scholarly journals Can Reminders of Rules Induce Compliance? Experimental Evidence from a Common Pool Resource Setting

Author(s):  
Sabrina Eisenbarth ◽  
Louis Graham ◽  
Anouk S. Rigterink

AbstractThis paper presents results from an RCT exploring whether a behavioural intervention can improve the conservation of a common pool resource. The literature on common pool resource management suggests that the existence of rules and sanctions is important to resource conservation. However, behavioural science suggests that individuals have finite cognitive capacity and may not be attentive to these rules and sanctions. This paper investigates the impact of an SMS message intervention designed to improve users’ knowledge of and attentiveness to existing forest use rules. An RCT in Uganda explores the impact of these messages on forest use and compliance with the rules. This paper finds that SMS messages raise the perceived probability of sanctions for rule-breakers. However, SMS messages do not induce full compliance with forest use rules or systematically reduce forest use.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
ALIN HALIMATUSSADIAH

The use of classroom experiment as teaching method in economic courses is increasing overtime. However, it is not widely used in developing world. In the experiment, students can learn using their own experience how economic agents behave and how they make decisions in a certain situation setting. This paper aims to describe the advantage of the method, practical issues in conducting classroom experiment, and examples of two classrooms experimental games in natural resource and environmental economics course: a public goods game and a CPR (common pool resource) game. In the games we introduce different rules of the game to give an understanding the impact of different rules of the game to the result of the game. We also discussed the relation between individual characteristics and his/her decision in the game.   Keywords: classroom experiment, public goods game, CPR (common-pool resource) game, natural resource and environmental economics


2011 ◽  
Vol 70 (9) ◽  
pp. 1599-1608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Prediger ◽  
Björn Vollan ◽  
Markus Frölich

2022 ◽  
pp. 100185
Author(s):  
Chelsie L. Romulo ◽  
Chris J. Kennedy ◽  
Michael P. Gilmore ◽  
Bryan A. Endress

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Freeman ◽  
Christopher M. Anderson

Hydrology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Francisco Muñoz-Arriola ◽  
Tarik Abdel-Monem ◽  
Alessandro Amaranto

Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document