Price premium effect, supply contracts and strategic decision making under environmental considerations

2019 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinay Ramani ◽  
Sanjeev Swami ◽  
Debabrata Ghosh
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Price Premium ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Technological Adoption ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings. Findings A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Originality/value This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Supply chain contracting coordination for fresh products with fresh-keeping effort

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 538-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Zheng ◽  
Petros Ieromonachou ◽  
Tijun Fan ◽  
Li Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Decision Variable ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Purpose Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. The purpose of this paper is to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived. Design/methodology/approach To address this issue, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e. wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision making. The authors start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at the end. Findings The results show that the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; and the profit of a FPSC is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price. Research limitations/implications This research is based on the assumption that demand is relatively stable. It has not addressed when demand is stochastic. Practical implications The findings would be useful for managers in fresh food sector in terms of how to deal with suppliers in order to maximize total profit while also provide freshest food to the customers. Originality/value Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem.

Contract coordination optimization of a multi-power supplier-single dominant grid supply chain in hybrid electricity market

2019 ◽  
Vol 119 (9) ◽  
pp. 1861-1887
Author(s):  
Zhenning Zhu ◽  
Lingcheng Kong ◽  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Bing Cao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Power Supply ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Green Power

Purpose In the hybrid electricity market, renewable energy power generator faces the uncertainty of power market demand and the randomness of the renewable energy generation output. In order to improve the grid-connected quantity of green power, the purpose of this paper is to design the pricing mechanism for renewable energy power generator with revenue-sharing contract in a two-stage “multi-single” electricity supply chain which contains a single dominant power retailer and two kinds of power suppliers providing different power energy species. Design/methodology/approach Considering the dual uncertainties of renewable energy power output and power market demand, the authors design the full-cooperative contract decision-making model, wholesale price contract decision-making model and revenue-sharing contract decision-making model to compare and optimize grid-connected pricing in order to maximize profit of different parties in power supply chain. Then, this paper performs a numerical simulation, discusses the existence of the equilibrium analytical solutions to satisfy the supply chain coordination conditions and analyzes the optimal contract parameters’ variation characteristics and their interaction relationship. Findings The authors find that the expected profits of the parties in the hybrid power supply chain are concave about their decision variables in each decision-making mode. The revenue-sharing contract can realize the Pareto improvement for all parties’ interest of the supply chain, and promote the grid-connected quantity of green power effectively. The grid-connected price will reduce with the increase of revenue-sharing ratio, and this impact will be greater on the renewable energy power. The greater the competition intensity in power supply side, the smaller the revenue-sharing ratio from power purchaser. And for the same rangeability of competition intensity, the revenue-sharing ratio reduction of thermal power is less than that of the green power. The more the government subsidizing green power supplier, the smaller the retailer sharing revenue to it. Practical implications Facing with the dual uncertainties of green power output and market demand and the competition of thermal power in hybrid electricity market, this study can provide a path to solve the problem of renewable energy power grid-connecting. The results can help green power become competitive in hybrid power market under loose regulations. And this paper suggests that the government subsidy policy should be more tactical in order to implement a revenue-sharing contract of the power supply chain. Originality/value This paper studies the renewable energy electricity grid-connected pricing under the uncertainty of power supply and market demand, and compares different contract decision-making strategies in order to achieve the power supply chain coordination. The paper also analyzes the competition between thermal power and renewable energy power in hybrid electricity market.

Manufacturing and selling tactics for a green supply chain under a green cost sharing and a refund agreement

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 1419-1450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Mahsa Noori-Daryan ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Quality Item ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Refund Rate

Purpose This paper aims to deal with optimal pricing and production tactics for a bi-echelon green supply chain, including a producer and a vendor in presence of three various scenarios. Demand depends on a price, refund and quality where the producer controls quality and the vendor proposes a refund policy to purchasers to encourage them to order more. Design/methodology/approach In the first scenario, the members seek to optimize their optimum decision variables under a centralized decision-making method while in the second scenario, a decentralized system is assumed where the members make a decision about variables and profits under a non-cooperative game. In the third scenario, a cost-sharing agreement is concluded between the members to provide a high-quality item to the purchasers. Findings The performance of the proposed model is investigated by illustrating a numerical example. A sensitivity analysis of some key parameters has been done to study the effect of the changes on the optimal values of the decision variables and profits. From sensitivity analysis, the real features are observed and mentioned in this section. Originality/value This research examines the behavior of partners in a green supply chain facing with a group of purchasers whose demand is the function of a price, greenery degree and refund rate. This proposed mathematical model is developed and analyzed which has an implication in supply chain model.

