scholarly journals Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-528
Author(s):  
A. A. Withagen-Koster ◽  
R. C. van Kleef ◽  
F. Eijkenaar

AbstractMost health insurance markets with premium-rate restrictions include a risk equalization system to compensate insurers for predictable variation in spending. Recent research has shown, however, that even the most sophisticated risk equalization systems tend to undercompensate (overcompensate) groups of people with poor (good) self-reported health, confronting insurers with incentives for risk selection. Self-reported health measures are generally considered infeasible for use as an explicit ‘risk adjuster’ in risk equalization models. This study examines an alternative way to exploit this information, namely through ‘constrained regression’ (CR). To do so, we use administrative data (N = 17 m) and health survey information (N = 380 k) from the Netherlands. We estimate five CR models and compare these models with the actual Dutch risk equalization model of 2016 which was estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). In the CR models, the estimated coefficients are restricted, such that the under-/overcompensation for groups based on self-reported general health is reduced by 20, 40, 60, 80, or 100%. Our results show that CR can improve outcomes for groups that are not explicitly flagged by risk adjuster variables, but worsens outcomes for groups that are explicitly flagged by risk adjuster variables. Using a new standardized metric that summarizes under-/overcompensation for both types of groups, we find that the lighter constraints can lead to better outcomes than OLS.

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Paolucci ◽  
Andre Den Exter ◽  
Wynand Van De Ven

In this article we perform an economic analysis of different regulatory frameworks that aim at guaranteeing solidarity in competitive health insurance markets. Thereafter, we analyse the legal conformity of these intervention strategies with EC law. We find that risk compensation schemes are the first-best intervention strategy because they guarantee an ‘acceptable level of solidarity’ without hindering free trade and competition and without reducing efficiency. Second-best options are premium and excess-loss compensation schemes, which guarantee solidarity at the expense of some efficiency. Premium rate restrictions and open enrolment should be avoided because they reduce efficiency and are unnecessary, not proportional, and undesirable to the pursuit of the general good. These conclusions are relevant for EU countries that adopt premium rate restrictions and open enrolment in combination with a risk compensation scheme, such as Ireland and the Netherlands. In these countries policy makers should design the health insurance schemes in conformity with EC law, for example by replacing premium rate restrictions and open enrolment with premium and/or excess-loss compensation schemes.


Medical Care ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 448-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter J. A. Stam ◽  
René C. J. A. van Vliet ◽  
Wynand P. M. M. van de Ven

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wynand P. M. M. Van de Ven

AbstractIn this paper, we first deal with the rationale of risk adjustment and risk equalization in health insurance markets. Then we discuss the state of the art concerning the application of risk adjustment and risk equalization in practice. Finally, we focus on: What needs to be done?


2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan C. Monheit ◽  
Joel C. Cantor ◽  
Margaret Koller ◽  
Kimberley S. Fox

2021 ◽  
Vol Publish Ahead of Print ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon A. Ramo ◽  
Anna McClung ◽  
Chan-Hee Jo ◽  
James O. Sanders ◽  
Burt Yaszay ◽  
...  

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 75-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Glazer ◽  
Thomas G. McGuire

Abstract In many countries, competition among health plans or sickness funds raises issues of risk selection. Funds may discourage or encourage potential enrollees from joining, and these actions may have efficiency or fairness implications. This article reviews the experience in the U.S., and comments on the evidence for risk selection in Germany. There is little evidence that risk selection causes efficiency problems in Germany, but risk selection does lead to an inequality in contribution rates. A simple approach to equalizing contribution rates that does not involve risk adjustment is presented and discussed.


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