When Is a Mechanistic Explanation Satisfactory? Reductionism and Antireductionism in the Context of Mechanistic Explanations

Author(s):  
Tudor M. Băetu
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 567-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Miłkowski ◽  
Mateusz Hohol ◽  
Przemysław Nowakowski

The focus of this special issue of Theory & Psychology is on explanatory mechanisms in psychology, especially on problems of particular prominence for psychological science such as theoretical integration and unification. Proponents of the framework of mechanistic explanation claim, in short, that satisfactory explanations in psychology and related fields are causal. They stress the importance of explaining phenomena by describing mechanisms that are responsible for them, in particular by elucidating how the organization of component parts and operations in mechanisms gives rise to phenomena in certain conditions. We hope for cross-pollination between philosophical approaches to explanation and experimental psychology, which could offer methodological guidance, in particular where mechanism discovery and theoretical integration are at issue. Contributions in this issue pertain to theoretical integration and unification of psychology as well as the growing importance of causal mechanistic explanations in psychological science.


2001 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 208-219
Author(s):  
A E Gargett ◽  
M Li ◽  
R Brown

Based on observed correlations, marine fisheries are often hypothesized to depend on environmental factors. Since correlations are unreliable as a predictive tool, it is desirable to seek mechanistic explanations for observed correlations. This paper considers methods available for testing such mechanistic explanations. As a specific example, we consider the optimal stability window, proposed as a mechanistic explanation of observed correlations between the survival of North Pacific salmon stocks and the state of the atmosphere over the North Pacific in winter, as applied to the coastal waters and fisheries of southern British Columbia, Canada.


Author(s):  
Sarah K. Robins ◽  
Carl F. Craver

This article examines the concept of mechanistic explanation by considering the mechanism of circadian rhythm or biological clocks. It provides an account of mechanistic explanation and some common failures of mechanistic explanation and discusses the sense in which mechanistic explanations typically span multiple levels. The article suggests that models that describe mechanisms are more useful for the purposes of manipulation and control than are scientific models that do not describe mechanisms. It comments on the criticism that the mechanistic explanation is far too simple to fully express the complexity of real explanations in neuroscience and that neuroscientific explanations require emergent properties that cannot be explained by decomposition into the parts, activities, and organizational features that constitute the mechanism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 156-181
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini

Psychological and neuroscientific explanations strongly constrain one another, so much so that psychology has become an integral part of cognitive neuroscience. The functional analyses of classical cognitive psychology can be integrated with neuroscientific explanations to form multilevel mechanistic explanations of cognition. At each level of mechanistic organization, a mechanism explains phenomena by showing that they are produced by suitably organized components. This requires abstraction from irrelevant causes and lower level details, which abstraction is an essential aspect of mechanistic explanation. Therefore, psychological and neuroscientific explanations are not autonomous from one another.


Author(s):  
Carrie Figdor

Chapters 8 and 9 present objections to Literalism inspired by its implications. Chapter 8 presents the homuncular functionalist view of psychological explanation, which holds that in order to naturalize the mind we need to posit “homunculi”, or ever-simpler capacities, to avoid explaining intelligence with intelligence. Otherwise one commits the homuncular fallacy. The Literalist responds that the fallacy is not a fallacy. Many contemporary mechanistic explanations commonly ascribe the same capacities at many levels in the same decomposition, and there is no plausible way to carve out an exception for psychology. It reinterprets the demand for “discharging” the psychological capacities in terms of finding mathematical models to illuminate old concepts rather than inventing new ones. It also argues that decompositional hierarchies of simple and basic capacities and simple and basic objects are not mirror images of each other.


Author(s):  
James Woodward

This chapter employs an interventionist framework to elucidate some issues having to do with explanation in neurobiology. I argue that this framework can be used to distinguish theories and models that are explanatory from those that are merely descriptive. This framework can also be used to characterize a notion of a mechanistic explanation, according to which mechanistic explanations are those that meet interventionist criteria for successful explanation and certain additional constraints as well. However, from an interventionist perspective, although mechanistic theories have a number of virtues, it is a mistake to think that such models are the only legitimate kind of explanation in neuroscience and psychology. In particular, some (but not all) dynamical systems models in neuroscience are explanatory as are many models, such as the Hodgkin-Huxley model, that abstract away from mechanistically relevant low-level detail.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel L Pick ◽  
Nyil Khwaja ◽  
Michael A. Spence ◽  
Malika Ihle ◽  
Shinichi Nakagawa

