Bounded Rationality, Group Formation and the Emergence of Trust: An Agent-Based Economic Model

Author(s):  
Jefferson Satoshi Kato ◽  
Adriana Sbicca
Author(s):  
Joshua M. Epstein

This part describes the agent-based and computational model for Agent_Zero and demonstrates its capacity for generative minimalism. It first explains the replicability of the model before offering an interpretation of the model by imagining a guerilla war like Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq, where events transpire on a 2-D population of contiguous yellow patches. Each patch is occupied by a single stationary indigenous agent, which has two possible states: inactive and active. The discussion then turns to Agent_Zero's affective component and an elementary type of bounded rationality, as well as its social component, with particular emphasis on disposition, action, and pseudocode. Computational parables are then presented, including a parable relating to the slaughter of innocents through dispositional contagion. This part also shows how the model can capture three spatially explicit examples in which affect and probability change on different time scales.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 13-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Lorscheid ◽  
Matthias Meyer

Purpose This study aims to demonstrate how agent-based simulation (ABS) may provide a computational testbed for mechanism design using concepts of bounded rationality (BR). ABS can be used to systematically derive and formalize different models of BR. This allows us to identify the cognitive preconditions for behavior intended by the mechanism and thereby to derive implications for the design of mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach Based on an analysis of the requirements of the decision context, the authors describe a systematic way of incorporating different BR concepts into an agent learning model. The approach is illustrated by analyzing an incentive scheme suggested for truthful reporting in budgeting contexts, which is an adapted Groves mechanism scheme. Findings The study describes systematic ways in which to derive BR agents for research questions where behavioral aspects might matter. The authors show that BR concepts may lead to other outcomes than the intended truth-inducing effect. A modification of the mechanism to more distinguishable levels of payments improves the results in terms of the intended effect. Research limitations/implications The presented BR concepts as simulated by agent models cannot model human behavior in its full complexity. The simplification of complex human behavior is a useful analytical construct for the controlled analysis of a few aspects and an understanding of the potential consequences of those aspects of human behavior for mechanism design. Originality/value The paper specifies the idea of a computational testbed for mechanism design based on BR concepts. Beyond this, a systematic and stepwise approach is shown to formalize bounded rational behavior by agents based on a requirements analysis, including benchmark models for the comparison and evaluation of BR concepts.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. S. Askar ◽  
A. Al-khedhairi

In this paper, the Caputo derivative with fractional orders is suggested to model a competition among four competing firms. The proposed economic model that describes this competition is constructed based on a generalization of the traditional bounded rationality. In this generalization, we study the influence of memory parameter on the complex behavior of the model. Memory means that we not only take into account the changes in quantities at a current time, but also study the changes occurring in the quantities during an interval of time. For simplicity, it is assumed that the degree of memory is described by one parameter during that interval. The properties of the proposed model such as stability of equilibria, bifurcation, and chaos are studied. Furthermore, we introduce and study the cooperation that may take place among the four firms using Keeney-Raiffa approach.


Author(s):  
Einar Jón Erlingsson ◽  
Marco Raberto ◽  
Hlynur Stefánsson ◽  
Jón Thór Sturluson

Author(s):  
Roger Koppl

The division of labor creates a division of knowledge, which creates expertise and the problem of experts. The rule of experts exists when experts have an epistemic monopoly and choose for others. Generally, experts may have power that threatens individual autonomy. Competition tends to dissipate the power of experts, although the details of market structure matter. Even well-meaning experts may fail because they have bounded rationality. Epistemic monopoly increases the risks of error and expert failure; competition reduces them. Information choice theory is an economic theory of experts. It may help in the design of epistemic systems, which are agent-based processes viewed from perspective of their knowledge properties. Epistemic engineering studies the design principles of epistemic systems. Economists should consider the epistemic properties of alternative institutions to minimize the problem of experts and avoid the rule of experts. Applications discussed include religion, law and justice, and medical research.


2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (17n19) ◽  
pp. 2376-2386 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHU-HENG CHEN ◽  
BIN-TZONG CHIE

No matter how commonly the term innovation has been used in economics, a concrete analytical or computational model of innovation is not yet available. This paper argues that a breakthrough can be made with genetic programming, and proposes a functional-modularity approach to an agent-based computational economic model of innovation.


Author(s):  
Fabrizio Messina ◽  
Giuseppe Pappalardo ◽  
Domenico Rosaci ◽  
Corrado Santoro ◽  
Giuseppe M. L. Sarné

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