Philosophy of Law: Normative Foundations

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Oberdiek

This article on the philosophy of law focuses on contemporary discussions of law’s normative foundations. This branch of philosophy of law, also called normative legal theory, overlaps with topics in political philosophy and ethics, as well as with analytical general jurisprudence, and it is a lively and rich area of philosophical research. As this description suggests, normative philosophy of law covers a vast territory. A case could easily be made to include several dozen more topics under this heading, or indeed to devote separate overarching entries to many of the topics that might be subsumed under normative philosophy of law. The philosophy of criminal law, for example, comprises far more than theories of punishment. This is all to say that what follows is but a primer. The common focus of the following topics is the relationship between individuals and the state. Examining that relationship has long been a principal concern of normative philosophy of law. More specifically, normative philosophy of law in the dominant Anglophone tradition has long been devoted to exploring the state’s role in alternately protecting and constraining individual liberty through law. This article charts aspects of that alternating role, focusing on authority, the duty to obey the law, the rule of law, rights, legal moralism, and punishment.

Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
Alex Silk

ABSTRACTIt is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.


Author(s):  
Susan Longfield Karr

For humanist sixteenth-century jurists such as Guillaume Budé, Ulrich Zasius, Andrea Alciati the ‘rule of law’ was central. In response to the use of law and legal theory to legitimize arbitrary forms of authority, they called for substantive reforms in legal education and practice, which could alleviate the dangers of masking the arbitrary will of rulers with the language of security, utility, and the common good. By focusing on fundamental categories such as ius, natural law, and ius gentium they effectively argued for a universal ‘rule of law’ that could hold political and legal authorities to a higher criterion of justice. In so doing, they redefined fundamental legal categories, ideas, and terms that continue to underpin and structure modern understandings of universal jurisprudence and international law to this day.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-430
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

I argue that attention to Austin helps us to appreciate that there are significant continuities between his legal theory and that of contemporary positivists; hence, to the extent that Austin’s theory has defects, these are reproduced in the work of contemporary legal positivism. An historical perspective on contemporary philosophy of law thus permits one to appreciate that the basic divide in legal theory is between a tradition whose basic intuition is that law is answerable to a moral ideal of legality and the positivist tradition that sees law as the transmitter of political judgment. For the former, the rule of law tradition, the basic problem for philosophy of law is to explain the distinction between the rule of law and the arbitrary rule of men. For the latter, the rule by law tradition, the basic problem is to explain how law can effectively transmit the judgments made political elites. The rule by law tradition encounters severe difficulties in making sense of the idea of government according to law, difficulties which reach their height once legal positivists accept, following Hart, that philosophy of law has to understand law as a normative phenomenon, which in turns requires taking seriously the internal point of view of legal officials.


ICL Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-211
Author(s):  
Nadia E Nedzel

Abstract The Rule of Law and economic development are widely regarded as necessary for a successful society, but defining the international rule of law and explaining the relationship with economic development has proven elusive. This article begins with explanations posited by Hayek and others, but brings a fresh perspective grounded in a multidisciplinary and contextual approach that includes history, philosophy, economics, and law. Properly defined, the rule of law refers to a specific understanding of the relationship between the individual and government. The common law conception of the rule of law (as opposed to the civilian Rechtsstaat or L’État de Droit) is historically more supportive of economic development, but modern international descriptions and definitions confuse the two. Based on empirical economic studies and historical legal anthropology, the common law understanding focused on limited government and individual freedom from interference has proven more likely to encourage entrepreneurship and hence economic development on a long-term basis.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Jaffe ◽  
Antonio Canova ◽  
Jose Gregorio Contreras ◽  
Ana Cecilia Soares ◽  
Juan Carlos Correa ◽  
...  

