scholarly journals CLASSROOM EXPERIMENT AS A TEACHING METHOD IN NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS COURSE EKSPERIMEN KELAS SEBAGAI METODE PEMBELAJARAN DALAM MATA AJAR EKONOMI SUMBER DAYA ALAM DAN LINGKUNGAN

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
ALIN HALIMATUSSADIAH
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Teaching Method ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Classroom Experiment ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The use of classroom experiment as teaching method in economic courses is increasing overtime. However, it is not widely used in developing world. In the experiment, students can learn using their own experience how economic agents behave and how they make decisions in a certain situation setting. This paper aims to describe the advantage of the method, practical issues in conducting classroom experiment, and examples of two classrooms experimental games in natural resource and environmental economics course: a public goods game and a CPR (common pool resource) game. In the games we introduce different rules of the game to give an understanding the impact of different rules of the game to the result of the game. We also discussed the relation between individual characteristics and his/her decision in the game.   Keywords: classroom experiment, public goods game, CPR (common-pool resource) game, natural resource and environmental economics

The impact of lotteries on cooperation in the public goods game

2018 ◽  
Vol 512 ◽  
pp. 925-934 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Yang ◽  
Tong Chen ◽  
Qiao Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Impact

The impact of expressing willingness to cooperate on cooperation in public goods game

2020 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 110258
Author(s):  
Yuhang Jiao ◽  
Tong Chen ◽  
Qiao Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

scholarly journals The Influence of the Benefit Redistribution Method on the Willingness to Voluntary Contribute to Public Goods Provision Classroom Experiment

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-395
Author(s):  
Jana Péliová
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Individual Point ◽  
Laboratory Classroom ◽  
Classroom Experiment

Currently we are facing Covid 19 pandemics and it opens many questions about willingness of individuals to give up some private pleasure to contribute to public wellbeing. Theoretical economic research suggest that methodology of group account distribution does affect the contribution size. Lawyers, politicians and economists try to answer these questions using various scientific approaches and methods. One of them is to examine the willingness of individuals to contribute to public goods. Using a laboratory classroom experiment, we test various situations through public goods game. We examine whether economic entities are willing to contribute in situations when it is not advantageous for them from an individual point of view, but it is advantageous for society.

scholarly journals The role of common pool resource institutions in the implementation of Swiss natural resource management policy

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-David Gerber ◽  
Stéphane Nahrath ◽  
Emmanuel Reynard ◽  
Luzius Thomi
Keyword(s):  
Resource Management ◽  
Natural Resource Management ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Management Policy ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool

The impact of culture and ecology on cooperation in a common-pool resource experiment

2011 ◽  
Vol 70 (9) ◽  
pp. 1599-1608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Prediger ◽  
Björn Vollan ◽  
Markus Frölich
Keyword(s):  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 475 (2227) ◽  
pp. 20190349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinhai Fang ◽  
Tina P. Benko ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Haiyan Xu ◽  
Qingmei Tan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Individual Incentive ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.

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