Research on Quality Control of Electronics Products Based on Signal Game Model in the Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

2011 ◽  
Vol 230-232 ◽  
pp. 600-604
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Quality Control ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Production System ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strong Competition

Various participants in the supply chain must combine their own quality control and the relevant coordination decision-making with other enterprises to ensure they have strong competition position in the supply chain. Transactions among the manufacturers and retailers with the existence of asymmetric information in the electronic production system, as a result, the game will existent among them. In this paper, application of signal game theory to quality control of retailers are studied and the signaling game model of equilibrium to satisfy the three conditions are also be analysis.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals A Green Supply-Chain Decision Model for Energy-Saving Products That Accounts for Government Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Xiaoqing Ji ◽  
Yan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies

Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.

Benefit Analysis about Parts Supplier and Bus Factory as Well as Users Based on Game Theory

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 202-205
Author(s):  
Liang Han ◽  
Xiang Mei Si
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

This thesis analyzes the benefit produced by the cooperation or non-cooperation of parts supplier and bus factory as well as users by use of the perfect-information static game model of the game theory in connection with the current situation of China's bus market supply chain. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis that good after-sales service not only brings benefits to users but also can efficiently promote the voluntary cooperation between a parts supplier and a bus factory, so that the individual benefit and the overall benefit are both increased, and a win-win situation is finally achieved.

scholarly journals Differential Game Analysis of the Green Innovation Cooperation in Supply Chain under the Background of Dual-Driving

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Guiju Zhu ◽  
Jialing Li ◽  
Yi Zhang ◽  
Haiyun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Change ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
Innovation Cooperation ◽  
The Government

Taking government environmental regulation and consumer’s green preference into a unified analytical framework, this study constructed a differential game model. With the joint effect of supplier and manufacturer green innovation efforts on the dynamic change of the product’s green level, it compared and analyzed the long-term dynamic equilibrium strategies of green innovation cooperation in a supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision-making situations. Accordingly, a scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract was then proposed. On this basis, it further carried out a numerical simulation analysis on the dual-driving effects of the government and market. The results showed that the scientific and reasonable profit-distribution contract under the centralized decision-making situation, which was designed by using the Rubinstein bargaining game model, could effectively ensure that the supply chain members’ sharing profits would realize "Dual Pareto Improvements." With the increase of the environmental regulation’s intensity, the product’s green level kept rising and tended to be stable. However, the overall equilibrium profit of the supply chain was characterized by "U" fluctuation, which first descended and then ascended. In addition, the product’s green level, the green innovation investment and equilibrium (distributed) profits of supply chain members, and the overall profits of supply chain all increased with the consumers’ green preference.

scholarly journals Knowledge friction in universities, approach from game theory

2020 ◽  
pp. 26-50
Author(s):  
Marianela Talavera-Ruz ◽  
Graciela Lara- Gómez ◽  
Macario Valdez-Reséndiz
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Knowledge Processes ◽  
Strategic Resources ◽  
Main Determinants ◽  
Structural Aspects ◽  
Cooperative Game Model

In today's market economies, organizations see knowledge as one of their most valuable and strategic resources and seek to properly manage it so that it becomes a competitive advantage (Teece, 1988; Hamel and Prahalad, 1990, Drucker, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Boisot, 1998; Spender, 1996; Senge, 1990). Although many organizations make significant investments in technology and tools to promote knowledge sharing, cultural, behavioral, and structural aspects are the main determinants of success (Sharma and Bhattacharya, 2013). Organizational knowledge processes are, by their nature, generally social and complex. The behaviors related to sharing knowledge of organizational agents are full of situations of conflict of interest or dilemmas in which they receive different payments based on their strategic decisions. Such situations can be modeled as games. This article presents the approach to a particular dilemma, that of the knowledge friction in an Institution of Higher Education through Game Theory, describing a non-cooperative game model that allows showing the scope of said situation according to the decisions considered to be done by employees and employer and their related payments, exploring different decision-making scenarios.

Model of Collaborative Knowledge Innovation with Distributor Participation in Supply Chain

2011 ◽  
Vol 201-203 ◽  
pp. 773-778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu Mei Zhang ◽  
Na Li Shen ◽  
Xiao Ping Mao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Innovation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Knowledge Innovation ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Selection For ◽  
Collaborative Knowledge

Considering the influence of distributor participation, collaborative knowledge innovation is studied by building the game model from the decision-making viewpoint of manufacturer. Changes of market demand due to the collaborative innovation and the behaviors of participators are also analyzed. The results show that distributor participation can spur manufacturer to increase product innovation investment and be available to realize the higher level of innovation, and that the degree of distributor participation is not only affected by its own cost of the collaborative innovation, but also the investment of manufacturer. Furthermore, the research gets the boundary condition of different decision selection for manufacturer and its distributor.

scholarly journals Cooperative Advertising in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi He ◽  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Chunxu Wu ◽  
Xiaohang Yue
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Channel Member ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Horizontal Competition ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Strategies

Cooperative advertising programs are usually provided by manufacturers to stimulate retailers investing more in local advertising to increase the sales of their products or services. While previous literature on cooperative advertising mainly focuses on a “single-manufacturer single-retailer” framework, the decision-making framework with “multiple-manufacturer single-retailer” becomes more realistic because of the increasing power of retailers as well as the increased competition among the manufacturers. In view of this, in this paper we investigate the cooperative advertising program in a “two-manufacturer single-retailer” supply chain in three different scenarios; that is, (i) each channel member makes decisions independently; (ii) the retailer is vertically integrated with one manufacturer; (iii) two manufacturers are horizontally integrated. Utilizing differential game theory, the open-loop equilibrium-advertising strategies of each channel member are obtained and compared. Also, we investigate the effects of competitive intensity on the firm’s profit in three different scenarios by using the numerical analysis.

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