Regulatory Reform in Selected Network Industries: Lessons from Turkey

Author(s):  
Sencer Ecer ◽  
David Thomas Seymour
1998 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 799
Author(s):  
A. Asher

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has competition and fair-trading law responsibility for Australian industries. It has gained regulatory responsibilities for third-party access to telecommunications, soon will become the national regulator of gas pipeline access under a legislated code developed by the jurisdictions and industry working in a common forum, and will progressively become the national regulator of electricity transmission.This paper describes the ACCC's concept of the term 'efficient incentive regulation', gives examples of government decisions on network industry operations to which it is relevant and describes the general approach the ACCC will take in applying that concept, to encourage competition, innovation, economic investment and fair dealing by suppliers with users.The paper describes the relevance of the rise of national product markets and convergence in the delivery of telecommunications, electricity and gas services to the types of decisions the ACCC and State-based regulators will have to take and places those decisions in the context of common issues in regulatory reform internationally. Regulatory decisions taken for one network industry may have particular positive effects if the underlying principles flow on to others.A necessary part of dealing with national industries is the coordination of regulatory effort where Commonwealth and State/Territory regulators are involved. There is the risk in Australia that separation of regulatory powers between jurisdictional and national levels may cause welfare gains to business, customers and the wider community arising from the industry reform process to be lost if there are shortcomings in communications between regulators, duplication of effort or inconsistencies in approach. The paper describes the current division of responsibilities; the potential of the Utility Regulators' Forum to coordinate regulatory effort; and indicates the potential for losses of welfare and economic efficiency if COAG principles of a national approach to regulation are not fully embraced.The paper discusses the range of tools available to deal with challenges arising from privatisations, from the entry of multinational players to network industries and from the implementation of competition policy reforms, drawing on concerns about network industries raised with the ACCC, and on the ACCC's broader complaints experience. Finally, the paper outlines the reasons for policy-makers to pay particular attention to shaping and bringing light-handed but effective regulation to the areas of the converging network industries where market power remains unconstrained by competition, and for regulators to coordinate their administration of the regulated areas of network industries so that the policy objectives of incentive regulation are realised, resulting in the industry, users and the community sharing in the benefits.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingo Vogelsang

Have you ever wondered how your telephone company or Internet service provider can give you access to almost all people in the world, or how electricity suppliers can compete with each other if there is only one electric supply line passing through your street? This Element deals with the economics and public regulation of such network industries. It puts particular emphasis on the specific economic concepts used for analyzing them and on the regulatory reform movement and the compatibility of regulation and competition. Worldwide most of these industries have changed dramatically in recent years, telecommunications in particular. Network industries mostly exhibit economies of scale in production and similar economies in consumption. Both of these properties cause market power problems that often require industry-specific regulation. However, due to technological and market changes network policies have moved on from end-user regulation to wholesale regulation and in some cases to deregulation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 115-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Bastianin ◽  
Paolo Castelnovo ◽  
Massimo Florio

2016 ◽  
pp. 77-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Dzhagityan

The article looks into the spillover effect of the sweeping overhaul of financial regulation, also known as Basel III, for credit institutions. We found that new standards of capital adequacy will inevitably put downward pressure on ROE that in turn will further diminish post-crisis recovery of the banking industry. Under these circumstances, resilience of systemically important banks could be maintained through cost optimization, repricing, and return to homogeneity of their operating models, while application of macroprudential regulation by embedding it into new regulatory paradigm would minimize the effect of risk multiplication at micro level. Based on the research we develop recommendations for financial regulatory reform in Russia and for shaping integrated banking regulation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoo-Duk Kang ◽  
Kyuntae Kim ◽  
Tae Hyun Oh ◽  
Cheol-Won Lee ◽  
Hyun Jean Lee ◽  
...  

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