Signaling Game Model of Safety Management on Construction

2013 ◽  
pp. 893-900
Author(s):  
Hong Ren ◽  
Fei Xu
Keyword(s):  
Safety Management ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model

Screening Model in Enterprise Competitive Intelligence Activity

2010 ◽  
Vol 121-122 ◽  
pp. 360-363
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu ◽  
Fang Liu ◽  
Yun Feng Luo
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Competitive Intelligence ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Screening Model ◽  
Intelligence Activity ◽  
True Type ◽  
Standard Term

The paper researched the screening model in enterprise competitive intelligence activity based on game theory. It studied the service provider’s decision in competitive intelligence(CI) project and proved it could be satisfied with Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It also revealed the heterogeneity between the service providers through a signaling game model in which signal set was the combine of CI quality standard term. The result shows that a quality standard about CI should be designed in contract which provides a signal for service provider to self-certify its own true type and is in favor of screening for enterprise.

scholarly journals Game model of enterprises and government based on the tax preference policy for energy conservation and emission reduction

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (15) ◽  
pp. 3963-3974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guoxing Zhang ◽  
Zhenhua Zhang ◽  
Yongjing Cui ◽  
Chun Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Number ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Tax Preference ◽  
Single Period ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

In recent years, greater efforts in tax preference policy for energy conservation and emission reduction (ECER) have been implemented in our country. Based on the tax preference of enterprise income for comprehensive utilization of resources, the constraints to achieve completely successful equilibrium are studied in the single period and multiple periods. In the single period, the key to achieve separating equilibrium is analyzed carefully by constructing a signaling game model of enterprises and government on tax preference of enterprise income. In the multiple periods, with the stochastic evolutionary game model based on the stochastic differential equation (SDE) theory, the constraints of keeping the separating equilibrium stable and continuing in a long term will be further investigated. It gives the optimal number of tax preference of enterprise income, camouflage cost and expected cost of risk under the state of separating equilibrium. The optimal result of completely successful equilibrium is obtained in single period by the analysis of numerical example for enterprises and government signaling game model. The simulation experiment is successfully finished to test the effectiveness of the stochastic evolutionary game model by using mathematical software MATLAB.

scholarly journals Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rongwu Lu ◽  
Xinhua Wang ◽  
Hao Yu ◽  
Dan Li
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mine ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Mine Safety ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Optimization Analysis ◽  
Coal Mine Safety ◽  
Complex Relationships

Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management.

Research on Quality Control of Electronics Products Based on Signal Game Model in the Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

2011 ◽  
Vol 230-232 ◽  
pp. 600-604
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Quality Control ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Production System ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strong Competition

Various participants in the supply chain must combine their own quality control and the relevant coordination decision-making with other enterprises to ensure they have strong competition position in the supply chain. Transactions among the manufacturers and retailers with the existence of asymmetric information in the electronic production system, as a result, the game will existent among them. In this paper, application of signal game theory to quality control of retailers are studied and the signaling game model of equilibrium to satisfy the three conditions are also be analysis.

Network Attack Intention Recognition Based on Signaling Game Model and Netlogo Simulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoning Zhang ◽  
Hengwei Zhang ◽  
Chenwei Li ◽  
Pengyu Sun ◽  
Zhilin Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Network Attack ◽  
Intention Recognition
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