The Rule of Law and Legal State Doctrines as a Methodology of the Philosophy of Law

Author(s):  
Dmitry Dedov
Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
Alex Silk

ABSTRACTIt is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.


Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Oberdiek

This article on the philosophy of law focuses on contemporary discussions of law’s normative foundations. This branch of philosophy of law, also called normative legal theory, overlaps with topics in political philosophy and ethics, as well as with analytical general jurisprudence, and it is a lively and rich area of philosophical research. As this description suggests, normative philosophy of law covers a vast territory. A case could easily be made to include several dozen more topics under this heading, or indeed to devote separate overarching entries to many of the topics that might be subsumed under normative philosophy of law. The philosophy of criminal law, for example, comprises far more than theories of punishment. This is all to say that what follows is but a primer. The common focus of the following topics is the relationship between individuals and the state. Examining that relationship has long been a principal concern of normative philosophy of law. More specifically, normative philosophy of law in the dominant Anglophone tradition has long been devoted to exploring the state’s role in alternately protecting and constraining individual liberty through law. This article charts aspects of that alternating role, focusing on authority, the duty to obey the law, the rule of law, rights, legal moralism, and punishment.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-430
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

I argue that attention to Austin helps us to appreciate that there are significant continuities between his legal theory and that of contemporary positivists; hence, to the extent that Austin’s theory has defects, these are reproduced in the work of contemporary legal positivism. An historical perspective on contemporary philosophy of law thus permits one to appreciate that the basic divide in legal theory is between a tradition whose basic intuition is that law is answerable to a moral ideal of legality and the positivist tradition that sees law as the transmitter of political judgment. For the former, the rule of law tradition, the basic problem for philosophy of law is to explain the distinction between the rule of law and the arbitrary rule of men. For the latter, the rule by law tradition, the basic problem is to explain how law can effectively transmit the judgments made political elites. The rule by law tradition encounters severe difficulties in making sense of the idea of government according to law, difficulties which reach their height once legal positivists accept, following Hart, that philosophy of law has to understand law as a normative phenomenon, which in turns requires taking seriously the internal point of view of legal officials.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Segun Gbadegesin

Review of John Ayotunde Isola Bewaji's The Rule of Law and Governance in Indigenous Yoruba Society: A Study in African Philosophy of Law. Lexington Books, 2016, 282 pages.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Kalthöner

The modern idea of the rule of law is based on the assertion that with the establishment of law as a central instrument of control, the incidence of violence within society could be reduced. This understanding of law is radically questioned by Walter Benjamin in his essay "Critique of Violence" and by certain poststructural authors; for them law itself is entangled in a violent momentum. This study reconstructs the discourse between Walter Benjamin, Jaques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, and Christoph Menke on the violence of law and reflects on it from a legal perspective. In doing so, it addresses both – the philosophy of law as well as jurisprudence interested in basic principles of law.


IEE Review ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 218
Author(s):  
Clifford Gray
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