Geopolitics: An Ideology for Legitimising the National Socialist Policy of Conquest or a Scientific and Political Field that Is Unappreciated Today?

2015 ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Egbert Jahn
2016 ◽  
pp. 91-118
Author(s):  
Peter Black

The Sonderdienst (Special Service) was an enforcement agency developed by German SS and Police authorities, specifically in the Lublin District of the so called Government General (central and southeastern German-occupied Poland) to assist in enforcing German occupation ordinances in the cities and particularly in the countryside, where lack of police personnel, ignorance of local conditions, and perceived fear of partisan attack discouraged a direct German police presence. After February 1941, the SS and Police relinquished control over the Sonderdienst to the German civilian occupation authorities. Under civilian authority, the Sonderdienst was deployed at the Kreis level, under command of the so-called German Stadt- and Kreishauptmänner in detachments of approximately 30 men to carry out administrative enforcement activities when the civilian authorities were unable to count or SS and police support. This article examines how the Sonderdienst highlights the dependence of German administration in the Government General on locally recruited auxiliaries, particularly in the countryside. The Sonderdienst was conceived, developed, expanded, and deployed within the context of a bitter battle between German civilian authorities and the SS/police apparatus over control of local executive police power. This is hardly new; yet the Government General is unusual in that the German civilian authorities were able to fight the SS to a draw on this issue. Since its formation followed the recruitment of the “ethnic” and ideological “cream” of the ethnic German population of occupied Poland into agencies such as the Selbstschutz, and the Waffen SS, the Sonderdienst represents an early effort of the National Socialist authorities to fashion an ethnically conscious and ideologically committed corps from young men of questionable, even dubious, German ancestry and heritage. Finally, this study reveals not only the complicity of the civilian authorities in Nazi crimes, but the link in German-occupied Poland between “routine” administrative duties, such as collecting fines for ordinance violations, and the brutal persecution and annihilation of groups targeted as enemies of the German Reich, such as the Polish Jews. Civilian administrators and SS and police authorities shared the “National Socialist consensus” in occupied Poland. They wanted to annihilate the Jews and the Polish intelligentsia, to exploit the labor potential of the Polish masses, and to turn the Government General into a region of German settlement. As a part of this vision, the Sonderdienst was to serve not only as a police executive, but as a political and cultural steppingstone to full acceptance into the German “racial community.” There is no question that, even in “routine” duties, the Sonderdienst participated, more or less willingly, in the implementation of the most evil racist policies of the National Socialist regime.


Author(s):  
Claudia Leeb

Through a critical appropriation of Hannah Arendt, and a more sympathetic engagement with Theodor W. Adorno and psychoanalysis, this book develops a new theoretical approach to understanding Austrians’ repression of their collaboration with National Socialist Germany. Drawing on original, extensive archival research, from court documents on Nazi perpetrators to public controversies on theater plays and museums, the book exposes the defensive mechanisms Austrians have used to repress individual and collective political guilt, which led to their failure to work through their past. It exposes the damaging psychological and political consequences such failure has had and continues to have for Austrian democracy today—such as the continuing electoral growth of the right-wing populist Freedom Party in Austria, which highlights the timeliness of the book. However, the theoretical concepts and practical suggestions the book introduces to counteract the repression of individual and collective political guilt are relevant beyond the Austrian context. It shows us that only when individuals and nations live up to guilt are they in a position to take responsibility for past crimes, show solidarity with the victims of crimes, and prevent the emergence of new crimes. Combining theoretical insights with historical analysis, The Politics of Repressed Guilt is an important addition to critical scholarship that explores the pathological implications of guilt repression for democratic political life.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 189-216
Author(s):  
Jamil Hilal

The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of the construction of a Palestinian political field after it collapsed in 1948, when, with the British government’s support of the Zionist movement, which succeeded in establishing the state of Israel, the Palestinian national movement was crushed. This article focuses mainly on the Palestinian political field as it developed in the 1960s and 1970s, the beginnings of its fragmentation in the 1990s, and its almost complete collapse in the first decade of this century. It was developed on a structure characterized by the dominance of a center where the political leadership functioned. The center, however, was established outside historic Palestine. This paper examines the components and dynamics of the relationship between the center and the peripheries, and the causes of the decline of this center and its eventual disappearance, leaving the constituents of the Palestinian people under local political leadership following the collapse of the national representation institutions, that is, the political, organizational, military, cultural institutions and sectorial organizations (women, workers, students, etc.) that made up the PLO and its frameworks. The paper suggests that the decline of the political field as a national field does not mean the disintegration of the cultural field. There are, in fact, indications that the cultural field has a new vitality that deserves much more attention than it is currently assigned.


