scholarly journals A comparison of individual and collective decision making for standard gamble and time trade-off

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-473
Author(s):  
Arthur E. Attema ◽  
Han Bleichrodt ◽  
Olivier l’Haridon ◽  
Stefan A. Lipman

AbstractQuality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) are typically derived from individual preferences over health episodes. This paper reports the first experimental investigation into the effects of collective decision making on health valuations, using both time trade-off (TTO) and standard gamble (SG) tasks. We investigated collective decision making in dyads, by means of a mixed-subjects design where we control for learning effects. Our data suggest that collective decision making has little effect on decision quality, as no effects were observed on decision consistency and monotonicity for both methods. Furthermore, QALY weights remained similar between individual and collective decisions, and the typical difference in elicited weights between TTO and SG was not affected. These findings suggest that consulting with others has little effect on health state valuation, although learning may have. Additionally, our findings add to the literature of the effect of collective decision making, suggesting that no such effect occurs for TTO and SG.

2014 ◽  
Vol 281 (1789) ◽  
pp. 20141016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy M. Aplin ◽  
Damien R. Farine ◽  
Richard P. Mann ◽  
Ben C. Sheldon

There is increasing evidence that animal groups can maintain coordinated behaviour and make collective decisions based on simple interaction rules. Effective collective action may be further facilitated by individual variation within groups, particularly through leader–follower polymorphisms. Recent studies have suggested that individual-level personality traits influence the degree to which individuals use social information, are attracted to conspecifics, or act as leaders/followers. However, evidence is equivocal and largely limited to laboratory studies. We use an automated data-collection system to conduct an experiment testing the relationship between personality and collective decision-making in the wild. First, we report that foraging flocks of great tits ( Parus major ) show strikingly synchronous behaviour. A predictive model of collective decision-making replicates patterns well, suggesting simple interaction rules are sufficient to explain the observed social behaviour. Second, within groups, individuals with more reactive personalities behave more collectively, moving to within-flock areas of higher density. By contrast, proactive individuals tend to move to and feed at spatial periphery of flocks. Finally, comparing alternative simulations of flocking with empirical data, we demonstrate that variation in personality promotes within-patch movement while maintaining group cohesion. Our results illustrate the importance of incorporating individual variability in models of social behaviour.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 20160544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isobel Watts ◽  
Máté Nagy ◽  
Theresa Burt de Perera ◽  
Dora Biro

In animal groups where certain individuals have disproportionate influence over collective decisions, the whole group's performance may suffer if these individuals possess inaccurate information. Whether in such situations leaders can be replaced in their roles by better-informed group mates represents an important question in understanding the adaptive consequences of collective decision-making. Here, we use a clock-shifting procedure to predictably manipulate the directional error in navigational information possessed by established leaders within hierarchically structured flocks of homing pigeons ( Columba livia ). We demonstrate that in the majority of cases when leaders hold inaccurate information they lose their influence over the flock. In these cases, inaccurate information is filtered out through the rearrangement of hierarchical positions, preventing errors by former leaders from propagating down the hierarchy. Our study demonstrates that flexible decision-making structures can be valuable in situations where ‘bad’ information is introduced by otherwise influential individuals.


Author(s):  
Jan-Harm de Villiers

This article examines the conflict between procedure and substance. Substance should be favoured above procedure because where substance is at the heart of a legitimacy mechanism, collective decision-making can take place that makes a positive contribution and constructs an ethical society. Lawfulness and morality should be connected to give practical effect to such a model. Apartheid laws were collective decisions that were procedurally lawful, but were morally unsatisfactory. When a citizen faces a law that is immoral, and in terms of Aquinas irrational, it is not a law at all, and it should be resisted.


Author(s):  
Rob LeGrand ◽  
Timothy Roden ◽  
Ron K. Cytron

This chapter explores a new approach that may be used in game development to help human players and/or non-player characters make collective decisions. The chapter describes how previous work can be applied to allow game players to form a consensus from a simple range of possible outcomes in such a way that no player can manipulate it at the expense of the other players. Then, the text extends that result and shows how nonmanipulable consensus can be found in higher-dimensional outcome spaces. The results may be useful when developing artificial intelligence for non-player characters or constructing frameworks to aid cooperation among human players.