Impact of carbon permit allocation rules on incentive contracts for carbon emission reduction

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1143-1167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinqin Li ◽  
Yujie Xiao ◽  
Yuzhuo Qiu ◽  
Xiaoling Xu ◽  
Caichun Chai
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Permit Allocation ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions. Design/methodology/approach The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared. Findings The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare. Practical implications These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals A Green Supply-Chain Decision Model for Energy-Saving Products That Accounts for Government Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Xiaoqing Ji ◽  
Yan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies

Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.

A two-period pricing model with hunger marketing strategy

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lili Yu ◽  
Juzhi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the effect of hunger marketing strategy on supply chain pricing and coordinate the supply chain through a two-period pricing model. Design/methodology/approach According to a two-period pricing model with hunger marketing strategy, the authors investigate two different scenarios: the centralized system and the decentralized system. The optimal or equilibrium solutions are calculated and compared in two different scenarios. Findings First, the hunger marketing strategy can improve the total profit of the supply chain by increasing the retail price and the total sales volume. Second, the hunger marketing strategy aggravates the double marginalization effect. Third, the authors introduce the revenue-sharing contract and characterize the conditions under which the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain and be accepted by both the members. Research limitations/implications First, the authors suppose the same retail price in two periods for mathematic simplicity; second, they do not consider the discount factor for the revenue during the two periods. Practical implications This paper provides a guide to policymakers in terms of product pricing and supply rate. Originality/value First, the authors suppose the same retail price in two periods for mathematic simplicity; second, they do not consider the discount factor for the revenue during the two periods.

Environmental sustainability of logistics service provider: an ANP-QFD approach

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasmine Siu Lee Lam ◽  
Jing Dai
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Green Supply Chain Management ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sustainability Performance ◽  
Logistics Service

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a methodology with systematic metrics for logistics service providers (LSPs) to develop their environmental sustainability performance in the context of green supply chain management. Design/methodology/approach – An integrated analytical approach which combines analytical network process (ANP) with quality function deployment (QFD) is proposed to develop LSPs’ environmental sustainability performance. In the approach, QFD is used to translate customer requirements (CRs) for “green” concerns into multiple criteria for LSP’s design requirements (DRs). ANP is used to analyze the inter-relationships among the various CRs and DRs. Findings – The effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated by applying it to a global LSP. A case study shows how the proposed “ANP-QFD” technique can be deployed to understand customers’ expectation for environment management and develop tactics and measures with the aim to achieve the desirable outcome for LSPs’ environmental sustainability performance. Practical implications – Firms that emphasize sustainability as a competitive priority will benefit by communicating sustainability efforts to customers. Therefore, “ANP-QFD” is an integrative method which helps develop LSPs’ environmental sustainability performance by enabling logistics managers incorporate the “voice” of customers for environmental concerns into their decision-making process. The study demonstrates how to develop LSPs to be greener in order to realize the requirements of green supply chains. The proposed integrated approach can also be applied in other decision-making scenarios for effective green supply chain management. Originality/value – Various approaches that can deal with multiple and conflicting criteria have been adopted for LSP assessment in the literature. However, they fail to include the impact of business objectives and the requirements of company stakeholders (customer in this study) in the identification of performance criteria for LSP. They also did not incorporate the environmental sustainability perspective. This paper contributes to the emerging research topic of environmental sustainability in logistics and supply chains by tackling these inadequacies in the literature. The study facilitates LSPs and the supply chains they serve in achieving better economic and environmental performance, thus leading to truly sustainable outcomes.

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