortion strategies can unilaterally transcend any opponent’s expected payoffs and promote cooperative behaviors in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. However, extortion strategies have the evolutionary instability if the players game with uniform structure. In this paper, we study the influence of extortion on the evolution of cooperation in the scale-free network with the player’s game payoffs calculated by average payoffs and the strategy update rule according to the replicator dynamics rule. Firstly, we study the stability of evolutionary game results after introducing the extortion strategy and the influence of evolution extortion on cooperation. In addition, we compare the results of our model with the donation games of the accumulated payoff in the BA networks. Moreover, we study the influence of the model parameters on game results. The results show that extortion can form long-term stable relationships with neighbors and the average payoffs’ inhibiting effect of cooperative behaviors disappear after introducing the extortion strategies in the scale-free network. The smaller value of the extortion actor and the benefit factor have a greater effect on the stability density of the strategies but the initial strategy density does not.

scholarly journals Evolution of egalitarian punishment

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kohei Tamura ◽  
Rieko C Morita ◽  
Yasuo Ihara
Keyword(s):  
Network Model ◽  
Population Model ◽  
Computational Experiments ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Social Equality ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Individual Based Models ◽  
Free Network

Punishment has been deemed as a key to solve the puzzle of the evolution of cooperation. Recent studies have suggested that altruistic punishment may be motivated by preference for social equality (egalitarian punishment). Here we construct individual-based models to investigate the effectiveness of egalitarian punishment in promoting cooperation. Based on computational experiments, we first show that egalitarian punishment is as effective as classic punishment, which directly observes others' strategies, in a meta-population model. We then use a scale-free network model to show that egalitarian punishment can be effective even when heterogeneity in the number of interactions among individuals is incorporated. Finally, we show that generosity in punishment can affect co-evolution of egalitarian punishment and cooperation.

scholarly journals An Evolution Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Network considering Government Subsidies and Supervision

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Liangqun Qi ◽  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Zang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Networks ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Free Network ◽  
The Government

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game-based theory in the B-A scale-free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium-intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.

scholarly journals Evolution of Cooperation through Power Law Distributed Conflicts

Complexity ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Pilwon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Power Law ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Power Law Distribution ◽  
Homogeneous Population ◽  
Interpersonal Conflicts ◽  
Personal Resource ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Free Network

At an individual level, cooperation can be seen as a behaviour that uses personal resource to support others or the groups which one belongs to. In a conflict between two individuals, a selfish person gains an advantage over a cooperative opponent, while in a group-group conflict the group with more cooperators wins. In this work, we develop a population model with continual conflicts at various scales and show cooperation can be sustained even when interpersonal conflicts dominate, as long as the conflict size follows a power law. The power law assumption has been met in several observations from real-world conflicts. Specifically if the population is structured on a scale-free network, both the power law distribution of conflicts and the survival of cooperation can be naturally induced without assuming a homogeneous population or frequent relocation of members. On the scale-free network, even when most people become selfish from continual person-person conflicts, people on the hubs tend to remain unselfish and play a role as “repositories” of cooperation.

Research on new evolution model of scale-free network

2009 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 1230-1232
Author(s):  
Hao RAO ◽  
Chun YANG ◽  
Shao-hua TAO
Keyword(s):  
Evolution Model ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Free Network
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