Screening Model in Enterprise Competitive Intelligence Activity

2010 ◽  
Vol 121-122 ◽  
pp. 360-363
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu ◽  
Fang Liu ◽  
Yun Feng Luo
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Competitive Intelligence ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Screening Model ◽  
Intelligence Activity ◽  
True Type ◽  
Standard Term

The paper researched the screening model in enterprise competitive intelligence activity based on game theory. It studied the service provider’s decision in competitive intelligence(CI) project and proved it could be satisfied with Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It also revealed the heterogeneity between the service providers through a signaling game model in which signal set was the combine of CI quality standard term. The result shows that a quality standard about CI should be designed in contract which provides a signal for service provider to self-certify its own true type and is in favor of screening for enterprise.

Signaling Game in CI Activity

2014 ◽  
Vol 926-930 ◽  
pp. 4081-4084
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu
Keyword(s):  
Service Provider ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Information Service ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Ratio Scale ◽  
Signal Set ◽  
True Type ◽  
Standard Term

CI activity coordination can be probably achieved by adjusting the spending ratio scale, which will economize payoff and regulate information service providers decision. The paper revealed that heterogeneity between the two information service providers through a signaling game model in which signal set was the combine of CI quality standard term. The result shows that a quality standard about CI should be designed in contract which provides a signal for information service provider to self-certify its own true type and is in favor of screening for enterprise. It also gave a simulation example to illustrate the implementation mechanism.

scholarly journals British Thoracic Society Quality Standards for outpatient management of pulmonary embolism

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. e000636
Author(s):  
Robin Condliffe ◽  
Paul Albert ◽  
Raza Alikhan ◽  
Emma Gee ◽  
Daniel Horner ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Pulmonary Embolism ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Good Practice ◽  
Quality Standards ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Standards Of Care ◽  
British Thoracic Society ◽  
Dissemination And Implementation ◽  
Outpatient Management ◽  
The Uk

IntroductionThe purpose of the quality standards document is to provide healthcare professionals, commissioners, service providers and patients with a guide to standards of care that should be met for outpatient management of pulmonary embolism in the UK, together with measurable markers of good practice. Quality statements are based on the British Thoracic Society (BTS) Guideline for the Initial Outpatient Management of Pulmonary Embolism.MethodsDevelopment of BTS Quality Standards follows the BTS process of quality standard production based on the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence process manual for the development of quality standards.ResultsSix quality statements have been developed, each describing a standard of care for the outpatient management of pulmonary embolism in the UK, together with measurable markers of good practice.DiscussionBTS Quality Standards for Outpatient Management of Pulmonary Embolism form a key part of the range of supporting materials that the society produces to assist in the dissemination and implementation of a guideline’s recommendations.

scholarly journals Game model of enterprises and government based on the tax preference policy for energy conservation and emission reduction

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (15) ◽  
pp. 3963-3974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guoxing Zhang ◽  
Zhenhua Zhang ◽  
Yongjing Cui ◽  
Chun Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Number ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Tax Preference ◽  
Single Period ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

In recent years, greater efforts in tax preference policy for energy conservation and emission reduction (ECER) have been implemented in our country. Based on the tax preference of enterprise income for comprehensive utilization of resources, the constraints to achieve completely successful equilibrium are studied in the single period and multiple periods. In the single period, the key to achieve separating equilibrium is analyzed carefully by constructing a signaling game model of enterprises and government on tax preference of enterprise income. In the multiple periods, with the stochastic evolutionary game model based on the stochastic differential equation (SDE) theory, the constraints of keeping the separating equilibrium stable and continuing in a long term will be further investigated. It gives the optimal number of tax preference of enterprise income, camouflage cost and expected cost of risk under the state of separating equilibrium. The optimal result of completely successful equilibrium is obtained in single period by the analysis of numerical example for enterprises and government signaling game model. The simulation experiment is successfully finished to test the effectiveness of the stochastic evolutionary game model by using mathematical software MATLAB.

An Integrative Framework for Strategic Intelligence

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Xu ◽  
G. Roland Kaye
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Business Intelligence ◽  
Performance Indicators ◽  
Key Performance Indicators ◽  
Competitive Intelligence ◽  
Integrative Framework ◽  
Strategic Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Activity ◽  
Insight Into

This paper defines strategic intelligence as a distinct organisational resource that differs from competitive intelligence (CI) and business intelligence (BI). A literature review unfolds a number of deficiencies in intelligence practice and systems. The findings, based on a case study, suggest that there is a lack of systematic scanning, analysing and support for strategic intelligence. An integrative framework is proposed to guide and improve strategic intelligence activity, which comprises of Key External Intelligence (KEI) and internal Key Performance Indicators (KPI). Implementation issues are discussed. The paper develops novel insight into strategic intelligence, and the proposed solution has implications on enhancing managers’ and an organisations’ sensibility and capability by detecting and responding to emerging strategic signals.

Measuring and Managing Intellectual Capital for both Development and Protection

2011 ◽  
pp. 254-267
Author(s):  
G. Scott Erickson ◽  
Helen N. Rothberg
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Strategic Management ◽  
Intellectual Capital ◽  
Additional Data ◽  
Competitive Intelligence ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Knowledge Assets ◽  
The Core ◽  
Intelligence Activity ◽  
Core Metrics

This chapter considers the strategic management of intellectual capital, balancing the need to develop knowledge assets with the need to protect them. In making more strategic decisions, metrics on the level of intellectual capital and degree of knowledge management necessary to compete in an industry are required, as are those on the threat from competitive intelligence activity. The authors develop the case for appropriate metrics that accomplish these purposes, noting both potential and limitations. The authors also consider alternatives, additional data that could contribute to the usefulness and understanding of the core metrics, and provide suggestions for further research.

Competitive intelligence activity: evidence from Greece

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (7) ◽  
pp. 659-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantinos‐Vasilios Priporas ◽  
Lampros Gatsoris ◽  
Vassilis Zacharis
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Activity
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document