Pricing Strategies for Maximizing Viral Advertising in Social Networks

Author(s):  
Bolei Zhang ◽  
Zhuzhong Qian ◽  
Wenzhong Li ◽  
Sanglu Lu
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 205630511984751 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itai Himelboim ◽  
Guy J. Golan

The diffusion of social networking platforms ushered in a new age of peer-to-peer distributed online advertising content, widely referred to as viral advertising. The current study proposes a social networks approach to the study of viral advertising and identifying influencers. Expanding beyond the conventional retweets metrics to include Twitter mentions as connection in the network, this study identifies three groups of influencers, based on their connectivity in their networks: Hubs, or highly retweeted users, are Primary Influencers; Bridges, or highly mentioned users who associate connect users who would otherwise be disconnected, are Contextual Influencers, and Isolates are the Low Influence users. Each of these users’ roles in viral advertising is discussed and illustrated through the Heineken’s Worlds Apart campaign as a case study. Providing a unique examination of viral advertising from a network paradigm, our study advances scholarship on social media influencers and their contribution to content virality on digital platforms.


2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo-Lei Zhang ◽  
Zhu-Zhong Qian ◽  
Wen-Zhong Li ◽  
Bin Tang ◽  
Sang-Lu Lu ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Ying-Ju Chen ◽  
Yves Zenou ◽  
Junjie Zhou

2014 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian W. Bartholomae

Der Markt für Social Games verzeichnet hohe Wachstumsraten und stellt ein lukratives Umfeld für potentielle Neueintreter dar. Allerdings ist dieser Markt durch einige ökonomische Besonderheiten gekennzeichnet, die ihn von traditionellen Märkten unterscheiden und bei jeder unternehmerischen Entscheidung zu berücksichtigen sind. Zudem steigt die dortige Wettbewerbsintensität zunehmend, während zugleich mit den Interessen der Betreiber sozialer Netzwerke sowie den anspruchsvoller werdenden Kunden umgegangen werden muss, und damit die dort aktiven Unternehmen vor große Herausforderungen stellt. Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet den Markt näher, identifiziert wichtige Erfolgsfaktoren und Preisstrategien, stellt aktuelle Entwicklungen dar und gibt darauf basierend Handlungsempfehlungen. As the market for social games becomes more and more important, many game developers try to enter this market. However, firms must be aware that this market features some special economic features which distinguish it from traditional markets. As this market matures, competition gets fiercer and consumers become more demanding. Moreover, the social networks interests also challenge the game developers. This paper analyzes the market, identifies important factors of success and pricing strategies, and derives recommendations. Keywords: spieldesign, monetarisierungsstrategien, konsumentenprofil, alleinstellungsmerkmal


Author(s):  
David Arthur ◽  
Rajeev Motwani ◽  
Aneesh Sharma ◽  
Ying Xu

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Aspinall ◽  
Noor Rohman ◽  
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi ◽  
Rubaidi ◽  
Zusiana Elly Triantini

AbstractWhat underlying logic explains candidate participation in vote buying, given that clientelist exchange is so difficult to enforce? We address this question through close analysis of campaigns by several dozen candidates in two electoral districts in Java, Indonesia. Analyzing candidates’ targeting and pricing strategies, we show that candidates used personal brokerage structures that drew on social networks to identify voters and deliver payments to them. But these candidates achieved vote totals averaging about one quarter of the number of payments they distributed. Many candidates claimed to be targeting loyalists, suggestive of “turnout buying,” but judged loyalty in personal rather than partisan terms, and extended their vote-buying reach through personal connections mediated by brokers. Candidates were market sensitive, paying prices per vote determined not only by personal resources, but also by constituency size and prices offered by competitors. Accordingly, we argue that a market logic structures Indonesia's system of vote buying.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 672-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-Ju Chen ◽  
Yves Zenou ◽  
Junjie Zhou

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