Living in Space. A Phenomenological Account

2017 ◽  
pp. 3-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunnar Declerck ◽  
Charles Lenay
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Account

scholarly journals Grief, disorientation, and futurity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantin Mehmel
Keyword(s):  
Making Sense ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation, irrespective of the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger’s phenomenology, I argue that it is a core characteristic of the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into a specific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible.

The Pathogenesis of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations in Schizophrenia: A Clinical–Phenomenological Account

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 165-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Gram Henriksen ◽  
Andrea Raballo ◽  
Josef Parnas
Keyword(s):  
Auditory Verbal Hallucinations ◽  
Phenomenological Account

Gender as Lived Time: Reading The Second Sex for a Feminist Phenomenology of Temporality

Hypatia ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan M. Burke
Keyword(s):  
Human Existence ◽  
Underlying Structure ◽  
Sexual Objectification ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Second Sex ◽  
Experience Of Time ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
Time Reading ◽  
Feminist Phenomenology ◽  
Lived Time

This article suggests that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex offers an important contribution to a feminist phenomenology of temporality. In contrast to readings of The Second Sex that focus on the notion of “becoming” as the main claim about the relation between “woman” and time, this article suggests that Beauvoir's discussion of temporality in volume II of The Second Sex shows that Beauvoir understands the temporality of waiting, or a passive present, to be an underlying structure of women's existence and subordination. Accordingly, I argue that Beauvoir does not see “woman” as a mere becoming, as that which unfolds in time, but instead understands becoming a woman to be realized as lived time. As such, Beauvoir's account shows that gender and temporality are deeply entangled, and thus she challenges the classic phenomenological account of temporality as a general, given structure of human existence. More specifically, I argue that her account shows how a particular experience of time is an underlying structure of sexual objectification, a claim that expands on the feminist phenomenological claim that a particular relation to space becomes a way in which women take up and negotiate their own subordination and objectification.

Ten theses on the reality of video-chat: A phenomenological account

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-224
Author(s):  
Christian Ferencz-Flatz
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
The Public ◽  
Video Chat ◽  
Phenomenological Account

Abstract The following paper addresses the experience of reality in video-calls. To this extent, it first draws from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reflections that connect the question of reality with that of interaction and that of intersubjective communication. These reflections set the larger theoretical framework for sketching out ten theses with regard to the specific case of video-calls. To this extent it addresses issues like the public-private divide, the specific image-form of contemporary video-calls, the mutual intersubjective relations they involve, as well as their specific spatiality and temporality.

scholarly journals The Surplus of Signification: Merleau-Ponty and Enactivism on the Continuity of Life, Mind, and Culture

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-52
Author(s):  
Hayden Kee
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
Sensorimotor Systems ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Phenomenological Dimension

This paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism.

A Phenomenological Account of Grief and Loss

Aletheia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor Goska
Keyword(s):  
Grief And Loss ◽  
Phenomenological Account

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–80)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Howells
Keyword(s):  
Collective Choice ◽  
Personal History ◽  
The Other ◽  
Jean Paul ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The World ◽  
Dialectical Reason ◽  
History Of ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
Material Conditions

Sartre was a philosopher of paradox: an existentialist who attempted a reconciliation with Marxism, a theorist of freedom who explored the notion of predestination. From the mid-1930s to the late-1940s, Sartre was in his ‘classical’ period. He explored the history of theories of imagination leading up to that of Husserl, and developed his own phenomenological account of imagination as the key to the freedom of consciousness. He analysed human emotions, arguing that emotion is a freely chosen mode of relationship to the outside world. In his major philosophical work, L’Être et le Néant(Being and Nothingness) (1943a), Sartre distinguished between consciousness and all other beings: consciousness is always at least tacitly conscious of itself, hence it is essentially ‘for itself’ (pour-soi) – free, mobile and spontaneous. Everything else, lacking this self-consciousness, is just what it is ‘in-itself’ (en-soi); it is ‘solid’ and lacks freedom. Consciousness is always engaged in the world of which it is conscious, and in relationships with other consciousnesses. These relationships are conflictual: they involve a battle to maintain the position of subject and to make the other into an object. This battle is inescapable. Although Sartre was indeed a philosopher of freedom, his conception of freedom is often misunderstood. Already in Being and Nothingness human freedom operates against a background of facticity and situation. My facticity is all the facts about myself which cannot be changed – my age, sex, class of origin, race and so on; my situation may be modified, but it still constitutes the starting point for change and roots consciousness firmly in the world. Freedom is not idealized by Sartre; it is always within a given set of circumstances, after a particular past, and against the expectations of both myself and others that I make my free choices. My personal history conditions the range of my options. From the 1950s onwards Sartre became increasingly politicized and was drawn to attempt a reconciliation between existentialism and Marxism. This was the aim of the Critique de la raison dialectique (Critique of Dialectical Reason) (1960) which recognized more fully than before the effect of historical and material conditions on individual and collective choice. An attempt to explore this interplay in action underlies both his biography of Flaubert and his own autobiography.

The Relation between Husserl’s Phenomenological Account of Imaginative Empathy and High-level Simulation, and How to Solve the Problem of the Generalizability of Empathy

2019 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 596-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heath Williams
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Phenomenological Theory ◽  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
High Level

This article provides an overview of Edmund Husserl’s lesser known account of high-level imaginative empathy. The author discusses Husserl’s solution to what we might call the ‘generalizability problem’; if empathy is conceived as a relation whereby the understanding I have of my own mind allows me to understand your mind (as some versions of simulation theory and Husserl contend), then how does empathy account for potential differences between us? The author also discusses some features that make empathy more generalizable than might be initially thought, as well as its limits. A second major aim is to use this exegesis of Husserl to show a variety of overlaps between his theory and high-level simulation theory. The author also shows how Husserl’s phenomenological theory provides a compelling response to critiques of high-level simulation from authors that utilize a hybrid cognitive science/phenomenological approach (i.e. Gallagher and Zahavi).

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