scholarly journals THEORIES OF VAGUENESS AND THEORIES OF LAW

Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
Alex Silk

ABSTRACTIt is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Oberdiek

This article on the philosophy of law focuses on contemporary discussions of law’s normative foundations. This branch of philosophy of law, also called normative legal theory, overlaps with topics in political philosophy and ethics, as well as with analytical general jurisprudence, and it is a lively and rich area of philosophical research. As this description suggests, normative philosophy of law covers a vast territory. A case could easily be made to include several dozen more topics under this heading, or indeed to devote separate overarching entries to many of the topics that might be subsumed under normative philosophy of law. The philosophy of criminal law, for example, comprises far more than theories of punishment. This is all to say that what follows is but a primer. The common focus of the following topics is the relationship between individuals and the state. Examining that relationship has long been a principal concern of normative philosophy of law. More specifically, normative philosophy of law in the dominant Anglophone tradition has long been devoted to exploring the state’s role in alternately protecting and constraining individual liberty through law. This article charts aspects of that alternating role, focusing on authority, the duty to obey the law, the rule of law, rights, legal moralism, and punishment.


Author(s):  
Kim Economides

This paper questions some basic assumptions of legal theory, education and practice from the perspective of rural, remote and regional (RRR) legal communities beyond the metropolis. Legal ideologies and values fundamental to the legitimacy of the modern state, such as the Rule of Law, are embedded in most law curricula and reinforced at every stage of the educational continuum, and commonly assert that law, legal rights and access to courts of law apply equally regardless of physical location or social status. Despite this, indigenous and other excluded groups living in peripheral communities frequently experience law differently from their urban counterparts, as do legal professionals living and working outside the city. The key issue examined concerns how centre-periphery tension should best be managed in the future regulation of law and lawyers. What kind of policies and strategies may genuinely assist social inclusion and to what extent should law and legal practice accommodate diversity? How and to what extent should lawyers and para-legals represent the interests of communities rather than private individuals in RRR areas of Australia? What kind of training and technological support do they require? The paper aims to set out some choices that confront policymakers while drawing upon international experience that may offer some guidance.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-430
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

I argue that attention to Austin helps us to appreciate that there are significant continuities between his legal theory and that of contemporary positivists; hence, to the extent that Austin’s theory has defects, these are reproduced in the work of contemporary legal positivism. An historical perspective on contemporary philosophy of law thus permits one to appreciate that the basic divide in legal theory is between a tradition whose basic intuition is that law is answerable to a moral ideal of legality and the positivist tradition that sees law as the transmitter of political judgment. For the former, the rule of law tradition, the basic problem for philosophy of law is to explain the distinction between the rule of law and the arbitrary rule of men. For the latter, the rule by law tradition, the basic problem is to explain how law can effectively transmit the judgments made political elites. The rule by law tradition encounters severe difficulties in making sense of the idea of government according to law, difficulties which reach their height once legal positivists accept, following Hart, that philosophy of law has to understand law as a normative phenomenon, which in turns requires taking seriously the internal point of view of legal officials.


Author(s):  
Вадим Павлов ◽  
Vadim Pavlov

the article deals with the development of the modern theory of law-making process. The main changes that took place in the sphere of law-making in the post-Soviet period are analyzed. The importance of the use of such a modern law-making tool as regulatory impact assessment is considered. The analysis of the process of lawmaking from the perspective of anthropology of law is offered. The rule of law and its normativity in the anthropological approach do not precisely express the essence of law, but are only its substantive basis. The essence of law is necessarily expressed with the participation of a person in law, a subject involved in legal interaction. In addition to the rule of law and human rights in law, the third element of legal reality is significant – the fact of legal life, which reveals both the normative properties of the legal system, and reveals the legal properties of a person in law. Thus, in the anthropological approach, the rule of law and the normativity of law in comparison with the classical theory of law-making acquire a new meaning, characterized by the fact that in a General sense it can be called anthropologization of law, the acquisition of its human dimension. On this basis, the theory and practice of lawmaking should focus on the development of the doctrine of the interpretation of law, as well as on the practice of its implementation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-131
Author(s):  
James Bernard Murphy

Philosophers and lawyers have long argued about the relation of law to politics: “does the king make law” or “does law make the king”? This persistent debate stems from two different perspectives on the nature of law. Professors of law have long noted that laypersons tend to speak of “a law” and the “laws” while lawyers tend to speak more holistically of “the law.” After discussing how rival perspectives in legal theory can be compared and evaluated, several dimensions of this contrast between the lay and the lawyerly conceptions of law: the individuation of laws, the sources of law, the ethical and imperative aspects of law, and the nature of the rule of law are analyzed. The distinction between a lawyerly and a lay perspective on law is reflected in the traditional linguistic and conceptual distinction between ius and lex. Many of the classic philosophers of law, from Plato to Hobbes, are rank laymen when it comes to their descriptions of law since the lawyerly understanding of law has only very recently achieved philosophical articulation.


Author(s):  
Ruslan Skrynkovskyy ◽  
◽  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  
Yuriy Mazur ◽  
Valentyn Serdiuk ◽  
...  