Author(s):  
Steven Michael Press

In recognizing more than just hyperbole in their critical studies of National Socialist language, post-war philologists Viktor Klemperer (1946) and Eugen Seidel (1961) credit persuasive words and syntax with the expansion of Hitler's ideology among the German people. This popular explanation is being revisited by contemporary philologists, however, as new historical argument holds the functioning of the Third Reich to be anything but monolithic. An emerging scholarly consensus on the presence of more chaos than coherence in Nazi discourse suggests a new imperative for research. After reviewing the foundational works of Mein Kampf (1925) and Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930), the author confirms Klemperer and Seidel’s claim for linguistic manipulation in the rise of the National Socialist Party. Most importantly, this article provides a detailed explanation of how party leaders employed rhetorical language to promote fascist ideology without an underlying basis of logical argumentation.


Author(s):  
A. Zhavoronkov ◽  
◽  
S. Patrushev ◽  
L. Philippova ◽  
◽  
...  

2011 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
Frank Seberechts

Uit de papieren van jeugdleider John Caremans, die aan de zorgen van het ADVN werden toevertrouwd, krijgen we een duidelijker beeld van de geschiedenis van de Vlaams-nationalistische jeugdbewegingen voor en tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Caremans voert in 1942 in opdracht van zijn oversten ‘verkenningsopdrachten’ uit bij vertegenwoordigers van de nationaal-socialistische jeugdbeweging in Duitsland. Uit het verslag dat Caremans over zijn reizen opstelt en uit de naoorlogse ondervragingen van Caremans en van zijn chef, jeugdleider Edgar Lehembre, blijkt dat deze reizen naar Berlijn slechts een episode vormen in de strijd die gedurende de hele bezetting woedt tussen de verschillende jeugdbewegingen in Vlaanderen en tussen, de verschillende partijen en ideologische strekkingen in de collaboratie. Alle ingrediënten zijn aanwezig: de scepsis van een deel van de Nationaal-Socialistische Jeugd Vlaanderen (NSJV) tegenover de brute nationaal-socialistische machtshonger, het onbegrip en de machtspolitiek van Duitse instanties als het Deutsche Arbeiterfront (DAF) en de Hitlerjugend (HJ) tegenover de buitenlanders – zelfs wanneer die zich in de collaboratie inschakelen, de inmenging van Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond (VNV) en van de Vlaamsch-Duitsche Arbeidsgemeenschap (DeVlag)/SS. Het wordt duidelijk dat Lehembre en het VNV in deze strijd het onderspit zullen delven.________“Something on behalf of our young people”. John Caremans, Edgar Lehembre, Remi Van Mieghem and the Flemish and German machinations concerning the Flemish nationalist youth movement in 1942.The documents of youth leader John Caremans, which had been entrusted to the care of the ADVN, give a clearer picture of the history of the Flemish Nationalist youth movements before and during the Second World War. In 1942, Caremans was instructed by his superiors to carry out ‘exploratory missions’ among representatives of the National Socialist youth movement in Germany.The report written by Caremans about his travels and post-war interrogations of Caremans and his chief, youth leader, Edgar Lehembre, demonstrate that these trips to Berlin constituted only one episode in the struggle that raged throughout the occupation between the various youth movements in Flanders and between the various parties and ideological trends in the collaboration. All ingredients are present: the scepticism of a part of the National Socialist Youth of Flanders (NSJV) towards the brute National Socialist craving for power, the incomprehension and the power politics of German agencies, like the Deutsche Arbeiterfront (DAF) and the Hitlerjugend (HJ) towards foreigners – even when they engage in collaboration, the interference of the Flemish National Union (VNV) and the Flemish German Labour Community (De Vlag)/SS. It becomes clear that Lehembre and the VNV would come off worst in this combat.


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