Simulation of radionuclide atmospheric dispersion and dose assessment for inhabitants of Tehran province after a hypothetical accident of the Tehran Research Reactor

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Vali ◽  
M. E. Adelikhah ◽  
S. A. H. Feghhi ◽  
O. Noorikalkhoran ◽  
R. Ahangari
2016 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 17-26
Author(s):  
Nahid Sadeghi ◽  
Rohollah Ahangari

In this work, radiological assessment of atmospheric release from Tehran’s Research Reactor (TRR) stack and assessment of public exposures under normal operation has been studied. To perform tasks mentioned above, Pc-Cream computer code which simulates Gaussian Dispersion air transport plume model as well as laboratory analysis of the soil and leaves samples and TLD (Thermo Luminescent Dosimeter) monitoring around the TRR site was used. Results of the Pc-Cream code showed that the annual committed and external dose received by the individual in the vicinity of the reactor is below the regulatory limit. Also, the results of laboratory analysis of available radionuclides in the soil and leaves samples showed that the concentrations are close to the background (K40=635, Th232=28, Cs137=0.29 up to 28.82, Ra226=25 (Bq[1]/Kg) in soil and K40=457, Be7≈70 (Bq/Kg) in leaves) and confirm the code results. The monitored dose values of the TLD detectors were positioned around the reactor within 500 m radius shows that the background dose in vicinity of TRR (113 μSv up to 150 μSv) is consistent with the background dose in Tehran province (125 μSv).


2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (9) ◽  
pp. 763-766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hosein Choopan Dastjerdi ◽  
Hossein Khalafi ◽  
Yaser Kasesaz ◽  
Amir Movafeghi

Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Wheeler

This chapter examines the attempts by the first Obama Administration to reach out to Iran in an effort to build trust. It traces the failure of Obama’s diplomatic efforts to secure any reciprocation from Iranian leaders. The lack of reciprocation shows the problem of accurate signal interpretation when there is no trust. It focuses on the negotiations in 2009–10 over limiting Iran’s supply of nuclear fuel in return for refuelling the Tehran Research Reactor. The chapter argues these negotiations failed because of the lack of trust. What makes this case so important is that there was no face-to-face interaction, which this book argues is critical to the development of interpersonal trust and accurate signal interpretation.


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