Self-questioning dynamical evolutionary game with altruistic behavior and sharing mechanism in scale-free network

Author(s):  
Bo Yang ◽  
Jinhai Li
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Liangqun Qi ◽  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Zang

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game-based theory in the B-A scale-free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium-intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (30) ◽  
pp. 1850334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ai-Zhong Shen ◽  
Jin-Li Guo ◽  
Jun-Fang Wang ◽  
Qi Suo

Extortion strategies can unilaterally transcend any opponent’s expected payoffs and promote cooperative behaviors in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. However, extortion strategies have the evolutionary instability if the players game with uniform structure. In this paper, we study the influence of extortion on the evolution of cooperation in the scale-free network with the player’s game payoffs calculated by average payoffs and the strategy update rule according to the replicator dynamics rule. Firstly, we study the stability of evolutionary game results after introducing the extortion strategy and the influence of evolution extortion on cooperation. In addition, we compare the results of our model with the donation games of the accumulated payoff in the BA networks. Moreover, we study the influence of the model parameters on game results. The results show that extortion can form long-term stable relationships with neighbors and the average payoffs’ inhibiting effect of cooperative behaviors disappear after introducing the extortion strategies in the scale-free network. The smaller value of the extortion actor and the benefit factor have a greater effect on the stability density of the strategies but the initial strategy density does not.


2009 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 1230-1232
Author(s):  
Hao RAO ◽  
Chun YANG ◽  
Shao-hua TAO

2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 581-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming ZHENG ◽  
Yan-Xin HUANG ◽  
Wei SHEN ◽  
Yi ZHONG ◽  
Jia-Nan WU ◽  
...  

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiuwen Fu ◽  
Yongsheng Yang ◽  
Haiqing Yao

Previous research of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) invulnerability mainly focuses on the static topology, while ignoring the cascading process of the network caused by the dynamic changes of load. Therefore, given the realistic features of WSNs, in this paper we research the invulnerability of WSNs with respect to cascading failures based on the coupled map lattice (CML). The invulnerability and the cascading process of four types of network topologies (i.e., random network, small-world network, homogenous scale-free network, and heterogeneous scale-free network) under various attack schemes (i.e., random attack, max-degree attack, and max-status attack) are investigated, respectively. The simulation results demonstrate that the rise of interference R and coupling coefficient ε will increase the risks of cascading failures. Cascading threshold values Rc and εc exist, where cascading failures will spread to the entire network when R>Rc or ε>εc. When facing a random attack or max-status attack, the network with higher heterogeneity tends to have a stronger invulnerability towards cascading failures. Conversely, when facing a max-degree attack, the network with higher uniformity tends to have a better performance. Besides that, we have also proved that the spreading speed of cascading failures is inversely proportional to the average path length of the network and the increase of average degree k can improve the network invulnerability.


2005 ◽  
Vol 72 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazumoto Iguchi ◽  
Shuichi Kinoshita ◽  
Hiroaki Yamada

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Zhu ◽  
Lei Wang ◽  
Xiang Zheng ◽  
Yuzhang Xu

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