Trade Preference Through Tariff Rate Quotas and the Gravity Equation: Does the Tariff Equivalent Matter?

2011 ◽  
pp. 175-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Raimondi ◽  
Margherita Scoppola ◽  
Alessandro Olper
Keyword(s):  
Gravity Equation ◽  
Tariff Rate ◽  
Trade Preference ◽  
Tariff Rate Quotas ◽  
Tariff Equivalent

scholarly journals U.S. TRQs for Peanuts, Sugar, and Tobacco: Historical Allocation and Nondiscrimination

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Skully
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Pareto Optimization ◽  
Tariff Rate ◽  
Tariff Rate Quotas ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Tariff Equivalent

U.S. peanut, sugar, and tobacco tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are allocated to suppliers on an historical market share basis. Once allocated they become difficult to redistribute to accommodate changes in comparative advantage among suppliers. The distribution of trade departs increasingly from the tariff-equivalent distribution advocated by the WTO principle of nondiscrimination. Article ΧIII of the GATT regarding the rules for historical allocation is examined and applied to four cases of historical allocation: domestic tobacco quota and TRQs for peanuts, sugar and tobacco. The difference between the law enforcement objective of the WTO and the Pareto optimization objective assumed by economists is stressed throughout.

scholarly journals China – Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products: Against the Grain: Can the WTO Open Chinese Markets? A Contaminated Experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Joseph Glauber ◽  
Simon Lester
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Tariff Rate ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
Tariff Rate Quotas ◽  
International Obligations ◽  
Trade Relationship ◽  
Key Issues

Abstract The US complaint about Chinese tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on certain grain products helps illustrate several key issues in US–China trade relations and the effectiveness of WTO disputes. First, do international obligations based on transparency and fairness work in relation to an authoritarian country not known for the rule of law domestically? Second, can there be a disconnect between the legal aspects of a dispute and the underlying economic interests, with a DSB ruling sometimes not leading to improved trade flows? And third, given the bilateral trade war and ‘phase one’ trade deal between the United States and China, has the WTO been superseded in this trade relationship? This paper summarizes the facts and law of the China–TRQs dispute, and examines each of these questions in that context.

Canada-U.S. softwood lumber dispute: background.

2021 ◽  
pp. 10-26
Author(s):  
G. Cornelis van Kooten ◽  
Harry Nelson ◽  
Fatemeh Mokhtarzadeh
Keyword(s):  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Tariff Rate ◽  
Gains From Trade ◽  
Excess Supply ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Softwood Lumber ◽  
Modeling Approaches ◽  
Tariff Rate Quotas ◽  
Export Taxes ◽  
History Of

Abstract In this chapter, we examine the importance of softwood lumber production to Canada's economy and provide a brief history of the Canada-U.S. softwood lumber dispute and its resolution on various occasions using U.S. countervailing and anti-dumping duties, export taxes or various types of quota regimes, including tariff rate quotas. The construction of excess supply and demand functions is explained, as are the gains from trade. This helps inform the modeling approaches that are identified in later chapters.

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