Trust Games as a Model for Requests

Author(s):  
Jason Quinley
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Ben-Ner ◽  
Louis Putterman ◽  
Ting Ren
Keyword(s):  

Emotion ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle M. Shore ◽  
Magdalena Rychlowska ◽  
Job van der Schalk ◽  
Brian Parkinson ◽  
Antony S. R. Manstead

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-118
Author(s):  
Anthony S. Gillies ◽  
Mary L. Rigdon
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominic Burbidge ◽  
Nic Cheeseman

AbstractPolitical economy comparisons of Kenya and Tanzania have often found the political salience of ethnicity to be far higher in the former than the latter, with a negative impact on intercommunal trust. This difference has tended to be explained on the basis of the different kinds of leadership that the two countries experienced after independence. However, these findings have typically been demonstrated using aggregate or survey data. This paper assesses the salience of ethnicity at the individual level for the first time, deploying monetized two-round trust games in urban Kenya and Tanzania. The experimental games isolate the comparative impact of common knowledge of ethnicity and integrity among a quasi-random selection of 486 citizens. Verifying previous findings, we observe higher levels of trust and trustworthiness in Tanzania as compared with Kenya. Further, in comparison with Kenya, any shared knowledge of ethnic identities in Tanzania leads players to transfer fewer resources, while common knowledge that both players are “honest” led to higher transfers there than in Kenya. These results provide robust evidence of higher levels of trust in Tanzania, and of the negative effect in that country of common knowledge of ethnicity on levels of cooperation. The findings demonstrate the way in which political context can shape the impact of ethnic diversity, and encourage further experimental research that looks at the intersubjective dynamics of social cooperation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 1041-1046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Bell ◽  
Benjamin Robinson ◽  
Cornelius Katona ◽  
Anne-Kathrin Fett ◽  
Sukhi Shergill

AbstractBackgroundTrauma due to deliberate harm by others is known to increase the likelihood of developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This is the first study investigating basic and dynamic trust in ‘interpersonal’ PTSD.MethodsThirty-two participants with PTSD and 22 healthy controls played a novel multi-round version of a monetary investment protocol, the so-called ‘Trust Game’, a task from the behavioural economics literature, which is considered to involve trust and reciprocity. We used two ‘Trust Games’ including cooperative and unfair partners.ResultsFindings showed an effect for lower basic investment in PTSD compared to healthy controls, that trended towards significance (p = 0.09). All participants showed behavioural flexibility and modified their trust based on behavioural cues from their cooperative and unfair game partners. However, participants with PTSD made significantly lower investments towards the cooperative partner than controls. Investments towards the unfair partner did not differ between groups. Higher trauma scores were associated with lower levels of trust-related investments towards the cooperative but not the unfair game partner.ConclusionThe association between reduced trust towards cooperative others in individuals who experienced interpersonal trauma could indicate acquired insensitivity to social rewards or inflexible negative beliefs about others as a sequel of the traumatic experience, which increases in a dose response relationship with the severity of the trauma. A specific focus on cooperation and trusting behaviour could provide a treatment target for future cognitive and pharmacological interventions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 861-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Kathrin J Fett ◽  
Elias Mouchlianitis ◽  
Paula M Gromann ◽  
Lucy Vanes ◽  
Sukhi S Shergill ◽  
...  

Abstract In chronic psychosis, reduced trust is associated with a neural insensitivity to social reward and reduced theory of mind (ToM). Here we investigate whether these mechanisms could underlie emerging social impairments in early psychosis. Twenty-two participants with early psychosis and 25 controls (male, 13–19 years) participated in two interactive trust games against a cooperative and unfair partner. Region of interest neuroimaging analyses included right caudate, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), involved in reward and ToM processing. Both groups showed similar levels of trust (i.e. investments). However, individuals with psychosis failed to activate the caudate differentially in response to cooperation and unfairness while making decisions to trust. During cooperative returns, patients showed reduced and controls increased caudate activation. Patients demonstrated greater rTPJ activation than controls, possibly pointing towards compensatory mechanisms. Effects were associated with Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence vocabulary scores. No group differences emerged in mPFC activation. Early psychosis is associated with an aberrant neural sensitivity to social reward. This could foster reduced social motivation and social isolation. Absent behavioural differences in early, relative to chronic psychosis could indicate that trust is achieved through increased compensatory demand on ToM.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. e0233277 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Jobu Babin
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
Bart J. Wilson

Abstract:In this essay we provide a brief account and interpretation of The Theory of Moral Sentiments showing that it departs fundamentally from contemporary patterns of thought in economics that are believed to govern individual behavior in small groups, and contains strong testable propositions governing the expression of that behavior. We also state a formal representation of the model for individual choice of action, apply the propositions to the prediction of actions in trust games, report two experiments testing these predictions, and interpret the results in terms directly related to the model. In short, we argue that the system of sociability developed by Adam Smith provides a coherent non-utilitarian model that is consistent with the pattern of results in trust games, and leads to testable new predictions, some of which we test.


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