Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game

1991 ◽  
pp. 230-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Haller
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Strategic Game

Experimentalism as a Tool of Economic Innovation in Germany

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Jacoby ◽  
Martin Behrens
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Social Actor ◽  
Comparative Political Economy ◽  
System A ◽  
German Model ◽  
Economic Innovation

Our purpose in this article is to analyze changes in the German wagebargaining system, a system that has attracted enormous attentionfrom scholars of comparative political economy and comparativeindustrial relations. We argue that the wage bargaining portion ofthe German model is neither frozen in place, headed for deregulation,nor merely “muddling through.” Rather, we see the institutionalcapacities of the key actors—especially the unions and employerassociations—making possible a process we term “experimentalism.”In briefest form, experimentalism allows organizations that combinedecentralized information-gathering abilities with centralized decision-making capacity to probe for new possibilities, which, oncefound, can be quickly diffused throughout the organization. We willshow that the capacity for such experimentalism varies across actorsand sectors. And, to make things even tougher, neither major Germansocial actor can sustain innovation in the longer term withoutbringing along the other “social partner.”

Wage Bargaining and Managerial Incentives

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishita Chatterjee ◽  
Bibhas Saha
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Wage Bargaining

Understanding Rising Income Inequality and Stagnating Ordinary Living Standards in Germany

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Bosch ◽  
Thorsten Kalina
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Labour Market ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Household Income ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Living Standards ◽  
Social Model ◽  
Real Wages ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Over Time

This chapter describes how inequality and real incomes have evolved in Germany through the period from the 1980s, through reunification, up to the economic Crisis and its aftermath. It brings out how reunification was associated with a prolonged stagnation in real wages. It emphasizes how the distinctive German structures for wage bargaining were eroded over time, and the labour market and tax/transfer reforms of the late 1990s-early/mid-2000s led to increasing dualization in the labour market. The consequence was a marked increase in household income inequality, which went together with wage stagnation for much of the 1990s and subsequently. Coordination between government, employers, and unions still sufficed to avoid the impact the economic Crisis had on unemployment elsewhere, but the German social model has been altered fundamentally over the period

scholarly journals Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Speed Of Convergence ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Dynamic Version ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

Taxing the Tails in a Global Economy: How Electoral, Party and Wage Bargaining Systems Interact to Determine the Taxes Paid by the Poor and Rich

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jude C. Hays
Keyword(s):  
Global Economy ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Labor Market Institutions ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Consumption Taxes ◽  
Empirical Implications

Abstract A prominent line of research on electoral systems and income redistribution argues that proportional representation (PR) leads to tax-and-transfer policies that benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. This is because PR produces encompassing center-left coalitions that protect the poor and middle classes. Yet countries with PR electoral systems tend to rely heavily on consumption taxes and tax profits lightly, both of which are inconsistent with this expectation. Both policies are regressive and seem to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. This article argues that PR electoral institutions, when combined with trichotomous multipartism, are not as hostile to the rich as commonly believed, and that it is important to understand how electoral and party systems interact with labor market institutions in order to explain the puzzling pattern of taxation that is observed. The author develops a theoretical model and evaluates its empirical implications for a world in which production has become multinational.

scholarly journals What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. e45961 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Meijering ◽  
Hedderik van Rijn ◽  
Niels A. Taatgen ◽  
Rineke Verbrugge
Keyword(s):  
Eye Movements ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Strategic Game

After the Grand Fracture: Scenarios for the Collapse of the International Drug Control Regime

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan P. Caulkins
Keyword(s):  
Preliminary Analysis ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Drug Control ◽  
Illegal Trade ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Strategic Game ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Proper Perspective ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
Primary Contribution

AbstractInternational prohibitions create asymmetries; production and transshipment concentrate in relatively few places that bear the bulk of the negative externalities created by the illegal trade. These externalities fuel calls for altering the United Nations treaty framework and for individual nations to legalize outside of the framework. Analyses of the pros and cons of legalization usually adopt the perspective of a single nation acting in isolation. However, one nation’s legalization alters incentives for others to act, and not always in obvious ways. So the proper perspective is that of a dynamic game.The primary contribution of this paper is to make the case for analyzing legalization as a strategic game, but it also offers preliminary analysis for the case of cocaine. Tentative conclusions include:

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document