The Interplay Among Knowledge, Cognitive Abilities and Thinking Styles in Probabilistic Reasoning: A Test of a Model

2014 ◽  
pp. 195-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Chiesi ◽  
Caterina Primi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Thinking Styles

Intellectual Virtues and Vices

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-47
Author(s):  
Alessandra Tanesini
Keyword(s):  
Impression Management ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Philosophical Foundations

This chapter sets out the philosophical foundations of the proposed account of virtues and vices of intellectual self-appraisal. It explains the nature of intellectual vices in general by distinguishing between sensibilities, thinking styles, and character traits. Subsequently, it describes the specific features of the epistemic vices of self-appraisal. The chapter supplies an account of what makes epistemic vices vicious, and argues in favour of a motivational view. In the author’s view the vices of intellectual self-appraisal are impairments of epistemic agency caused by motivations, such as those of self-enhancement or impression management, that also bring other epistemically bad motives in their trail. Such motivations bias epistemic evaluations of one’s cognitive abilities, processes, and states. These appraisals, in turn, have widespread negative influences on agents’ epistemic conduct as a whole.

scholarly journals The Reflective Mind: Examining Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Base Rate Neglect with fMRI

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1011-1022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oshin Vartanian ◽  
Erin L. Beatty ◽  
Ingrid Smith ◽  
Kristen Blackler ◽  
Quan Lam ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Reflective Thinking ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Posterior Cingulate Cortex ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Base Rate Neglect ◽  
Behavioral Dissociation

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.

scholarly journals Probabilistic reasoning in schizophrenia is volatile but not biased

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerit Pfuhl ◽  
Håkon Tjelmeland
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Systematic Deviation ◽  
Recent Information ◽  
Probability Estimates ◽  
Common Task ◽  
Average Probability ◽  
Beads Task

We update our beliefs based on evidence. Aberrant belief updating has been linked to schizophrenia and autism. It is not clear whether the faulty updating is due to reducedgeneral cognitive abilities, overweighting of recent information, or lower thresholds for switching from one belief to another. A common task to assess belief updating isthe beads task. Patients with schizophrenia show hasty decision-making.We here present a model describing the deviations from an ideal Bayesian observer and apply the model to three independent datasets, totalling n=176 healthy controlsand n=128 patients with schizophrenia. The parameters describe a) the number of beads considered (memory), b) systematic deviation and c) unsystematic deviations (volatility) from probability estimates.We find that, on average, patients use fewer beads and or more volatile responding. However, patients have, on average, probability estimates that are closer to the true probabilities. Closer investigations yielded relevant differences among the datasets and sequences used. Morechallenging sequences improve the performance of patients.Our model captures well the cognitive mechanisms proposed to contribute to the performance differences in the beads task.

scholarly journals Different cognitive mechanisms explain how cognitive abilities and thinking styles contribute to conflict resolution in reasoning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna-Lena Schubert ◽  
Mário B. Ferreira ◽  
André Mata ◽  
Ben Riemenschneider
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Conflict Information

Recent results have challenged the widespread assumption of dual process models of belief bias that sound reasoning relies on slow, careful reflection, whereas biased reasoning is based on fast intuition. Instead, parallel process models of reasoning suggest that rule- and belief-based problem features are processed in parallel and that reasoning problems that elicit a conflict between rule- and belief-based problem features may also elicit more than one Type 1 response. This theoretical development has important implications for individual-differences research on reasoning, because rule-based responses by certain individuals may reflect that these individuals were either more likely to give a rule-based default response or that they successfully inhibited and overrode a belief-based default response. In two studies, we used the diffusion model to describe decision making during transitive reasoning and related model parameters to individual differences in cognitive abilities and thinking styles. We found that individuals with greater need for cognition showed a smaller decrease in drift rates when confronted with a conflict between rule- and belief-based problem features under logical validity instructions, which suggests that a greater disposition to engage in reflective thinking facilitated the inhibition and successful override of Type 1 responses. More intelligent individuals, however, showed a greater decrease in drift rates when confronted with a conflict between rule- and belief-based problem features under belief instructions, which suggests that their quickly generated logical response interfered with their ability to evaluate lower-level intrinsic problem features. Taken together, this double dissociation suggests that cognitive abilities and thinking styles affect the processing of conflict information through different mechanisms and at different stages of information-processing: Greater cognitive abilities facilitate the efficient creation of decoupled problem representations, whereas a greater disposition to engage in critical thinking facilitates the successful detection and override of Type 1 responses.

