Simulation of Emotional Processes in Decision Making

Author(s):  
Karim Mahboub ◽  
Véronique Jay
1970 ◽  
Vol 01 (020) ◽  
pp. 97-114
Author(s):  
Mikel Alonso López ◽  
Francisca Blasco López ◽  
Victor Molero Ayala

In the research on consumer purchasing decisions, there has historically been a constant duality between the presence or absence of emotions and their role. Historically they have been observed as annoyances that interfere with optimalprocess, as it would be rational and cognitive. Since the late 70s, some researches emerged defending the importance of emotional processes in decision-making. The latest studies also persist in the idea that emotions are present in all product purchase decisions. But, does it occur with the same intensity in all types of products? In this research paper, an experiment is proposed to classify different products in two categories, one that concentrates those that generate a more intense emotional response and another with less intensity. This categorization is interesting for those experiments in which it is necessary, either for statistical treatment or for other reasons, grouping products by emotional response.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-286
Author(s):  
Paul Whitney ◽  
John M. Hinson ◽  
Allison L. Matthews

AbstractWhile improving the theoretical account of base-rate neglect, Barbey & Sloman's (B&S's) target article suffers from affect neglect by failing to consider the fundamental role of emotional processes in “real world” decisions. We illustrate how affective influences are fundamental to decision making, and discuss how the dual process model can be a useful framework for understanding hot and cold cognition in reasoning.


Author(s):  
Richard P. Larrick ◽  
M. Asher Lawson

The field of judgment and decision making (JDM) arose in psychology to test the rational assumptions posed in other fields such as economics and statistics. This has led to three major contributions of the field. First, to the extent that people systematically deviate from rational models, their decisions are less than optimal. This has consequences for both business practice and for assumptions in many professional fields, such as finance, medicine, and law. Second, the deviation from rational models has led JDM researchers to identify categories of psychological processes that do guide decision making. These include associationistic memory processes, psychophysical processes, emotional processes, and learning. Third, building on the first two contributions, the field of JDM has merged rational and psychological perspectives to explore ways to improve decision making. These methods include a variety of interventions known as nudges, choice architecture, debiasing, and the use of external aids such as algorithms and the wisdom of crowds. The three contributions of JDM help researchers in a number of fields analyze problems and design helpful solutions. Workplace examples include designing better processes for hiring and evaluation, goal setting, and employee retirement savings planning.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104973232110376
Author(s):  
Katie Darabos ◽  
Allison J. Berger ◽  
Lamia P. Barakat ◽  
Lisa A. Schwartz

Decision-making among adolescents and young adults with cancer (AYA) is often complex, ongoing, and multifaceted, involving caregiver and oncology provider perspectives. Engagement in decision-making against the backdrop of normative developmental processes of acquiring autonomy and gaining independence contributes to the complexity of decision-making. Semi-structured qualitative interviews from 11 AYA and caregiver dyads and eight oncology providers examined decision-making processes with specific attention to the role of shared decision-making, cognitive and emotional processes, and coping with the decision-making experience. Five decision-making patterns were identified, with collaborative decision-making and AYA-driven decisions most commonly described. Utilizing hypothesis coding, AYA and caregivers explained how cognitive (i.e., pros/cons) and emotional (i.e., shock and fear of missing out) processes influenced cancer-related decisions. Coping strategies provided clarity and respite when engaged in decision-making. Our findings illuminate important implications for how to best support decision-making among AYA and caregivers, including the role oncology providers can play during decision-making.


Author(s):  
Nicola Cellini ◽  
Marco Mercurio ◽  
Michela Sarlo

AbstractMoral decision-making depends on the interaction between emotional and cognitive control processes, which are also affected by sleep. Here we aimed to assess the potential role of sleep in the modulation of moral decisions over time by testing the change in behavioral responses to moral dilemmas over time (1 week). Thirty-five young adults were tested twice, with one week between the sessions. In each session, participants were presented with 24 sacrificial (12 Footbridge- and 12 Trolley-type) and 6 everyday-type moral dilemmas. In sacrificial dilemmas, participants had to choose whether or not to kill one person to save more people (utilitarian choice), to judge how morally acceptable the proposed solution was, and how they felt in terms of valence and arousal during the decision. In everyday-type dilemmas, they had to decide whether to pursuit moral violations involving dishonest behavior. Between the sessions, the participants’ sleep pattern was assessed via actigraphy. We observed that participants reduced the utilitarian choices in the second session, and this effect was more pronounced for the Trolley-type dilemmas. We also showed that after a week participants judged the utilitarian choices as less morally acceptable, but there was no change in self-reported emotional reactivity (i.e., valence, and arousal). Moreover, sleep efficiency was mildly negatively associated with the changes in decision choices and moral acceptability for the Footbridge-type dilemmas. Taken together, our data suggest that dealing with a moral situation engages several interacting factors that seem to go beyond the competing roles of cognitive and emotional processes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Simen ◽  
Fuat Balcı

AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.


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