scholarly journals A guide to extending and implementing generalized risk-adjusted cost-effectiveness (GRACE)

Author(s):  
Darius N. Lakdawalla ◽  
Charles E. Phelps

AbstractThe generalized risk-adjusted cost-effectiveness (GRACE) model generalizes conventional cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) by introducing diminishing returns to Health-Related Quality of Life (QoL). This changes CEA practice in three ways: (1) Willingness to pay (WTP) increases exponentially with untreated illness severity or pre-existing permanent disability, and WTP ends up lower for mild diseases but higher for severe diseases compared with conventional CEA; (2) Average treatment effectiveness should be adjusted for uncertainty in outcomes; and (3) The marginal rate of substitution between life expectancy and QoL varies with health state. Implementing GRACE requires new parameters describing risk preferences over QoL, the marginal rate of substitution between life expectancy (LE) and QoL, and the variance and skewness of treatment outcomes distributions. In this paper, we provide: (1) a generalized WTP threshold incorporating the possibility of permanent disability; (2) a simpler method to estimate the tradeoff rate between QoL and LE, eliminating the need to carry out treatment-by-treatment estimates; (3) a more-general method to adjust WTP for illness severity that permits non-constant relative risk-aversion in QoL; (4) a new approach to estimating risk-preferences over QoL, leveraging established empirical methods from “happiness” economics; and (5) a step-by-step guide for practitioners wishing to implement multi-period GRACE analyses.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chee Hon Chan

Abstract Background Research has highlighted that satisfaction in health and social support are key areas of life affecting individual’s wellbeing. Many social and public health initiatives use these two intervention mechanisms to improve individual’s wellbeing. For the purpose of cost-benefit assessment, there has been growing interest in expressing these intervention effects in economic terms. However, only a handful of studies have ever estimated these effects in economic terms, and none of which examined in a Chinese context. The aim of this study is to extend this line of valuation work to estimate the implicit willingness-to-pays on the effects of improving individuals’ self-rated health status (SRH) and social support (SS) on their life satisfaction in the Chinese population. Methods Using individual’s life satisfaction data from a two-wave representative panel survey in Hong Kong (n = 1,109), this study first conducted a cross-lagged analysis with structural equation modelling technique to examine the causal effects of SRH and SS on life satisfaction, while simultaneously adjusting their reverse causal influences. The use of this cross-lagged approach was the effort to minimising the endogeneity problem. Then, substituting the respective estimates to the formulae of compensating surplus, the marginal rate of substitution of SRH and SS with respect to individual’s equivalised monthly household were estimated and were then expressed as the willingness-to-pays on the effect of improving individuals’ SRH and SS on their life satisfaction. Results The cross-lagged analysis ascertained the casual effects of SRH (β = 0.078, 95%CI: 0.020, 0.151) and SS on individuals’ satisfaction with life. The sample’s marginal rate of substitution of SRH and SS were found to be 1.28 (95%CI: 0.43, 2.15) and 1.36 (95%CI: 0.23, 2.49) respectively. Translating into the concept of compensating surplus, the implicit monetary values of improving the sample’s SRH from “poor health” to “excellent health” and their SS from “little support” to “a lot of support” are equivalent to an increase in their equivalised monthly household income by HK$56,000 and HK$39,400 respectively. Conclusions This study has implications for the cost-benefit assessment in wellbeing initiatives for the Chinese population.


SERIEs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Besada ◽  
Javier García ◽  
Miguel Mirás ◽  
Carmen Vázquez

2015 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Andre Chiappori ◽  
Murat Iyigun ◽  
Yoram Weiss

Abstract:We reconsider the well-known Becker–Coase (BC) theorem according to which changes in divorce law should not affect divorce rates. We do that in a context of households that consume public goods in addition to private goods. For the Becker–Coase theorem to hold in this setting, utility must be transferable both within marriage and upon divorce, and the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption needs to be invariant in marital status. We show that if divorce alters the way some goods are consumed (either because some goods that are public in marriage become private in divorce or because divorce affects either the marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods or even the cardinalization of a spouse’s utility), then the Becker–Coase theorem holds only for very specific preferences. We conclude that, in general, divorce laws will influence the divorce rate, although the impact of a change in divorce laws can go in either direction.


SERIEs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Martinez-Gorricho ◽  
Miguel Sanchez Villalba

AbstractWe generalize the disutility of effort function in the linear-Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) pure moral hazard model. We assume that agents are heterogeneous in ability. Each agent’s ability is observable and treated as a parameter that indexes the disutility of effort associated with the task performed. In opposition to the literature (the “traditional” scenario), we find a new, “novel” scenario, in which a high-ability agent may be offered a weaker incentive contract than a low-ability one, but works harder. We characterize the conditions for the existence of these two scenarios: formally, the “traditional” (“novel”) scenario occurs if and only if the marginal rate of substitution of the marginal disutility of effort function is increasing (decreasing) in effort when evaluated at the second-best effort. If, further, this condition holds for all parameter values and matching is endogenous, less (more) talented agents work for principals with riskier projects in equilibrium. This implies that the indirect and total effects of risk on incentives are negative under monotone assortative matching.


Author(s):  
G. Khatskevich ◽  
A. Pranevich ◽  
M. Chajkovskij

The article is devoted to the study of inverse problems of identifying two-factor production functions from given marginal rate of technical substitution. The analytical forms of twofactor production functions with given linear-fractionalmarginal rate of technical substitution of labor by capital. Classes of two-factor production functions that correspond to given (constant, linear, linear-fractional, exponential, etc.) marginal rate of technical substitution areindicated. The obtained results can be applied in modeling of production processes.


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