Balcanica ◽  
2014 ◽  
pp. 399-434
Author(s):  
Vojislav Stanovcic

The papers discusses the views of Slobodan Jovanovic (1869-1958) on several phenomena of Serbia?s political and institutional development in the hundred years between the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 and the fall of the Obrenovic dynasty in 1903, and on different political systems, looking at the sources on which his thought drew upon, the ideas he was guided by and the theoretical framework of his legal and socio-political thinking. His major work, a legal theory of the state, as most of his other writings, was his own contribution to what he held to be a national mission, the building of a modern state based on the rule of law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 371
Author(s):  
Marthen Arie

The applicable law (as a result of legislation) is not always a reflection of the society concerned. Local regulations in the area were impressed into law to be “forced” because it does not conform to the spirit and characteristics of the society. The formation of local regulation is increasingly complex and complicated when the process and its substance beside cannot be separated from the political process, it is also cannot be separated from social processes. The problematic of local regulation formation is indicated by the fact that the authorized institution to arrange the local regulation is still not sufficient to produce products of high quality local laws. Legisprudence theory may open new perspectives on the validity of norm or legitimacy of norm and by course using this approach the quality of local regulations will be more qualified. Although a political approach is more into the heart in the legislative process but legislation and regulation can be an important object. Legal theory is not only a basis on enforcement or implementation of the rule of law, but it is very useful theory in law-making.


Author(s):  
Gabdrakhman H. Valiev ◽  
Sergey V. Kondratyuk ◽  
Natalia A. Prodanova ◽  
Irina A. Babalikova ◽  
Kermen I. Makaeva ◽  
...  

The problem of the relationship of law and order is relevant to any modern society. The article tries to analyze this relationship, taking into account judicial, police and other activities. The named concepts are closely interconnected, but are not identical. They are correlated as cause and effect: there is a rule of law, there is no rule of law. One suggests the other. The rule of law as concrete reality logically precedes the rule of law as a doctrine, the connection here is hard, causal. The process is one. Law and order: a real indicator of the state of legality, reflects the degree of compliance with the laws, the requirements of all legal regulations. It is concluded that the rule of law is the end result of the implementation of legal requirements and, at the same time, the objective of legal regulation, since it is for the formation and maintenance of the rule of law that laws are issued, thus like other regulatory legal acts, various institutions and bodies and, above all, the justice system, the control system, various human rights organizations and social movements.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlatka Bilas ◽  
Mile Bošnjak ◽  
Sanja Franc

The aim of this paper is to establish and clarify the relationship between corruption level and development among European Union countries. Out of the estimated model in this paper one can conclude that the level of corruption can explain capital abundance differences among European Union countries. Also, explanatory power of corruption is higher in explaining economic development than in explaining capital abundance, meaning stronger relationship between corruption level and economic development than between corruption level and capital abundance. There is no doubt that reducing corruption would be beneficial for all countries. Since corruption is a wrongdoing, the rule of law enforcement is of utmost importance. However, root causes of corruption, namely the institutional and social environment: recruiting civil servants on a merit basis, salaries in public sector competitive to the ones in private sector, the role of international institutions in the fight against corruption, and some other corruption characteristics are very important to analyze in order to find effective ways to fight corruption. Further research should go into this direction.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1072-1097
Author(s):  
Atina Krajewska

AbstractThis article examines the relationship between reproductive rights, democracy, and the rule of law in transitional societies. As a case study, it examines the development of abortion law in Poland. The article makes three primary claims. First, it argues that the relationship between reproductive rights and the rule of law in Poland came clearly into view through the abortion judgment K 1/20, handed down by the Constitutional Tribunal in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. The judgment and the context in which it was issued and published are interpreted as reflections of deep-lying processes and problems in Polish society. Consequently, second, the article argues that analysis of the history of reproductive rights in recent decades in Poland reveals weak institutionalization of the rule of law. This is manifest in the ways in which different professional groups, especially doctors and lawyers, have addressed questions regarding abortion law. Therefore, third, the article argues that any assessment of the rule of law should take into account how powerful professional actors and organizations interact with the law. The Polish case study shows that reproductive rights should be seen as important parts of a “litmus test,” which we can use to examine the efficacy of democratic transitions and the quality of the democracies in which such transitions result.


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