The article reveals the peculiarities of the observance and implementation of the principle of the rule of law in the judicial practice of Ukraine. It was established that the implementation of the rule of law is regulated by the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine «On a Court Decision in a Civil Case», the Law of Ukraine «On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges» and the Constitution of Ukraine. It has been established that the principle of the rule of law is one of the main principles of a democratic society. It has been established that the problem of observance of the principle of the rule of law in the judicial practice of Ukraine is of a complex nature, and it can be solved only through the implementation of a comprehensive judicial and legal reform. It has been established that in the context of observing the rule of law in Ukraine, the experience of the European Court of Human Rights should be implemented. It has been established that the implementation of the principle of the rule of law occurs through the implementation of the principle of legal certainty, the principle of juridical certainty, the principle of justice, the principle of equality, the principle of clarity and unambiguity of the legal norm, the principle of proportionality, the principle of predictability. It has been proven that in the context of the administration of justice, the court must comply with the principle of the rule of law, as well as ensure the right of everyone to a fair trial, to ensure respect for everyone, as well as other rights and freedoms defined by legislative and regulatory documents. It has been established that one of the main principles for the implementation of the principle of the rule of law is the implementation of changes in legislation in order to establish an appropriate transitional period (that is, a reasonable period between the date of the official promulgation of the law and the date of entry into force of the law). It was determined that the implementation of the principle of the rule of law indicates the limited nature of public authorities in actions, primarily those regulated by law, and the main goal of the principle of the rule of law is to limit state power over everyone, as a result of which the rights of everyone should be properly ensured against arbitrary (and at the same time inappropriate) interference of the state or public authorities, in particular, in the relevant spheres of life of everyone. It is noted that the prospects for further research in this direction are the study of the legal foundations of other principles that guide the activities of the judicial authorities of Ukraine.


Author(s):  
Robert Piszko

Abstract In case when the criteria for the validity of interpretative directives are not clearly defined and a political dispute arises, the dispute participant may refer to such interpretative directives, the use of which will determine the content of the law and determine the outcome of the political dispute. In this way a crisis of the legal order in Poland has occurred. Therefore, the aim of this article is to draw attention to the consequences of the undefined status of the directives of legal interpretation, the resulting need for legitimacy of the interpretation of the law, the role of legal views (legal doctrine) possible in this respect and the validation role of the interpretation custom in legal doctrine. The article consists of four parts. The first one describes the phenomena that have disrupted the traditional approach to the sources of law. The second part describes the traditional approach to the sources of the law. The third one proves that the traditional approach to the sources of law, in which the main role is fulfilled by normative acts, is incorrect, this part also indicates that the key role in this respect is played by spontaneous rules of law interpretation. The fourth part indicates the need to legitimize the interpretation of the law and the role of the interpretation custom in judicial doctrine. The research material includes parliamentary practice in Poland, practice of law interpretation and scientific studies on law interpretation. The research material was examined mainly using the method of linguistic analysis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Yu.A. Shevchenko ◽  
O.V. Kharytonova

This article is devoted to the analysis of the current legislation of Ukraine, as well as judicial practice in the context of the need to enter information in the declaration of a person authorized to perform the functions of the state or local government, namely the column "Financial Liabilities", in the form of surety, and the problem of providing a criminal legal assessment in the context of the possibility of the acts qualification under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter - the Criminal Code of Ukraine). These issues nowadays acquire the status of an exceptional legal problem due to the lack of a single law enforcement practice, and therefore require theoretical and practical consideration. In this regard, the article focuses on the analysis of certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption", consideration of the crime under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, as well as consideration of the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court Ukraine, courts of appeal and local courts. Much of the author's attention is focused on the concept of legal nature and the institution of bail in general. In doing so, the author explored the above issues through the lens of human rights protection, based on the understanding of the essence of the principle of legal certainty, which is part of the concept of the rule of law. The conclusions suggested proposals as for improving the question that author discussed by amending national anti-corruption legislation in order to enable it to qualify the act provided for in Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in the form of failure to enter information in the declaration column "Financial liabilities" of the persons authorized to perform the functions of state or local government in the presence of surety. In particular, the author emphasized that formulation of the norm, which defines the concept of "financial liabilities", makes it impossible to apply it in the context of qualifying a crime under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine due to lack of legal certainty, which makes it impossible to maintain the principle the rule of law, and therefore a priori, human rights and freedoms will be violated.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-510
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

Justice Rand’s judgment in Roncarelli v. Duplessis is best understood in light of recent political and legal theory that argues for the importance of the republican ideal of non-domination for in it he sets out an account of the rule of law that gives clear expression to that ideal, one founded in a more basic ideal of respect for persons. As Rand understood things, Roncarelli was a member of a disliked minority, who was singled out for persecution when he had done nothing more than exercise his rights as a free and equal subject of the law. Those who singled him out for persecution sought to achieve their ends through law. The author argues that since government under law is valuable because it helps to secure non-domination (the rule of law rather than the arbitrary rule of men), to use law to single out an individual for domination is, as Duplessis discovered, rather a complex business. No matter one’s grip on power, one might find that one’s ends simply do not count as public ends within a system of public law because such a system is predicated on respect for the persons who are subject to its authority.


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