Status and Application of Good Faith in International Law

Author(s):  
Lingliang Zeng
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Murray

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.


1992 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1377
Author(s):  
Leslie Green
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Shibata Akiho

This chapter studies the principle of good faith, which has been declared by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as ‘a well-established principle of international law’. Through judicial pronouncements and state practice, it has come to acquire concrete legal content. The principle of good faith is closely linked to the concept of legal security; it provides certainty and foreseeability in society, and as such is fundamental and necessary to any legal system. The chapter examines the role that the principle of good faith could play, first, in general international law relating to the environment, focusing on three broad areas of environmental treaty performance, environmental cooperation, and due diligence. It then considers the more concrete role that the principle of good faith could play within multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) as special legal regimes. Finally, the chapter analyses two concrete contexts within which the principle of good faith could be engaged to perform specific normative functions in the operation of MEAs, namely in non-compliance and ‘pledge and review’ mechanisms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 695-712
Author(s):  
Chao Wang

Abstract The invocation of national security exceptions under Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 has long been viewed as “self-judging”. In the landmark case of Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, the panel of the WTO’s dispute settlement body (DSB) addressed two important but previously considered ambiguous issues. First, the Panel confirmed its jurisdiction to review its members’ invocation of Article XXI of GATT 1994. Second, offering a detailed interpretation of Article XXI, especially paragraph (b) and its subparagraph (iii), the panel distinguished the objective requirements from the self-judging features, and held that it has the jurisdiction to determine whether the objective requirements of Article XXI have been satisfied when a member invokes the national security exception, and the member’s discretion is also expected to be limited by its good faith obligation, which, as an established principle of international law, shall apply to both the member’s definition of the essential security interests and its connection to the measures being taken.


1914 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Fenwick

In a previous paper the attempt was made to state Vattel's system of municipal and international jurisprudence, and to show in a general way the authority attributed to his treatise on international law. It remains for us to consider the technical rules of international law proposed by Vattel and thus to lay the basis for a critical estimate of the position to which his treatise is entitled among the classics of international law.The rules of conduct which nations have voluntarily adopted for themselves, and which therefore constitute the law between them, may be divided, with regard to their intrinsic character, into two general classes: first, rules which define certain principles of moral conduct or which embody the recognition of certain fundamental rights of states, and secondly, rules which define the concrete application of principles to the practical relations of states. Chief of the rules defining principles of moral conduct is the rule of good faith between nations, which in its many applications pervades the whole field of international law. This rule of good faith is not merely an a priori conception deduced from the analogy between sovereign states as members of an international community and private persons as members of society; it is a rule of positive international law, accepted by nations as properly controlling their conduct, and appealed to by them in their diplomatic relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 7-36
Author(s):  
Clara Ho-yan CHAN

This study aims to explore different causes for the mistranslation of legal terminology in international agreements that are enforced through domestic legislation, and attempt to provide some solutions. It is said that legal training will help legal translators to render terminology correctly. This should be held true because many legal terms from different legal systems are ‘false friends’, in that even a well-trained lawyer may need to undertake extensive legal and linguistic research to render them in another language or legal system. This study, by use of a comparison of several translated legal terms from People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, shows that besides the cause of ‘legal knowledge’, the disparities between international law and national law and different legal traditions can also lead to an improper transfer of legal terminology. Examples of these terms are “Copyright piracy” (Daoban 盗版 vs. qinhai zhuzuoquan 侵害著作权), “Good Faith” (Chengshi shouxin 诚实守信 vs. shanyi 善意), and “Inventive Step” (Famingxing de buzhou 发明性的步骤 vs. jinbuxing 进步性). In order to enhance translators’ legal knowledge, it is proposed that they be presented with some substantive laws together with simple illustrations of their structures. Translators should crosscheck their translations against a wide range of sources at work. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 699-717
Author(s):  
Paul Gragl ◽  
Malgosia Fitzmaurice

AbstractThe main reason for Article 18 being one of the most opaque provisions of the Vienna Convention is that it establishes a relatively vague ‘interim obligation’ for States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty between its signature and ratification. Although the existence of such an interim obligation has been recognized by States and in various international legal regimes, it remains problematic since Article 18 neither defines nor determines its own contours and when and under which conditions it is being breached. It goes without saying that the legal consequences of a possible breach of this provision are left equally unclear. It remains uncertain how the interim obligation of Article 18 fits into the general international law of treaties; what its legal nature and temporal scope is; which role the principle of good faith plays as a possibly underlying principle of this provision; and how we should understand the object and purpose of a treaty and how it can be defeated. Furthermore, its apparent focus seems to be on bilateral rather than multilateral treaties, but this exclusive application of this interim obligation to bilateral treaties would contravene both the expressed and implied intent of the drafters. Therefore, this article also discusses how Article 18 fits within the normative system of international law and law-making treaties, such as human rights treaties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Verity Robson

Abstract Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is foundational, but not exceptional: the duty to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions must be considered within the framework of public international law as a whole. The Article obliges each High Contracting Party and its organs to respect the Geneva Conventions, and to ensure respect for these Conventions by the population over which it exercises authority and any other persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to it. This scope is demonstrated by the ordinary meaning of the term, subsequent agreements, subsequent practice and other relevant rules of international law, and confirmed by reference to the travaux preparatoires. In particular, erga omnes status does not affect it. As a matter of good faith performance of the Conventions, each High Contracting Party also has a duty not to encourage violations by others. Common Article 1 does not require, as some authors have argued, the prevention or termination of breaches of the Geneva Conventions by other parties to conflict, but High Contracting Parties may choose to take steps toward doing so, as a matter of policy.


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