Divorced from Citizenship: Palestinian-Christian Women between the Church and the Jewish State

The vast multidisciplinary literature on marital dissolution tends to conceptualize divorce as a personal, individualist act that naturally resides in the domestic sphere. The article challenges this prevailing scholarly perspective by dissecting a substantially underexplored dimension of divorce as a citizenship-certifying act located squarely in the public sphere. Drawing on a pioneering qualitative study among Palestinian Christians in Israel as a case study, we argue that Israel’s divorce law, which locks Catholics into indissoluble marriages, should be recognized as a key state instrument for delineating the contours of citizenship—a boundary-demarcating apparatus between insiders and outsiders who are excluded from full and equal membership. The article provides novel insights into the complex interrelations between divorce, gender, and citizenship, showing how Palestinian-Christian women pay the price of a purportedly sex-neutral, no-exit regime. The article also illuminates a seldom-studied phenomenon we call “divorce conversion”: the act of changing one’s denomination for the sake of marital freedom, which is a hallmark of Palestinian-Christians’ third-rate status in the Jewish state. We conclude that divorce should be reconceptualized as a right to egalitarian female citizenship, serving as a basic precursor to women’s full participation in all spheres of life.

Taking the Stand: Women as Witnesses in New Zealand’s Colonial Courts c.1840-1900

<p>The study considers women as witnesses in New Zealand’s colonial courts from c.1840 to 1900. An analysis of women as witnesses adds another dimension to what is known about the everyday but often compelling presence of women in New Zealand’s colonial courts. In 1840 British law was formally implemented in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The law’s institutional structures would soon follow. In 1841 the Supreme Court was established followed by the Resident Magistrate Courts in 1846. The courts were a part of formal British governance. While women were excluded from serving as judges, barristers, solicitors, court officials and jury members, they did appear before the courts as victims, defendants, spectators and witnesses. Being a witness was the only form of verbal participation women could undertake in the court processes during the nineteenth century. Existing scholarly work has tended to concentrate on women appearing in the courts in the nineteenth century as victims or defendants. This study explores the complex agency of women using the law and as active participants in its deliberations. Four substantive chapters consider women as witnesses in cases involving petty offences, violent crime, civil cases and the Native Land Court and finally cases of divorce, bigamy and action of breach of promise of marriage. Courts were significant public places in colonial New Zealand. They were places where disputes were settled, grievances could be aired, conduct was put on trial and order was maintained. A long established element of the legal tradition was that unprejudiced and fair justice could only be assured if the courts were open and public spaces. Thus, the witness stand was a place where women had a public voice. Women’s eligibility to appear as witnesses in the court changed over the period under study. In 1840 when British law formally arrived in New Zealand women were restricted in the cases and circumstances in which they could take the stand. Wives were unable to give evidence in cases involving their husbands. From 1843 to 1889 gradual changes to evidence law allowed women to take the stand in different ways and by 1900 women appeared as witnesses in case types ranging from civil actions to the most violent offences in the criminal law. Changes in married women’s property law in 1860, and more significantly in 1884 and divorce law from 1867 generally extended the number and kind of cases in which women gave testimony in the courts. From the 1860s the Native Land Court became a familiar place for many Māori women forced to resort to the Court to establish title over land. Evidence suggests women’s knowledge of whakapapa and the oral histories of iwi and hapū were vital on the witness stand to ‘prove’ their link with land. The study shows the variety of ways in which the courts were places where women spoke on a public stage, and where their words were often recorded and reported on as part of the official proceedings of the justice system. As witnesses they were also in courtrooms where they watched and were watched in a public domain and their words were heard long before they had any say in political representation. Once women had the vote, from 1893, they were eager to reform the justice system: seeking the opportunity for women to serve on juries, to serve as police, to qualify as lawyers, and in reforming the most egregious injustices such as the differential grounds for wives and husbands to petition for divorce. The application of the law, and the making of the law, proved uneven but had closely interrelated phases in the history of women in colonial New Zealand.</p>

Taking the Stand: Women as Witnesses in New Zealand’s Colonial Courts c.1840-1900

<p>The study considers women as witnesses in New Zealand’s colonial courts from c.1840 to 1900. An analysis of women as witnesses adds another dimension to what is known about the everyday but often compelling presence of women in New Zealand’s colonial courts. In 1840 British law was formally implemented in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The law’s institutional structures would soon follow. In 1841 the Supreme Court was established followed by the Resident Magistrate Courts in 1846. The courts were a part of formal British governance. While women were excluded from serving as judges, barristers, solicitors, court officials and jury members, they did appear before the courts as victims, defendants, spectators and witnesses. Being a witness was the only form of verbal participation women could undertake in the court processes during the nineteenth century. Existing scholarly work has tended to concentrate on women appearing in the courts in the nineteenth century as victims or defendants. This study explores the complex agency of women using the law and as active participants in its deliberations. Four substantive chapters consider women as witnesses in cases involving petty offences, violent crime, civil cases and the Native Land Court and finally cases of divorce, bigamy and action of breach of promise of marriage. Courts were significant public places in colonial New Zealand. They were places where disputes were settled, grievances could be aired, conduct was put on trial and order was maintained. A long established element of the legal tradition was that unprejudiced and fair justice could only be assured if the courts were open and public spaces. Thus, the witness stand was a place where women had a public voice. Women’s eligibility to appear as witnesses in the court changed over the period under study. In 1840 when British law formally arrived in New Zealand women were restricted in the cases and circumstances in which they could take the stand. Wives were unable to give evidence in cases involving their husbands. From 1843 to 1889 gradual changes to evidence law allowed women to take the stand in different ways and by 1900 women appeared as witnesses in case types ranging from civil actions to the most violent offences in the criminal law. Changes in married women’s property law in 1860, and more significantly in 1884 and divorce law from 1867 generally extended the number and kind of cases in which women gave testimony in the courts. From the 1860s the Native Land Court became a familiar place for many Māori women forced to resort to the Court to establish title over land. Evidence suggests women’s knowledge of whakapapa and the oral histories of iwi and hapū were vital on the witness stand to ‘prove’ their link with land. The study shows the variety of ways in which the courts were places where women spoke on a public stage, and where their words were often recorded and reported on as part of the official proceedings of the justice system. As witnesses they were also in courtrooms where they watched and were watched in a public domain and their words were heard long before they had any say in political representation. Once women had the vote, from 1893, they were eager to reform the justice system: seeking the opportunity for women to serve on juries, to serve as police, to qualify as lawyers, and in reforming the most egregious injustices such as the differential grounds for wives and husbands to petition for divorce. The application of the law, and the making of the law, proved uneven but had closely interrelated phases in the history of women in colonial New Zealand.</p>

