On Knowing What’s Right and Being Responsible for It

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
The Right ◽  
Central Claim

The debate about whether moral responsibility has an epistemic condition has traditionally focused on whether and, if so, when moral ignorance can provide an excuse for wrong actions. This chapter takes up the question of moral responsibility for right actions. Its central claim is that whether an agent is morally responsible for her right action depends on whether she knows what the right thing is to do. The chapter’s argument for this appeals to considerations from the philosophy of action. It argues that moral knowledge matters to moral evaluations because it is a central ingredient in intentional action. Our knowledge of what the right and wrong thing is to do partly determines whether we do the right or wrong thing intentionally. Moral responsibility inherits its epistemic condition from the epistemic condition on intentional action.

scholarly journals Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
High Time ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Quality Of Will ◽  
Independent Condition ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Full Volume

Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, and it is high time for a full volume on the topic. The chapters in this volume address the following central questions. Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one’s culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one’s action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one’s quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?

Blame and Moral Ignorance

2019 ◽  
pp. 84-108
Author(s):  
Brian Weatherson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Popular View ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Action

This chapter argues against the popular view that acting in accordance with one’s principles excuses moral wrongdoing. That is, if one is ignorant of the moral truth, and that ignorance explains one’s wrong actions in the right way, one shouldn’t be blamed for doing the wrong thing. One objection I raise is that there is no good way to make sense of the notion of the ignorance explaining the action in the right way. Another, linking back to the discussion of moral motivation, is that it is rare for moral ignorance to lead to wrong action in the absence of some other blameworthy moral failing. But the chapter ends on a concessive note; there are some rare cases where a false moral belief could excuse certain wrong actions.

Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far

2019 ◽  
pp. 165-185
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Harman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Moral Ignorance

This paper argues for answers to two questions, and then identifies a tension between the two answers. First, regarding the implications of moral ignorance for moral responsibility: “Do false moral views exculpate?” Does believing that one is acting morally permissibly render one blameless? It does not. Second, in moral epistemology: “Can moral testimony provide moral knowledge?” It can (even granting some worries about moral deference). The tension: If moral testimony can provide moral knowledge, then surely it can provide justified false moral belief. But surely there is no blameworthiness in a case in which a person acts on a justified false moral belief. So surely some false moral views do exculpate. This tension can be resolved by adoption of the view that moral testimony cannot provide justified false moral belief; this view relies on the fact that whether a belief is justified is sensitive to an agent’s total evidence.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

Doing One's Reasonable Best: What Moral Responsibility Requires

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN MONTMINY
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
General Condition ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Michael Zimmerman

ABSTRACT:Moral responsibility, I argue, requires agents to do what is within their abilities to act morally. This means that an agent is to blame just in case his wrongdoing is due to an underperformance, that is, to a failure to do what he can to act morally. I defend this account by considering a skeptical argument about responsibility put forth by Gideon Rosen and by Michael Zimmerman. I explain why the epistemic condition they endorse is inadequate and why my alternative epistemic condition, which directly follows from my general condition on culpability, should be preferred. I then defend my view against potential criticisms.

Hegel on Sophocles’ Oedipus the King and the Moral Accountability of Ancient Tragic Heroes

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Falkenstern
Keyword(s):  
Historical Account ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Tragic Hero ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis paper argues that Hegel’s account of subjectivity and agency as historically coined is essential to an accurate understanding of his theory of tragedy. Focusing on Sophocles’ Oedipus the King, I argue that Hegel’s historical account of agency is necessary for understanding his theory of the ancient tragic hero. Although Hegel’s theory of ancient tragedy is often described in terms of a conflict between ethical spheres embodied in two individuals, the conflict in Oedipus is between Oedipus’ deeds and his later knowledge of what has actually occurred. I show how this seemingly subjective conflict is in keeping with Hegel’s theory. Further, while Hegel sees Oedipus as wrong to take full moral accountability for the consequences of his deeds, at the same time, for Hegel, this is the right action for a tragic hero, and the very thing that renders Oedipus timelessly and tragically heroic, rather than a mere victim of fate.

scholarly journals The Human Right to Political Participation

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabienne Peter
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Political Participation ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Right ◽  
Governance Processes ◽  
Central Claim

In recent developments in political and legal philosophy, there is a tendency to endorse minimalist lists of human rights that do not include a right to political participation. Against such tendencies, I shall argue that the right to political participation, understood as distinct from a right to democracy, should have a place even on minimalist lists. In addition, I shall defend the need to extend the right to political participation to include participation not just in national, but also in international and global governance processes. The argument will be based on a cosmopolitan conception of political legitimacy and on a political conception of human rights that is normatively anchored in legitimacy. The central claim of my paper is that a right to political participation is necessary – but not sufficient – for political legitimacy in the global realm.

scholarly journals «The Right Thing» and «The Wrong Thing» as a Result of Discerning Signals

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-173
Author(s):  
Tatiana Muzychuk ◽  
Igor Anokhov
Keyword(s):  
External Noise ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Physical Level ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

The article is dedicated to studying the process of information perception by an individual. A hypothesis is suggested that the environment that surrounds an individual is full of different signals, which have na­tural, social or technogenic origin. Separate signals can turn into information, if the recipient is able of discerning these signals and perceives them on the physical, intellectual, emotional and axiological levels of information perception. Whereas the complex of signals which are indiscernible for an individual are external noise. The authors state that interpretation of a signal by individuals begins on the physical level of perception which is necessary to synchronize their activity with that of the source of the signal. After that the individual has to move to the axiological level of information perception in order to coordinate the notions and meanings with the source of the signal. Furthermore, the authors substantiate the possibility of revealing two components in the structure of the discerned signal: «The Right Thing» and «The Wrong Thing» as an inherent beginning of any process of perceiving the outside world by an individual. The suggested hypothesis is illustrated in the article by the example of two kinds of information message: a painting by A. Deyneka and a poem by A. Blok which are studied in terms of the proposed hypothesis about the existence of levels of information perception and the possibility of discerning two basic elements in them: «The Right Thing» and «The Wrong Thing». The results of the research can be applied to improve the process of communicating and perceiving information.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

Moral psychology, for purposes of this volume, encompasses issues in metaethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action, including questions concerning the objectivity of morality, the relationship between moral judgment and emotion, the nature of the emotions, free will, and moral responsibility, and the structure of the mind as that is relevant to the possibility of moral action and judgment. Nietzsche’s “naturalism” is introduced and explained, and certain confusions about its meaning are addressed. An overview of the volume follows

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