2010 ◽  
Vol 278 (1712) ◽  
pp. 1697-1704 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Sueur ◽  
J. L. Deneubourg ◽  
O. Petit

Mechanisms related to collective decision making have recently been found in almost all animal reigns from amoebae to worms, insects and vertebrates, including human beings. Decision-making mechanisms related to collective movements—including pre-departure and joining—have already been studied at different steps of the movement process, but these studies were always carried out separately. We therefore have no understanding of how these different processes are related when they underlie the same collective decision-making event. Here, we consider the whole departure process of two groups of Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ), using a stochastic model. When several exclusive choices are proposed, macaques vote and choose the majority. Individuals then join the movement according to a mimetism based on affiliative relationships. The pre-departure quorum and the joining mimetic mechanism are probably linked, but we have not yet identified which transition mechanism is used. This study shows that decision-making related to macaque group movements is governed by a quorum rule combined with a selective mimetism at departure. This is the first time that transition mechanisms have been described in mammals, which consequently helps understand how a voting process leads to social amplification. Our study also provides the first complete proof that there is continuity in the decision-making processes underlying collective movements in mammals from the first intention movement right through to the last joiner.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
George Butler ◽  
Gabriella Pigozzi ◽  
Juliette Rouchier

In this article, we propose an agent-based model of opinion diffusion and voting where influence among individuals and deliberation in a group are mixed. The model is inspired from social modeling, as it describes an iterative process of collective decision-making that repeats a series of interindividual influences and collective deliberation steps, and studies the evolution of opinions and decisions in a group. It also aims at founding a comprehensive model to describe collective decision-making as a combination of two different paradigms: argumentation theory and ABM-influence models, which are not obvious to combine as a formal link between them is required. In our model, we find that deliberation, through the exchange of arguments, reduces the variance of opinions and the proportion of extremists in a population as long as not too much deliberation takes place in the decision processes. Additionally, if we define the correct collective decisions in the system in terms of the arguments that should be accepted, allowing for more deliberation favors convergence towards the correct decisions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406612098788
Author(s):  
Thomas Dörfler ◽  
Thomas Gehring

We examine how analogy-based collective decision-making of member states contributes to the endogenous emergence of informal rules and the incremental change of international organizations (IOs). Decision-making by analogy is an important characteristic of day-to-day decision-making in IOs. Relating current decisions to previous ones through analogies drives incremental change and simultaneously reinforces organizational resilience. Whereas the foreign policy analysis literature shows that analogies can be used as cognitive shortcuts in fuzzy and complex foreign policy situations, we focus on their use to overcome social ambiguity (indeterminacy) of coordination situations in IOs. Drawing on psychological conceptions, we develop two micro-level mechanisms that elucidate the effects of analogy-based collective decision-making in member-driven IOs. Analogy-based collective decisions emphasizing similarity between a current situation and previous ones follow an established problem schema and produce expansive and increasingly well-established informal rules. Collective decisions that are analogy-based but emphasize a crucial difference follow different problem schemas and trigger the emergence of additional informal rules that apply to new classes of cases. The result is an increasingly fine-grained web of distinct organizational solutions for a growing number of problems. Accordingly, an IO can increasingly facilitate collective decision-making and gains resilience. Empirically, we probe these propositions with a documentary analysis of decision-making in the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, established by the United Nations Security Council to deal with a stream of requests for exempting certain goods or services from the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in response to the War in the Balkans.


2019 ◽  
Vol 252 ◽  
pp. 03003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edyta Kucharska ◽  
Katarzyna Grobler-Dębska ◽  
Radosław Klimek

The paper presents a collective decision making in dynamic vehicle routing problem. In contrast to the static problem, a part or all of the customers’ companies are revealed dynamically during the design or execution of the routes. The problem is modelled using the algebraic-logical meta-model (ALMM) methodology, which enables making collective decisions in successive process stages, not separately for individual vehicles. ALMM is considered to be the rule according to which the availability of companies is determined. The steps and schematics of the general algorithm that take into account the dynamic appearance of new companies are shown. The proposed approach belongs to trajectory-based metaheuristics methods.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Addison Pan ◽  
Simona Fabrizi ◽  
Steffen Lippert

Abstract We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority.


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