Embodied Space in Natural and Virtual Environments: Implications for Cognitive Neuroscience Research

2016 ◽  
pp. 110-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Morganti
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Environments ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Neuroscience Research

The Default Network Distinguishes Construals of Proximal versus Distal Events

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 2945-2955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana I. Tamir ◽  
Jason P. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
Individual Variability ◽  
Retrosplenial Cortex ◽  
Default Network ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Four Dimensions ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Different Dimensions

Humans enjoy a singular capacity to imagine events that differ from the “here-and-now.” Recent cognitive neuroscience research has linked such simulation processes to the brain's “default network.” However, extant cognitive theories suggest that perceivers reliably simulate only relatively proximal experiences—those that seem nearby, soon, likely to happen, or relevant to a close other. Here, we test these claims by examining spontaneous engagement of the default network while perceivers consider experiencing events from proximal and distal perspectives. Across manipulations of perspective in four dimensions, two regions of the default network—medial prefrontal cortex and retrosplenial cortex—were more active for proximal than distal events, supporting cognitive accounts that perceivers only richly simulate experiences that seem immediate and that perceivers represent different dimensions of distance similarly. Moreover, stable individual differences in default activity when thinking about distal events correlated with individual variability in an implicit measure of psychological distance, suggesting that perceivers naturally vary in their tendency to simulate far-off or unlikely experiences.

Remembering Over the Short and Long Term

2020 ◽  
pp. 282-310
Author(s):  
Patricia A. Reuter-Lorenz ◽  
Alexandru D. Iordan
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Semantic Processing ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Strategic Processing ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Short And Long Term ◽  
Time Courses

This chapter reviews evidence from behavioural and cognitive neuroscience research that supports a unitary view of memory whereby working memory and long-term memory phenomena arise from representations and processes that are largely shared when remembering over the short or long term. Using ‘false working memories’ as a case study, it highlights several paradoxes that cannot be explained by a multisystem view of memory in which working memory and long-term memory are structurally distinct. Instead, it is posited that behavioural memory effects over the short and long term relating to semantic processing, modality/domain-specificity, dual-task interference, strategic processing, and so on arise from the differences in activational states and availability of different representational features (e.g. sensory/perceptual, associative, action-based) that vary in their time courses and activity, attentional priority, and susceptibility to interference. Cognitive neuroscience evidence primarily from brain imaging methodologies that support this view is reviewed.

scholarly journals Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

F1000Research ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 2573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rüdiger J. Seitz ◽  
Raymond F. Paloutzian ◽  
Hans-Ferdinand Angel
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Brain Function ◽  
Belief Systems ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Personal Meaning ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Scholarly Discourse ◽  
Theology And Philosophy

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals’ behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.

Social Empathy

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Segal
Keyword(s):  
Social Work ◽  
Brain Imaging ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Work Practice ◽  
Social Work Practice ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Social Empathy ◽  
The Relationship

This article defines and explains the concept and trait of social empathy and the relationship to interpersonal empathy. Both concepts are explained using the latest cognitive neuroscience research on brain activity. Through brain imaging, the components that together make up the full array of empathy have been identified and are discussed in relation to social work practice. The application of social empathy in the policy-making arena is described, and the implications for social work practice to enhance empathy are discussed.

From Believing to Belief: A General Theoretical Model

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 1254-1264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rüdiger J. Seitz ◽  
Raymond F. Paloutzian ◽  
Hans-Ferdinand Angel
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Interpersonal Contact ◽  
Brain Functions ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Situational Demands

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to explore the mental processes underlying what a belief and what believing are. Recent evidence suggests that believing involves fundamental brain functions that result in meaningful probabilistic representations, called beliefs. When relatively stable, these beliefs allow for guidance of behavior in individuals and social groups. However, they are also fluid and can be modified by new relevant information, interpersonal contact, social pressure, and situational demands. We present a theoretical model of believing that can account for the formation of both empirically grounded and metaphysical beliefs.

scholarly journals Using Connectivity to Explain Autism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Ewen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Method Development ◽  
Causal Models ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Connectivity Model ◽  
Brain Changes ◽  
Function Language ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Level Of Analysis

The case of cerebral connectivity research in ASD contains themes that are commonly seen throughout cognitive neuroscience research. The end goal of the enterprise is to evaluate and validate causal models that demonstrate how physiological changes—in this case, alterations in cerebral connectivity—cause a behavioral phenotype. Method development, validation and usage are important, but are explicitly in the service of more rigorously and specifically evaluating causal models. It is alternative causal models, and not methodological read-outs, which should be the language by which progress in the field is discussed. Cognitive neuroscience, as a relatively new field with many disciplinary forbearers, needs greater validation of constructs that serve as elements within cognitive models. Bridging an imaging level of analysis and a computational/cognitive level, we have attempted to open a conversation about differentiable computational constructs that could add important nuance to what we mean when we report on “connectivity” and bring us closer to understanding how semantic information is transferred and computed upon in the brain. Within ASD-connectivity research, we need to sharpen our correlational knowledge by specifying and testing both the topography (where) and developmental (when) parameters of causal models. We then need methods to perturb the system at various points in the model to firmly establish causality. We also need multi-modal studies to eliminate confounds (such as artifacts to which one method but not the other is sensitive), to index non-connectivity-related biological elements within a connectivity model, and to directly test non-connectivity theories against connectivity theories of ASD. Theories also need to be clear about theoretical scope. Is the study making causal claims about “all of ASD,” about a core symptom (social communication, restricted/repetitive interest/behaviors) or about a peripheral symptom (altered executive function, language, motor function, perception)? Is it making claims about a symptom that is seen only in ASD or one that is seen in multiple neuropsychiatric conditions? Consideration of scope is important for two practical reasons: for dealing with the heterogeneity of ASD and for dealing with the fact that there is overlap among classical neuropsychiatric diagnoses both in terms of connectivity differences (compared with controls) and symptoms. Data-driven approaches may help us “re-slice the pie,” but even if that venture is successful, causal inference will still be needed to help us understand how brain changes cause behavioral consequences. And only in doing so will we best be able to develop biomarkers and interventions that help affected individuals and families reach their life goals.

scholarly journals Frontiers in cognitive neuroscience research of aging

2020 ◽  
Vol 84 (0) ◽  
pp. SS-020-SS-020
Author(s):  
Hikaru Sugimoto ◽  
Akihiro Sasaki ◽  
Yuta Katsumi ◽  
Kouhei Masumoto
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Neuroscience Research
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