2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 9-16
Author(s):  
C. Kim ◽  
D. Han

The primary objective of this study is to improve the methodology for water allocation focused on efficiency and risk aspects. To attain the primary objective, this study sets up an objective function to maximize social expected benefits, and considers three types of allocation methods. Three types of allocation methods are optimal, proportional, and fixed allocation between regions and service sectors. The results of case study area shows that the fixed allocation method is preferred to the proportional allocation in most cases except that the variance of flow is small with respect to efficiency. Also, efficient and less-risky allocation is simultaneously obtained in some cases, while efficiency and risk show the relation of trade-off in other cases.


Water ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lizhen Wang ◽  
Yong Zhao ◽  
Yuefei Huang ◽  
Jianhua Wang ◽  
Haihong Li ◽  
...  

Water-rights trade has proved to be an effective method for coping with water shortages through the transfer of water resources between users. The water allocation system is classified into two categories based on information transparency and water rights transaction goals: administered system (AS) and market-based system (MS). A multi-agent and multi-objective optimal allocation model, built on a complex adaptive system, was introduced to direct the distribution of water resources under an AS in the Shiyang River Basin; it was compared with a market-based water rights transaction model using the bulletin-board approach. Ideal economic agent equations played a dominant role in both models. The government and different water users were conceptualized as agents with different behaviors and goals in water allocation. The impact of water-saving cost on optimal water allocation was also considered. The results showed that an agent’s water-saving behavior was incentivized by high transaction prices in the water market. Under the MS, the highest bid in the quotation set had a dominant influence on how trade was conducted. A higher transaction price will, thus, result in a better benefit ratio, and a lower one will result in inactivity in terms of water rights trade. This will significantly impact the economic benefit to the basin.


Author(s):  
Li Pan ◽  
Xudong Chen ◽  
Lu Zhao ◽  
Anran Xiao

Water resources allocation is an urgent problem for basin authorities. In order to obtain greater economic benefits from limited water supplies, sub-regions must cooperate with each other. To study the influence of cooperation among sub-regions and the symmetry of cooperation information on the interests of the basin authority and each sub-region, this study proposes a regional water allocation model in three different situations: (1) non-cooperation; (2) cooperation and information symmetry; (3) cooperation and information asymmetry. The proposed model clearly reflects the Stackelberg game relationship between the basin authority and sub-regions. Finally, the model is applied to the Qujiang River Basin in China, and the decisions of the basin authority and sub-regional managers of the Qujiang River Basin under three different situations are discussed. The results show that regional cooperation benefits both the cooperative regions and the social welfare value of the entire river basin, when compared with non-cooperation.


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