Is diachronic thought a specific reasoning ability? 1The authors are grateful to Fawzia Campana, Florence Dokic, Stéphanie Jaccard, Rachel Luternauer, Isabelle Maeder, Delphine Rinaldi and Lise Rubin for their important help during the collection and analysis of the data. They also wish to thank the children who participated in the experiment and their teachers for their cooperation.

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Pons ◽  
Jacques Montangero
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Spatial Reasoning ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Cognitive Level ◽  
Change Over Time ◽  
Significant Development ◽  
Dynamic Synthesis ◽  
Effect Of Age ◽  
Over Time

Several experiments have shown that cognitive abilities involved in the representation and understanding of change over time (what we term “diachronic thought”) develop strikingly in various domains between the ages of 8 and 12 years. Do these abilities simply reflect the child's general cognitive level or are they specific reasoning competencies related to change over time? The present research deals with this question and studies the relationships between three tasks assessing diachronic thought (Qualitative transformation, Temporal dissociation and Dynamic synthesis) and two tasks assessing the children's operatory level (Probabilistic reasoning and Spatial reasoning). Each set of tasks was presented during a separate session to 45 children aged 8, 10 and 12 years. As expected, a significant development in the subjects' answers to diachronic and operatory tasks was observed. Moreover, the results revealed that there was a significant correlation between two diachronic tasks and the operatory tasks as long as the effect of age was not controlled, but that only the correlation between tasks in the same set (either diachronic or operatory) remained significant when the age effect was controlled. We interpret these results as showing that diachronic thought, as assessed with our three tasks, can be considered as a specific reasoning ability.

scholarly journals A replication study of JTC bias, genetic liability for psychosis and delusional ideation

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Cécile Henquet ◽  
Jim van Os ◽  
Lotta K. Pries ◽  
Christian Rauschenberg ◽  
Philippe Delespaul ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Spectrum Disorder ◽  
Adjusted Relative Risk ◽  
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder ◽  
Delusional Ideation ◽  
Patient Status ◽  
Schizophrenia Spectrum ◽  
Lifetime Experience ◽  
Sibling Status

Abstract Background This study attempted to replicate whether a bias in probabilistic reasoning, or ‘jumping to conclusions’(JTC) bias is associated with being a sibling of a patient with schizophrenia spectrum disorder; and if so, whether this association is contingent on subthreshold delusional ideation. Methods Data were derived from the EUGEI project, a 25-centre, 15-country effort to study psychosis spectrum disorder. The current analyses included 1261 patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder, 1282 siblings of patients and 1525 healthy comparison subjects, recruited in Spain (five centres), Turkey (three centres) and Serbia (one centre). The beads task was used to assess JTC bias. Lifetime experience of delusional ideation and hallucinatory experiences was assessed using the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences. General cognitive abilities were taken into account in the analyses. Results JTC bias was positively associated not only with patient status but also with sibling status [adjusted relative risk (aRR) ratio : 4.23 CI 95% 3.46–5.17 for siblings and aRR: 5.07 CI 95% 4.13–6.23 for patients]. The association between JTC bias and sibling status was stronger in those with higher levels of delusional ideation (aRR interaction in siblings: 3.77 CI 95% 1.67–8.51, and in patients: 2.15 CI 95% 0.94–4.92). The association between JTC bias and sibling status was not stronger in those with higher levels of hallucinatory experiences. Conclusions These findings replicate earlier findings that JTC bias is associated with familial liability for psychosis and that this is contingent on the degree of delusional ideation but not hallucinations.

scholarly journals The relationship between intellectual styles, intelligence and learning strategies

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angélica Polvani TRASSI ◽  
Katya Luciane de OLIVEIRA ◽  
Acácia Aparecida Angeli dos SANTOS
Keyword(s):  
Learning Strategies ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Basic Education ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
The State ◽  
Brazilian Population ◽  
Assessment Scale ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Intellectual Styles ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract Intellectual styles comprise a preference of people to use their cognitive abilities to solve problems. In this sense, the objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between thinking styles, verbal reasoning, and learning strategies in basic education. A total of 470 students from the 2nd to the 9th gradein a city in the state of Paraná participated in the study. We used the Thinking Styles Inventory - Revised II, the Learning Strategies Assessment Scale, and the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. The Wechsler Scale was administered individually and to a restricted sample of 45 students. Positive relations were obtained between the intellectual styles inventory score and the learning strategies. The data pointed towards the need for further national studies to assess these correlations due to the early stage of these studies within the Brazilian population.

Refining our understanding of the “elephant in the room”

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Critical Factors ◽  
Technological Culture

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.

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