Islam, Fatwa dan Negara: Meretas Pluralisme Hukum Perceraian di Aceh

The pluralism of divorce in Aceh has had an impact on the current practice of divorce. Fatwa, Jurisprudence, and the State also color the pluralism of divorce law, each of which has a normative and sociological power base. The Aceh MPU's fatwa tends to legitimize divorce regulated in fiqh books while the State has a different view of divorce law. This paper is a doctrinal study with a legal pluralism approach. This article argues that in substance there is a significant difference between the divorce provisions in the fatwa, fiqh, and state law. Fatwa and fiqh share the same view that divorce without witnesses and taking place outside the court is still valid, as well as triple talaq, whether pronounced cumulatively or separately, is still subject to triple talaq, this provision is different from divorce law which is regulated by the state and practiced in religious courts.

THE LAW APPLICABLE TO DIVORCE ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ROMANIAN CIVIL CODE

The article aims to study the provisions concerning the law applicable to divorce according to art. 2597 and art 2600 of the Romanian Civil Code (2011e, 2011f). The article aims to answer the following questions: 1. What is the law applicable to divorce by choice of law agreement? 2. What is the law applicable to divorce in the absence of a choice of law agreement? 3. What does recognition of divorce by unilateral termination entail? 4. What is the scope of divorce law?

The Survival of Sharia Islamic Divorce Law in the Syrian and Egyptian Personal Status Laws

The family law was not codified in both Syria and Egypt until 1917 when the Ottomans issued the Ottoman Family Rights Law, which applied to Muslims, Christians, and Jews each according to its provisions. This Ottoman Family Rights Law and the book of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Qadri Pasha (‘Legal Ruling on Personal Status’) formed the first core of personal status laws in both Egypt and Syria, which s explains the survival of Islamic law to this day in personal status laws, in contrast to other branches of law. This paper presents a comparative study between the Egyptian Personal Status Law No. 25 of 1920, and the Syrian Personal Status Law No. 59 of 1953, regarding divorce provisions.

Critical Review of Domestic Violence as Reason for Divorce (Comparison of Divorce Laws in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Maldives)

The phenomenon of domestic violence is on the rise every year and often puts a marriage into divorce. Divorce on the grounds of domestic violence frequently appears in the courtroom of Religious Courts in Indonesia as stipulated in Article 19 letter d PP No. 9 of 1975. It affirms that one party committing cruelty or severe persecution that endangers another party can be the legal reason for divorce. And then what about other Muslim countries? This research is library research with a descriptive-analytical method using a juridical normative approach. It found that domestic violence is accommodated as one of the reasons for divorce in family law in Indonesia, Malaysia (Negeri Sembilan, Persekutuan Pulau Pinang, Selangor dan Johor), and the Maldives. However, there are differences in granting the right for filing a divorce because of domestic violence. Divorce law in Indonesia and Malaysia enables both husband and wife to file for divorce because of domestic violence while Maldives law only enables the wife to do so. Fenomena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga selalu meningkat setiap tahunnya dan seringkali menjadi sebab perceraian. Perceraian karena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga sering muncul di ruang sidang pengadilan agama di Indonesia. Ini sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 19 huruf d PP No. 9 Tahun 1975 bahwa salah satu pihak yang melakukan kekejaman atau penganiayaan berat yang membahayakan pihak lain dapat menjadi alasan hukum terjadinya perceraian. Lalu bagaimana dengan di negara-negara Muslim lainnya? Penelitian ini termasuk dalam penelitian pustaka (library research) yang bersifat deskriptif analitis dengan pendekatan normatif yuridis. Dalam penelitian ini diperoleh temuan bahwa kekerasan dalam rumah tangga diakomodir sebagai alasan perceraian dalam hukum keluarga di Indonesia, Malaysia (Negeri sembilan, Persekutuan Pulau Pinang, Selangor dan Johor), maupun Maladewa. Hanya saja, terdapat perbedaan dalam hak mengajukan perceraian karena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga. Hukum perceraian di Indonesia dan Malaysia membolehkan kedua belah pihak untuk mengajukan perceraian karena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga, sementara hukum Maladewa hanya memungkinkan pihak istri.

Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce

This article suggests an alternative way of thinking about the role of law at the time of divorce. It is concerned primarily with the impact of the legal system on negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom. One sees the primary function of contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution rights and responsibilities. This process by which parties to a marriage are empowered to create their own legally enforceable commitments is a form of “private ordering.” Whether or not one accepts the desirability of private ordering, it is clear that most divorcing couples do not require adjudication of their disputes. The article then analyzes how the legal system affects the bargaining behavior of divorcing couples, before presenting a theory of divorce bargaining. It also considers the role of lawyers and courts in divorce.