We often quantify a behaviour by counting the number of times it occurs within a specific, short observation period. Measuring behaviour in such a way is typically unavoidable but induces error. This error acts to systematically reduce effect sizes, including metrics of particular interest to behavioural and evolutionary ecologists such as R2, repeatability (intra-class correlation, ICC) and heritability. Through introducing a null model, the Poisson process, for modelling the frequency of behaviour, we give a mechanistic explanation of how this problem arises and demonstrate how it makes comparisons between studies and species problematic, because the magnitude of the error depends on how frequently the behaviour has been observed (e.g. as a function of the observation period) as well as how biologically variable the behaviour is. Importantly, the degree of error is predictable and so can be corrected for. Using the example of parental provisioning rate in birds, we assess the applicability of our null model for modelling the frequency of behaviour. We then review recent literature and demonstrate that the error is rarely accounted for in current analyses. We highlight the problems that arise from this and provide solutions. We further discuss the biological implications of deviations from our null model, and highlight the new avenues of research that they may provide. Adopting our recommendations into analyses of behavioural counts will improve the accuracy of estimated effect sizes and allow meaningful comparisons to be made between studies.


Author(s):  
Andrés L. Jaume

RESUMENEl presente artículo analiza las diferentes teorías que sobre el concepto de función se han vertido en los últimos cuarenta años y sus problemas. Respecto de los dos grandes enfoques (histórico-etiológico y sistémico) se sostiene que el primero, pese a su hegemonía histórica, presenta considerables dificultades y que la reflexión actual se centra cada vez más en la perspectiva sistémica. Esta última puede enfrentarse mejor a los diversos problemas que genera el concepto de función biológica y es siempre preferible.PALABRAS CLAVEFUNCIÓN BIOLÓGICA, FUNCIÓN SISTéMICA, EXPLICACIÓN FUNCIONAL, EXPLICACIÓN BASADA EN MECANISMOS, TELEOLOGíAABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the different theories on biological function and the problems they brought up over the last forty years. Concerning the two most important points of view on functions (aetiological theory and systemic theory) I hold that the aetiological theory, despite its historical hegemony, presents substantial difficulties and that the present philosophical thinking is centred on systemic theories. Systemic theories are capable of solving the various problems generated by the biological function concept which is preferable.KEYWORDSBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION, SySTEMIC FUNCTION, FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION, MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION TELEOLOGY


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Yi ◽  
Philip Pärnamets ◽  
Andreas Olsson

Responding appropriately to others’ facial expressions is key to successful social functioning. Despite the large body of work on face perception and spontaneous responses to static faces, little is known about responses to faces in dynamic, naturalistic situations, and no study has investigated how goal directed responses to faces are influenced by learning during dyadic interactions. To experimentally model such situations, we developed a novel method based on online integration of electromyography (EMG) signals from the participants’ face (corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major) during facial expression exchange with dynamic faces displaying happy and angry facial expressions. Fifty-eight participants learned by trial-and-error to avoid receiving aversive stimulation by either reciprocate (congruently) or respond opposite (incongruently) to the expression of the target face. Our results validated our method, showing that participants learned to optimize their facial behavior, and replicated earlier findings of faster and more accurate responses in congruent vs. incongruent conditions. Moreover, participants performed better on trials when confronted with smiling, as compared to frowning, faces, suggesting it might be easier to adapt facial responses to positively associated expressions. Finally, we applied drift diffusion and reinforcement learning models to provide a mechanistic explanation for our findings which helped clarifying the underlying decision-making processes of our experimental manipulation. Our results introduce a new method to study learning and decision-making in facial expression exchange, in which there is a need to gradually adapt facial expression selection to both social and non-social reinforcements.


Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick

Some dispositions have causal bases or grounding properties. However, ungrounded dispositions do not have causal bases. Ungrounded dispositions are also known as powers, baseless dispositions, and bare dispositions. Ungrounded dispositions are not supplanted by mechanistic explanations, for even mechanistic explanations ultimately reference dispositions. While some argue that citing dispositions does not really explain anything, dispositions can in fact figure in adequate explanations. Furthermore, scientific explanations reference dispositions with no known grounds. This lends some support for the view that ungrounded dispositions are metaphysically possible. Philosophical arguments based on multiple realizability or the demand for truth-makers fail to show that ungrounded dispositions are impossible.


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