Believers in pseudoscience present lower evidential criteria

Previous studies have proposed that low evidential criteria or proneness to jump to conclusions influences the formation of paranormal beliefs. We investigated whether the low evidential criteria hypothesis for paranormal beliefs extends to a conceptually distinct type of unwarranted beliefs: those related to pseudoscience. We presented individuals varying in their endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs with two hypothesis testing tasks. In the beads task, the participants were asked to decide from which of two jars containing different proportions of colored beads they were collecting samples. In the mouse trap task, they were asked to guess which rule determined whether a participant-controlled mouse obtained a piece of cheese or was trapped. In both cases, the volunteers were free to decide when to stop collecting evidence before completing the tasks. Our results indicate that, compared to skeptics, individuals presenting stronger endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs tend to require less evidence before coming to a conclusion in hypothesis testing situations.

Persons with first episode psychosis have distinct profiles of social cognition and metacognition

Subjects with first-episode psychosis experience substantial deficits in social cognition and metacognition. Although previous studies have investigated the role of profiles of individuals in social cognition and metacognition in chronic schizophrenia, profiling subjects with first-episode psychosis in both domains remains to be investigated. We used latent profile analysis to derive profiles of the abilities in 174 persons with first-episode psychosis using the Beck’s Cognitive Insight Scale, the Faces Test, the Hinting Task, the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire, and the Beads Task. Participants received a clinical assessment and a neuropsychological assessment. The best-fitting model was selected according to the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). We assessed the importance of the variables via a classification tree (CART). We derived three clusters with distinct profiles. The first profile (33.3%) comprised individuals with low social cognition. The second profile (60.9%) comprised individuals that had more proneness to present jumping to conclusions. The third profile (5.7%) presented a heterogeneous profile of metacognitive deficits. Persons with lower social cognition presented worse clinical and neuropsychological features than cluster 2 and cluster 3. Cluster 3 presented significantly worst functioning. Our results suggest that individuals with FEP present distinct profiles that concur with specific clinical, neuropsychological, and functional challenges. Each subgroup may benefit from different interventions.

Delusional Ideation and Data Quality

According to continuum models of psychosis, cognitive biases contribute to delusional ideation in the general population. In a large (N = 1002) pre-registered general population study, we examine key specific predictions of such models; in particular, the hypotheses that delusional ideation in the general population is predicted by the Jumping to Conclusions bias (JTC), Over-adjustment, the Bias Against Disconfirm-ing Evidence (BADE), and the Liberal Acceptance bias (LA). Crucially, we include explicit indices of data quality, and incorporate a new, animated Beads Task which overcomes known problems with this instrument. Our results initially appear to replicate several classic findings concerning the relationships between delusional ideation and the aforementioned cognitive biases: Delusional ideation predicted JTC, overadjustment, and BADE. Importantly, however, we demonstrate that many of these classic findings are either severely diminished — or disappear entirely — when inattentive participants are removed from the analyses. These findings highlight crucial issues that need to be addressed to rigorously test continuum models of psychosis.

Birds of a Feather Flock Together: Disadvantageous Decision Making in Augmented Restless Legs Syndrome Patients with and without Impulse Control Disorders

Background: Augmentation (AUG) in patients with restless legs syndrome (RLS) can be associated with impulse control disorder (ICD) symptoms, such as compulsive sexual behavior, gambling disorder or compulsive shopping. In this study, we wanted to assess whether RLS patients with AUG differ in decision making from those patients who have augmentation and in addition ICD symptoms (AUG + ICD) in a post hoc analysis of a patient cohort assessed in a previous study. Methods: In total, 40 RLS patients with augmentation (19 AUG + ICD, 21 AUG without ICDs) were included. RLS diagnosis, severity, and diagnosis of augmentation were made by sleep disorder specialists. ICD symptoms were assessed using semi-structured interviews. All patients performed the beads task, which is an information sampling task where participants must decide from which of the two cups colored beads were drawn. Results were compared to 21 healthy controls (HC). Results: There was no difference in information sampling or irrational decision making between AUG and AUG + ICD patients (p = 0.67 and p = 1.00, respectively). Both patient groups drew less beads and made more irrational decisions than HC (all p-values < 0.03, respectively). Conclusions: Our results suggest that augmentation itself is associated with poorer decision making even in the absence of ICD symptoms. Further studies are necessary to explore whether rapid and hasty decision making are a harbinger of augmentation in RLS.

Dynamic Representation of the Subjective Value of Information

To improve future decisions, people should seek information based on the value of information (VOI), which depends on the current evidence and the reward structure of the upcoming decision. When additional evidence is supplied, people should update VOI to adjust subsequent information seeking, but the neurocognitive mechanisms of this updating process remain unknown. We used a modified beads task to examine how the VOI is represented and updated in the human brain. We theoretically derived, and empirically verified, a normative prediction that the VOI depends on decision evidence and is biased by reward asymmetry. Using fMRI, we found that the subjective VOI is represented in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Critically, this VOI representation was updated when additional evidence was supplied, showing that DLPFC dynamically tracks the up-to-date VOI over time. These results provide new insights into how humans adaptively seek information in the service of decision making.

Problems in measuring the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders with the fish task: A secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

Background: The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models for the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the present study aims to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with a more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions, and positive symptoms in general.Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at the start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients’ delusional severity and delusional conviction. Results: There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction, and positive symptoms.Conclusions: We found no differences in JTC between patients with psychotic disorders and healthy controls, which is in part in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. Interestingly, patients with psychotic disorders displayed JTC rates commonly found in the literature, while healthy control subjects showed an unexpectedly high level of JTC. The task variant we used in the present study (fish task) is discussed as a potential reason for our results, as it may induce a more deliberative reasoning style in controls as compared to the traditional beads task. Furthermore, possible implications for the measurement of the JTC-bias, in general, are discussed.Trial Registration: ISRCTN29242879 (isrctn.com), date of registration: April 12th 2006, retrospectively registered

Problems in measuring the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders with the fish task: a secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

Background The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models for the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the present study aims to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with a more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions, and positive symptoms in general. Methods Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at the start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients’ delusional severity and delusional conviction. Results There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction, and positive symptoms. Conclusions We found no differences in JTC between patients with psychotic disorders and healthy controls, which is in part in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. Interestingly, patients with psychotic disorders displayed JTC rates commonly found in the literature, while healthy control subjects showed an unexpectedly high level of JTC. The task variant we used in the present study (fish task) is discussed as a potential reason for our results, as it may induce a more deliberative reasoning style in controls as compared to the traditional beads task. Furthermore, possible implications for the measurement of the JTC-bias, in general, are discussed. Trial Registration ISRCTN29242879 (isrctn.com), date of registration: April 12th 2006, retrospectively registered.

Problems in measuring the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders with the fish task: A secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

Background: The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models for the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the present study aims to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with a more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions, and positive symptoms in general.Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at the start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients’ delusional severity and delusional conviction. Results: There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction, and positive symptoms.Conclusions: We found no differences in JTC between patients with psychotic disorders and healthy controls, which is in part in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. Interestingly, patients with psychotic disorders displayed JTC rates commonly found in the literature, while healthy control subjects showed an unexpectedly high level of JTC. The task variant we used in the present study (fish task) is discussed as a potential reason for our results, as it may induce a more deliberative reasoning style in controls as compared to the traditional beads task. Furthermore, possible implications for the measurement of the JTC-bias, in general, are discussed.Trial Registration: ISRCTN29242879 (isrctn.com), date of registration: April 12th 2006