scholarly journals Interface Between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property in the Payment Systems Market in India

Author(s):  
Yogesh Dubey ◽  
Konark Bhandari
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

In this article, I introduce the interaction between intellectual property(IP) and antitrust law. I describe the ways in which these two importantareas of government regulation are and are not in tension, and discuss thehistory of the relationship between these laws. I argue that IP andantitrust have cycled between over- and under-protection, and that we arecurrently (and mistakenly) conditioned to think of private property andprivate ordering as efficient in and of themselves, rather than asefficient only in the context of robust market competition. Further, Iargue that antitrust can serve the goals of innovation and dynamicefficiency directly in circumstances in which competition, not monopoly,serves as a spur to innovation. The goal of the IP and antitrust lawsshould be to seek a robust balance between competition and monopoly in theservice of dynamic efficiency. When IP laws are strong, antitrust lawsshould also be strong, and vice versa.


Author(s):  
S. S. Burchik

The growing importance of intellectual property as an asset raises the question whether exercising of the intellectual property rights shall be regulated by antitrust law to protect against possible abuses and ensure the efficiency of the economy. The study aims to improve the existing regulation in the Russian Federation and align it with the idea of balancing private and public interests while fostering competition and encouraging innovation.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Katz

This Article explores the rule of law aspects of the intersection between intellectual property and antitrust law. Contemporary discussions and debates on intellectual property (IP), antitrust, and the intersection between them are typically framed in economically oriented terms. This Article, however, shows that there is more law in law than just economics. It demonstrates how the rule of law has influenced the development of several IP doctrines, and the interface between IP and antitrust, in important, albeit not always acknowledged, ways. In particular, it argues that some limitations on IP rights, such as exhaustion and limitations on tying arrangements, are grounded in rule of law principles restricting the arbitrary exercise of legal power, rather than solely in considerations of economic efficiency.The historical development of IP law has reflected several tensions, both economic and political, that lie at the heart of the constitutional order of the modern state: the tension between the benefits of free competition and the recognition that some restraints on competition may be beneficial and justified; the concern that power, even when conferred in the public interest, can often be abused and arbitrarily applied to advance private interests; and the tension between freedom of contract and property and freedom of trade. This Article explores how rule of law considerations have allowed courts to mediate these tensions, both in their familiar public law aspects but also in their less conspicuous private law dimensions, and how, in particular, they have shaped the development of IP doctrine and its intersection with antitrust law and the common law.


Author(s):  
C. Scott Hemphill

This chapter surveys the intersection of competition law—or antitrust law, as it is known in the United States—with intellectual property (IP). It examines whether and how IP rights alter the substantive scope of antitrust law, either by operation of statute or as a matter of economic policy. It discusses a wide variety of antitrust claims, alleging collusion, exclusion, or both, that have been raised against IP rights holders. The examples are drawn mainly from the United States, although European developments are also included where relevant. The analysis supports the conclusion that, beyond a rights holder’s core ability to assert a valid, infringed right against a rival, IP restricts antitrust law less than one might expect. Moreover, the restrictions that do exist are often subtle.


2021 ◽  
pp. 121-134
Author(s):  
Mariateresa Maggiolino ◽  
Laura Zoboli

The interface between intellectual property rights (IPR) and the rules to protect the correct functioning of the market can be canvassed by looking at when these two sets of provisions converge and collide. This chapter analyses four alternative scenarios, by stressing that policy decisions become crucial to solve the cases of conflict and, in particular, the case where antitrust law forbids practices that intellectual property (IP) laws allow. Moreover, the chapter illustrates that it is in relation to these policy decisions that scholars and practitioners can appreciate how different jurisdictions, as in the United States (US) and European Union (EU), conceptualize the role that property rights and competition are called to play in spurring innovation.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

The overwhelming majority of intellectual property lawsuits settle beforetrial. These settlements involve agreements between the patentee and theaccused infringer, parties who are often competitors before the lawsuit.Because these competitors may agree to stop competing, to regulate theprice each charges, and to exchange information about products and prices,settlements of intellectual property disputes naturally raise antitrustconcerns. In this paper, we suggest a way to reconcile the interests ofintellectual property law and antitrust law in evaluating intellectualproperty settlements. In Part I, we provide background on the issue. PartII argues that in most cases courts can determine the legality of asettlement agreement without inquiring into the merits of the intellectualproperty dispute being settled, either because the settlement would belegal even if the patent were invalid or not infringed, or because thesettlement would be illegal even if the patent were valid and infringed.Only in a narrow class of cases will the merits of the intellectualproperty dispute matter. In Part III, we argue that in that narrow middleset of cases antitrust's rule of reason is unlikely to be helpful. Rather,courts must inquire into the validity, enforceability, and infringementissues in the underlying case, with particular sensitivity to both the typeof intellectual property right at issue and the industrial context of thedispute. In Part IV, we apply our framework to a number of commonsettlement terms, most notably the use of exclusion payments to settlepharmaceutical patent disputes. We argue that exclusion payments thatexceed litigation costs should be deemed illegal per se. There is nolegitimate reason for such payments, and the most likely reason - to permitthe patentee to exclude competition that would likely have occurred absentthe payment - is anticompetitive. Further, legitimate patent disputes canbe settled in other ways than with an exclusion payment - for example, bylicensing the defendant or by agreeing to delay entry.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

Most antitrust claims relating to intellectual property involve challengesto agreements, licensing practices or affirmative conduct involving the useor disposition of the intellectual property rights or the products theycover. But sometimes an antitrust claim centers on an intellectual propertyowner's refusal to use or license an intellectual property right, perhapscoupled with efforts to enforce the intellectual property right againstinfringers. The allegation may be that the intellectual property right isso essential to competition that it must be licensed across the board, orthat a refusal to license it to one particular party was discriminatory, orthat in context a refusal to license helped a monopolist to acquire ormaintain market power.Claims based on a unilateral refusal to license - the subject of thischapter - present important issues at the center of the tension betweenantitrust and intellectual property. The antitrust and intellectualproperty laws are not necessarily in conflict. For the most part they servecomplementary goals, though each must limit the scope of the other.Unilateral refusal to license cases, however, cut to the heart of theintellectual property owner's right to exclude others from practicing theintellectual property. As such, efforts to invoke antitrust law in thiscontext deserve special scrutiny.Section 2 reviews the basic principles relating to unilateral refusals tolicense intellectual property rights. Section 3 discusses in detail thevarious sets of circumstances in which antitrust plaintiffs argue forexceptions to those basic rules. Section 4 distinguishes unilateral fromconcerted and conditional refusals to deal.


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